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Japanese Cultural Trade Barriers : 
A New Generation of Issues in International Trade 
Martyn Taylor• 
This paper explores the theme of cultural barriers to international trade. However, in order to simplify an 
extraordinarily complex subject, the writer assesses the situation for a single country: Japan. Jn particular, this paper details the 
nature of selected Japanese trade barriers, reveals their cultural basis and then appraises the international legal techniques that 
may be applied to overcome them. This paper also considers recent developments in this field of trade law and suggests that 
archetypes for resolving cultural trade barriers are now provided by the Structural Impediments ]nititative and the proposed 
APEC Dispute Mediation Service. Finally, this paper briefly critiques a proposal mooted by the Japanese Ambassador to New 
Zealand in 1994; he suggested the establishment of a Japan - New Zealand 'Vispute Management Committee". 
I INTRODUCTION 
Within the past five decades the global community has achieved considerable 
success in eliminating many of the more formal restrictions to international trade. Successive 
rounds of multilateral negotiations have progressively lowered the tariff and quota barriers 
that were proving so inhibitive to global commerce. Yet, as these formal restrictions to trade 
have incrementally diminished, additional, more subtle impediments to international trade 
have been exposed. 1 These newly emerging trade barriers are typically extremely complex in 
character and often appear intractable. In the most difficult situations they embody deeply 
entrenched cultural patterns. They are rapidly forming a new dimension of legal issues within 
international trade. 2 
• LLB(Hons), BBSc, BA(Econ) student, Victoria University of Wellington. The writer also attended the Faculty of 
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Because tariff increases are prohibited by the GA TT, protectionism has now assumed the guise of "non-tariff" barriers. 
These non-tariff barriers were officially recognised during the Sixth (Kennedy) Round of GATT multilateral negotiations 
(1963-1967). But they were not then addressed due to the risk of compromising delicate tariff-reduction negotiations. 1n 
the Seventh (Tokyo) Round of multilateral negotiations (1973-1979), codes of conduct were created for non-tariff barriers, 
but substantive reduction agreements were left to subsequent rounds. 1n the latest Eighth (Uruguay) Round of multilateral 
negotiations (1986-1994), informal barriers were tack.led, but only superficially. See EJ Ray "Changing Patterns of 
Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs & Rise in Non-Tari.ff Barriers" (1987) 8 Nrthwst J lnt'I L Bus 26, 30. 
2 1n their January 1995 Trade Policy Review of Japan, the GA TT Secretariat commented: "It is recognised that [Japanese] 
formal trade barriers on industrial products are now generally low. The attention of Japan's trading partners has thus 
turned to conditions covering Government procurement practices, regulations on standards and testing requirements, 
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Professor RJ Smith of Cornell University commented in 1989 that "the greater the 
extent to which complex cultural and historical factors colour a troubled international 
relationship, the less amenable it may be to satisfactory mutual adjustment".3 In the context 
of the contemporary relationship between the United States and Japan, this comment seems 
particularly astute. For it is here that the elusive nature of these troublesome trade barriers 
has been dramatically revealed. 
Since the Japanese defeat in 1945, the relationship between the United States and 
Japan has remained relatively amicable. However, over the past decade it has become 
increasingly fraught with acrimony, mutual accusation and even fears of reciprocated 
retaliation. Japan and the United States constitute the world's two economic superpowers so 
their trading relationship ranks foremost in international commerce.4 Annual trade between 
the United States and Japan aggregates an astounding NZ$I00 billion worth of American 
products exported to Japan and NZ$200 billion of Japanese products exported to the United 
States.5 Yet these simple statistics quickly reveal a convoluted quandary, for the relationship 
between the United States and Japan has been marred by an alarming blowout of the United 
States trade deficit. 6 Last year this deficit totalled a record NZ$108 billion. To the chagrin of 
the American public, it seems their wealth and prosperity is unequivocally transferring to the 
Japanese.7 
With characteristic bellicosity, the United States administration sought a convenient 
scapegoat for their economic woes. 8 Japan seems to have been perceived as an easy victim. 9 
customs procedures, administrative guidance, antimonopoly legislation, the distribution system, keiretsu and other 
business practices" See GATT Trade Policy Review -Japan : Volume One (GATT, Geneva, January 1993), 55. 
3 See RJ Smith "Culture as an Explanation : Neither All Nor Nothing" (1989) 22 Cornell Int'I Ll 425, 434. 
4 The economic relationship between Japan and the United States is both the most important and the most complex in 
international trade. The two nations together account for 40% of global output, and their wealthy populations make them 
the world's largest markets. Their finns compete aggressively for international leadership in numerous high-technology and 
industrial sectors. See CF Bergsten Reconcilable Differences : United States - Japan Economic Conflict (Institute 
International Economics, Washington DC, 1993), 1. 
5 America's current account deficits have cumulated to about US$1 trillion over the past decade, with Japan's surpluses 
accounting for roughly two-thirds of this figure. See Bergsten, above n 4, 1. 
6 Ironically this deficit was caused not so much by trade barriers, as a divergence of macroeconomic policy between the two 
nations. Each country's saving-investment balance, together with the real exchange rate, determines the aggregate trade 
surplus or deficit. It seems in the long-run, demographic changes in the two nations, which determine the relative 
proportions of high and low savers in the domestic economy, will eventually push the trade position towards a greater 
balance. But in the short run the balance will be affected most directly by macroeconomic policies. In application to trade 
barriers, the trade deficit is more a "red-herring" that serves as a political instrument for focusing and intensifying public 
opinion. Trade barriers represent a problem in their own right, regardless of the size of the trade imbalance. Yet Bergsten 
estimates that structural considerations may be curtailing US exports by up to US$1 l billion annually. See Bergsten, 
above n 4, 56. See also TJ Pempel "The Trade Imbalance Isn't the Problem" (1989) 22 Cornell Int'I Ll 435,436. 
7 Essentially Japan is maintaining domestic output and employment at the expense of other countries, such as the United 
States, whose external deficits have risen as a counterpart to the Japanese surplus. Servicing this accumulated foreign debt 
requires additional transfers of American resources abroad. Continued depreciation of the dollar will thus adversely affect 
the American terms of trade and reduce American wealth and expenditure. See Bergsten, above n 4, 5. 
8 Kazuo comments that much of the hostility reflects frustration with America's own performance and a resulting tendency to 
look for scapegoats abroad. See N Kazuo "Treating America's Japanophobia" (1989) 16:4 Japan Echo 58. 
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Yet the economic gulf and high level of cultural misunderstanding between the two nations 
has exacerbated matters. 10 While the United States economic system generally worships the 
consumer and the sacrosanct Western ideal of perfect competition; Japanese society has long 
embraced a culture where the producer is paramount. 11 In Japan, the juxtaposition of cultural, 
political and historical factors have permitted power to prevail within immense corporations. 
These have in turn strongly influenced the shape and development of the Japanese legal and 
economic system. 12 
Yet this is not to suggest that the United States is wholly to blame for the current 
crisis in American relations with Japan. 13 The American perception that Japan is engaging in 
"unfair" trading practices appears well-founded. Within Japan, government and business 
have embraced in a cosy and often exclusive relationship that has spawned a proliferation of 
pervasive and self-serving bureaucratic regulation. 14 Such intervention has adopted the 
character of both overt governmental legislation, and a more covert marmer of governmental 
influence known as "administrative guidance". While the overt forms of Japanese 
discrimination have been largely eliminated by the GATT, many of the more covert 
techniques have remained. Such tacit discrimination against foreign products has so far 
eluded direct GATT scrutiny. 
9 Americans perceive that many Japanese, particularly the older generation, have deep feelings of gratitude, obligation and 
admiration towards America as a result of American political and economic guidance following World War II. This has 
meant Japan has attached far greater weight to its relations with the United States, than to its relations with other countries. 
See WA Wallis "Economics, Foreign Policy and United States-Japan Trade Disputes" (1989) 22 Cornell Int'I LJ 381,382. 
10 Moreover, the politics of the "Japan issue" tilts heavily away from the key macroeconomic issues towards the 
microeconomic concerns. This is partly because individual industry problems lend themselves easily to political anecdotes 
and outcomes that are far more comprehensible to the public. Sectoral complaints are also the direct source of constituents' 
appeals to governmental representatives and delivery on these demonstrates the ability of representatives to "do something". 
See MB Smith "Bilateralism's Role in Trade Liberalisation" (1990) 69 Economic Impact 22. 
11 In their January 1995 study, the Institute for International Economics concluded that Japanese tariff and non-tariff barriers 
inflict an annual cost to Japanese consumers ofUS$100 billion. At the expense of consumers, Japanese producers pocket 
perhaps US$60 billion. The Japanese government colJects only around US$2 bilJion in tariff revenue. The net cost to 
Japanese society as a whole amounts to around US$12 billion. See Y Sazanarni Measuring the Costs of Protection in 
Japan (Institute International Economics, Washington DC, 1995), 2. 
12 Access difficulties by American firms to the Japanese market, combined with the asymmetrical ease of access by Japanese 
firms to the American market, has spurred fears that Japanese firms may exercise predatory behaviour from behind the 
shelter of a domestic bastion market. See N Kazuo "The Fundamental Flaws in the American 'Containing Japan' Thesis" 
(1989) 16:4 Japan Echo 52, 55. See also S Johnson The Japanese Through American Eyes (Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 1988), 30. See also T Tanaka "The Role of Law of Law in Japanese Society : Comparisons with the West" 
(1985) 19 UBC L Rev 2, 17. 
13 During the past two decades there have been three peaks in trade tensions between the United States and Japan. The first 
peak was witnessed from 1968-1972, the "textile war". Here President Nixon pledged protection of the United States 
textile industry by controlling imports from Japan. He pressured Japan to reduce exports of textiles, but met fierce 
opposition from the Japanese. The second peak occurred from 1977-1979 and concerned steel and colour televisions. The 
third peak has continued from the early 1980s and has seen a striking broadening and perpetuation of trade frictions. See S 
Yachi "Beyond Trade Frictions: A New Horizon for US-Japan Economic Relations" (1989) 22 Cornell Int'I LJ 389,391. 
14 After World War ll, the Japanese government lent assistance to private enterprises to precipitate a rapid economic recovery. 
The pre-existing cultural propensity towards close relations between government and business was strengthened 
considerably. This lead to the establishment of a mechanism whereby the business community's wishes were directly 
reflected within government policy. See O Nariai History of the Modern Japanese Economy (Foreign Press Centre, 
Tokyo, 1994), 32. 
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The Japanese business milieu has also received sustained American assault. 15 
Japanese society has long extolled the virtue of long-term relationships and ranked the 
ambitions of the group above those of the individual. These Confucian ethics have evolved 
into a form of Japanese "relational contracting" that fuses the Western bargain theory of the 
contract with the twin Eastern ideals of harmony and long-term security. On a macro scale, 
such relational contracting has promulgated the large-scale practice of dango collusion within 
the construction industry, and the omnipotence of the corporate keiretsu.16 The intensely 
communal, yet historical feudal structuring of Japanese society, has further catalysed the 
development of the complex business pyramids that shape Japanese business practices of 
today.17 
Finally, American allegations highlight the Japanese distribution system, a system 
deeply rooted within Japanese history and culture. In its modem form, the Japanese 
distribution system comprises long and complex chains of intermediary wholesalers that link 
the producer with the Japanese consumer. 18 These chains have effectively maintained a 
unique social welfare system within Japanese society by absorbing unskilled labour, while 
cultivating the intricate packaging and high level of service associated with many Japanese 
products and retail outlets. Meanwhile, Government policy has sheltered the system from the 
inevitable tide of competition. 19 An example is provided by the Japanese Large Store law, 
15 Denial of access to the Japanese market (the world's second largest) may significantly hamper individual foreign industries. 
It reduces their ability to achieve economies of scale and slows their progress along the learning curve - both factors being 
critically important to success in most high technology sectors. See Bergsten, above n 4, 6. 
16 Linked by corporate ties, long-term supply arrangements, and an ongoing chain of reciprocal business favours, members of 
a Japanese keiretsu feel compelled to buy from another keiretsu sibling - even when an outside product represents a more 
economically justifiable choice. There exists extensive microeconomic theory concerning anti-competitive barriers to entry. 
This postulates how various examples of industry structure (for example, advertising intensity or commitment of capital) 
can disadvantage entrant finns relative to incumbents. Overall the theory predicts that the existence of barriers to entry 
results in fewer entries and therefore allows incumbent finns to enjoy above average profitability. Entry is, therefore, 
important in microeconomic theory as a means of promoting competition and thereby improving the allocation of economic 
resources. Many of the microeconomic models relating to a finns entry into a particular industry have a direct application 
to an importer's entry into a domestic protected market. See R Clarke & T McGuiness (eds) The Economics of the Firm 
(Basil Blackwell, New York, 1987), 127. See also RH Frank Microeconomics and Behaviour (2ed, McGraw Hill, New 
York, 1994). 205. See also PA Geroski, RJ Gilbert & A Jacquemin Barriers to Entry and Strategic Competition 
(Harwood, Zurich, 1990), 3. See also PA Geroski Market Dynamics and Barriers to Entry (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1991), 17. See also J Tirole The Theory of Industrial Organisation (2ed, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1989), 205. See N 
Terumasa "Japan's Place in the World" (1992) 14 Japan Echo 2, 5. 
17 The United States is essentially a pluralist society in which policy-making tends to be dominated by specific interest groups. 
In contrast, Japan, as a modem trading state is ruled more by a bureaucratic and political elite. Power in Japan is 
concentrated essentially within an interlocking triumvirate of politicians, bureaucrats and business associations. Japanese 
policy for the past 30 years has therefore been dominated by this group's desire to preserve overall economic stability, 
remain internationally competitive, and enhance opportunities for economic growth. See J Adams "The Law of United 
States-Japan Trade Relations" (1990) 24:2 World Trade 37, 40. See also Y Matsuura "Law and Bureaucracy in Modern 
Japan" (1989) 41 Stanford LR 6, 29. 
18 Tokyo ranks as one of the most expensive cities in the world (35% more expensive than London), mainly because high land 
prices act in conjunction with this complex "multiple mark-up" distribution system. See N Iwao "A Japan-US Free Trade 
Zone?" (1988) 15:4 Japan Echo 43, 47. 
19 It seems the GATT Secretariat shares a similar view: "Further trade liberalisation, while it will alter considerably the 
structure and levels of Japanese imports, should be pursued by the Japanese Government for its own benefit, inducing 
long-run economic competitiveness rather than seen as a fix for bilateral imbalances". See GATT, above n 2, 11. 
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which maintained the parochial feeling of Japanese society by favouring existing smaller local 
stores and thwarting the development of large and efficient malls and hypermarkets. 
Yet despite the perceived successes of the United States in reducing Japanese barriers 
to international trade, there have been high costs. The Japanese have become increasingly 
vexed by the constant American bullying and are now seeking to assert their presence within 
international society. 20 They have also become increasingly alarmed by the perceived 
Westernisation, indeed Americanisation, of their unique oriental culture. The recent turmoil 
within the Japanese political system, the soaring value of the Yen, and a severe domestic 
recession have further engendered something of a backlash against the United States.21 The 
all-American way of life may be gradually losing its appeal to the Japanese psyche. 
Where does this leave New Zealand? In the global arena of international trade, New 
Zealand, as a small but capable nation within the global community, must continue to extol 
the virtues of such initiatives as the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation ("APEC") and the 
World Trade Organisation ("WTO"). Japan's increasing assertiveness and the America's 
continued belligerency have progressively raised the temperature of each successive United 
States-Japan trade dispute.22 This has also provoked resentment and a higher degree of 
cultural friction. 23 The resulting climate of uncertainty is undermining the stability of the 
world's :financial, economic and trading networks.24 The nations of the world can only pray 
that the United States and Japan will continue to solve their disputes amicably. The global 
implications of an all-out trade war are potentially cataclysmic. 25 
20 Ironically, a traditional Japanese proverb states : no aru taku wa tsume wo kakasu or "An able hawk hides its talons". 
The Japanese perceive aggressive bargaining tactics within negotiations as fairly crude and childish. See BM Hawrysh & 
JL Zaichkowsky "Cultural Approaches to Negotiations : Understanding the Japanese" (1989)7 Int'l Mrkting Rev 28, 38. 
21 In international trade the United States has a reputation for arrogant and bullying behaviour. Takeshi notes that the 
American perception of "fair trade" is highly judgemental and that this "American Unilateralism" in trade is universally 
resented. This resentment has tainted many aspects of American international relations. See S Takeshi "Coming Next : 
Japan-United States Legal Friction" (1988) 15:1 Japan Echo 38,383. 
22 Fukushima comments: "as goods oriented friction is supplanted by institution oriented friction, problems in bilateral 
relations will become more structural and political in nature - hence frictions will escalate". See GS Fukushima 
"United States-Japan Free Trade Area: A Sceptical View" (1989) 22 Cornell Int Ll 455, 459. 
23 Bergsten comments: "On the political front, many Americans - including a number of politicians, business people, and 
labour leaders. view Japan as a major threat to America's economic future. Many see Japan as an international 'free-
rider' that fails to pay its way ... but instead depends on others for defence of its strategic interests and for maintenance 
of the open international economic system that is so crucial to its [relatively closed] economy .. Japan will continue to 
engender negative reactions in the United States as long as it retains its image of a closed and exclusionary society 
that fails to play an international role commensurate with its wealth and capability". See Bergsten, above n 4, 4. See 
also "The Centre of Gravity Shifts East", The Vancouver Sun, Vancouver, 13 November 1993. 
24 It is no secret that jitters on Wall Street, or in Tokyo, have profound implications throughout our modern global village. 
For example, the Washington Times stated: "There is no doubt that the event that set off tremors in the financial markets 
was the quarrel between the United States and Japan". An aggravated relationship between Japan and the United States 
would have an adverse effect not only on the their own development, but on the entire world economy. See "Volatility 
Linked to Japan-United States Conflict", The Washington Times, Washington DC, 19 July 1994. See Fukushima, above n 
22,459. See also "Now That the Rising Sam is Eclipsing the Rising Sun", Business Times, New York, 21 July 1994. 
25 Nukuzawa comments that the current trade relationship between the two economic super-powers [US/Japan] has analogies 
to the cold-war relationship between the two nuclear superpowers [US/USSR]. The relationship remains stable because 
each nation knows that if one were to start a (trade) war, it would be equally devastating to both. Nukuzawa termed this 
' I 
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PART ONE: CULTURAL TRADE BARRIERS 
II JAPANESE CULTURAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 
A The Decline in Tariffs and the Rise of Non-Tariff Barriers 
In 1987 the World Banlc reported that although Japan possessed the developed 
world's most heavily protected market, the most significant Japanese trade barriers did not 
exist in the form of traditional tariffs and quotas. 26 Indeed, as Japanese politicians frequently 
highlight, Japan maintains one of the world's lowest levels of tariffs and quotas and the 
Japanese remain exemplary in their adherence to GAIT bindings. 27 However, it seems that 
Japanese protectionism has followed a pattern that is now increasingly evident throughout the 
entire international community.28 As formal tariffs and quotas have gradually declined, so 
"non-tariff'' barriers have emerged as the primary impediment to international trade. 29 
Professor IB Jackson metaphorically explains: "the receding waters of tariffe and other forms 
of overt protection inevitably uncover the rocks and shoals of non-tariff barriers". 30 
Unlike tariffs and quotas, non-tariff trade barriers are not established solely by law. 
Instead they embody the interplay of legal, political, and cultural factors underlying an 
the international trade version of nuclear deterrence: Trade Mutually Assured Destruction (T-MAD). See K Nuk.azawa 
"Japan and the United States: Wrangling Towards Reciprocity" (1988) 64 Harvard Bus Rev 42, 50. 
26 In 1955, with the support of the US, Japan became a contracting party to the GAIT and began a gradual period of import 
liberalisation. Most quotas in the manufacturing sector had been eliminated by the beginning of the GAIT Kennedy 
Round in 1964. By the mid-1980s, tariff levels in Japan were comparable (if not somewhat lower than) those maintained 
by the United States and the European Community, and quotas had been largely eliminated. See Bergsten, above n 4, 71. 
27 While Japanese tariff rates are relatively high for agricultural commodities (13.9%), they are very low for other categories. 
The 1991-1992 average (unweighted) tariff on all products was only 6.9% (and 5.2% for manufactures). Again, 97% of 
all industrial tariff lines are bound, yet the rate for agriculture is an abject 59%. See Bergsten, above n 2, 68. 
28 Dunkel labels this trend the 'new protectionism': "We must not disguise what is happening. At the same time as 
governments profess their attachment to the open trading system, they are undermining it by resorting to indirect 
discrimination ... their involvement in such deals disqualifies them from challenging the similar behaviour of others. 
This is the new protectionism - measures in a grey area between legality and open breach of GAIT rules." Preusse 
labels the trend 'neo-protectionism' and defines it in terms of a "bundle of new, subtle forms of non-tariff intervention in 
trade, which have as common traits: recourse to selective measures; selectivity; bilateralness; and invisibility .... this 
represents a new cancer in the trading system". See J Dunkel "The New Protectionism - Who Pays?" (1982) 23 EFT A 
Bulletin I, 10. See also HG Preusse "Voluntary Export Restraints - An Effective Means Against a Spread of Neo-
Protectionism?" (1993) 27: I World Trade 5, 5. 
29 Ray attempts to define such informal non-tariff barriers in the following terms: ''A non-tariff barrier is defined as any 
measure (public or private). other than a customs tariff. that causes internationally trade goods and services, or 
resources devoted to the production of these goods and services, to be allocated in such a way as to reduce the 
potential real world income. Potential real world income is that level attainable if resources and outputs are allocated 
in an 'economically efficient manner"'. See Ray, above n I, 28. 
30 Groetzinger advocates the complementary view; non-tariff barriers have not only been exposed, but they have also 
increased: "National groups, formerly protected from foreign competition by high tariffs, now feel obliged to pressure 
their respective legislatures into adopting new non-tariff protective barriers". See JH Jackson The World Trading 
System Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (MIT, Boston, 1989). See also J Groetzinger "The New 
GAIT Code and International Harmonisation of Products Standards" (1975) 8 Cornell lnt'l l.J 168, 170. 
8 
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international trading relationship.31 They remain difficult to define, elusive to identify, and 
problematic to police.32 We should not be surprised that while GATT resolutely condemns 
such trade impediments, they have been frequently regarded as "intractable" by the 
international community and conveniently overlooked. 33 One peculiar form of non-tariff 
barrier is the "cultural trade barrier". 
B The Conceptual Status of Cultural Trade Barriers : Identifying the Issues 
Rachel Field, an Australian solicitor, notes in a recent article that cultural 
explanations for economic issues are often quickly dismissed. 34 She comments that this is 
often unfortunate; because while it is clear that culture is not the sole basis on which to 
understand particular trade phenomena, it cannot be denied that cultural elements have always 
played an important role in understanding the nature of international trading relationships. 35 
Indeed, many of the remaining structural impediments to free trade appear deeply entrenched 
within the history and culture of the respective nations. 
While the existence of underlying cultural influences is clearly recognisable, such 
influences are almost impossible to isolate. This makes the definition and recognition of 
cultural trade barriers extraordinarily complex. 36 Numerous commentators have struggled to 
articulate the underlying phenomenon. Japanese trade restrictions have been described as a 
"broad mix of deeply rooted structures, business practices, and cultural attitudes";31 "a web 
of government programmes, and oligopolistic practices .... a subterranean maze of non-tariff 
31 In the Japanese context, examples of non-tariff measures include: import quotas; government procurement limited to 
domestically produced goods; price support programmes coupled with restrictions on domestic sales; and various 
restrictions stemming from the Japanese system of industrial organisation. See Sazanami, above n 11, 19. 
32 Ray identifies three primary factors explaining the shift to non-tariff barriers: (i) industrialised nations now have highly 
developed taxation systems and no longer require tariff-related income; (ii) non-tariff barriers are subtle and more difficult 
to quantify, hence GAIT Rounds have tended to ignore them; and (iii) they can be used to protect special interest groups. 
Pomfret elaborates: "Policy-makers may favour non-tariff barriers because they grant more discretionary power than 
do tariffs (the level of which is bound by international agreement) and because their opaqueness may forestall 
opposition from groups negatively affected by trade restrictions". See R Pomfret International Trade : An Introduction 
to Theory and Policy (Basil Blackwell, New York, 1991), 121. See also Ray, above n I, 32. 
33 Unfortunately this has now allowed considerable scope for governmental avoidance ofGATI obligations. See W Ruigrok 
"Paradigm Crisis in International Trade Theory" (1991) 25 :1 World Trade 77, 81. 
34 See R Field "Japanese Cultural Trade Barriers and the Search for an Appropriate Dispute Settlement Forum : An 
Australian Perspective" (1993) 21 Aust Bus LR 173, 179. 
3 5 Smith reasons that cultural factors may loom large in some contexts, but play a minor role in others. They cannot serve as 
the entire explanation for any given development, but they are certain to be of some moment in every case. Smith also 
comments that legal, political and economic elements are typically heavily infused with cultural meanings; as culture 
provides the environment within which all legal, political and economic decisions are made. See Smith, above n 3, 426. 
36 The current very broad conception of "non-tariff barriers" creates extremely complex issues. Shutt comments, for example, 
there remains the logical possibility that parts of a country's social infrastructure might constitute a "non-tariff barrier": 
"The logical extension of this argument might lead us to the conclusion that all forms of public service - even down to 
the police and armed forces - are actually or potentially a form of subsidy to the private sector and thus preclude any 
genuinely undistorted competition". See H Schutt The Myth of Free Trade Patterns of Protectionism Since 1945 
(Oxford, London, 1985). 
37 See S Cohen Uneasy Partnership : Competition & Conflict in US-Japan Trade Relations (MIT, Boston, 1985), 165. 
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barriers";38 a "cult of uniqueness" that produces "significant non-tariff barriers to foreign 
trade and investment";39 and a "network of personal ties between Japanese businesses".40 
Professor PW Punke of George Washington University notes that these have "only hinted at 
the cultural element of non-tariff barriers" with "none giving more than a flavour of the core 
problem".41 
Punke's own strategy for identifying cultural trade barriers employs the following 
definition: 
A cultural trade barrier is best defined as an impediment to the free flow of internationally trade 
goods and services that stems, to a significant degree, from entrenched cultural patterns, rather than 
solely from economic or political motivations. [ emphasis added) 
However, there clearly remain severe difficulties with this approach. How does one 
differentiate between "entrenched cultural patterns" and "solely economic or political 
motivations"? Often these appear inextricably intertwined.42 Politicians and businesses may 
exploit culture to justify trade restrictions - exaggerating and manipulating cultural traits for 
their own advantage. Conversely, cultural patterns may themselves evolve via economic and 
political influences.43 
38 See Pempel, above n 6, 436. 
39 See E Frost For Richer, For Poorer: The New United States -Japan Relationship (Pergemon, New York, 1987), 79. 
40 See R Baldwin Non-tariff Distortions in International Trade (Oxford, London, 1970), 5. 
41 See MW Punke "Structural Impediments to United States-Japan Trade : The Collision of Culture and Law" (1990) 23 
Cornell Int'l Ll 55, 59. 
42 For example, Thatcher explains the underlying socio-cultural dynamics of the United States-Japan leather dispute: 
''Although in comparison with other trade issues leather did not seem like an issue worth expending significant 
amounts of political capital upon, Japan resisted demands for change in the face of a GATT determination of illegality 
because of important characteristics of its society". Thatcher comments that for centuries, outcast elements of Japanese 
society, the burakumin, have worked in such undesirable occupations as tanning and grave digging. Because of extreme 
discrimination against these people, which continues even today, they tend to be very poor with little chance to rise in 
society. The Japanese Government have therefore implemented affirmative action policies to protect existing burakumin 
employment and promote their social improvement. A direct conflict existed between the international demands of 
American businesses for access to the Japanese market and the Japanese Government's domestic policy of protecting an 
historically deprived minority group. See KB Thatcher "United States Trade Act 1974, Section 301 : Unfair Trade 
Practices by the Japanese" (1987) 81 Northwestern Uni LR 492,522. 
43 For example, modem Japanese law expresses Japanese cultural patterns - and reflects historical economic and political 
influences. The first Japanese judicial text was Prince Shotoku's Code of the Seventeen Articles written in 604. Its first 
principal, "harmony must be honoured", remains fundamental to modem day Japanese society. The Japanese did not 
inherit the Roman Law traditions of Western societies, but instead were deeply influenced by the precepts of the Confucian 
doctrine. To some extent the Confucian concept of the moral rule was substituted for the Rule of Law, with the whole 
concept of the Japanese State, of Japanese Law, and of social relations lastingly marked by it. In obtaining social dues 
owed by another, legal proceedings were traditionally regarded as a crude, vile and degrading method. The traditional way 
to resolve disagreement utilised a third party conciliator, such as a respected elder. This conciliation avoided the 
humiliation of the defeated party and allowed harmony to be restored and maintained. These social rules of behaviour were 
known as "giri''. For example, in the Western world an employer-employee relationship was governed by strict legal rights 
and obligations created by contract. Within Japan this relationship was governed by unwritten social rules whereby an 
employer offered protection and in return the employee offered loyalty. In the Japan's modem day legal system, these 
notions governing social life often underlie much Japanese caselaw. The Japanese Judiciary integrate this historically-
derived social reality into Japanese law together with the strong influences of international jurisprudence. See JH Moitry 
"Competition Law in Japan" (1988) 11:2 World Competition 5, 7. See also Hawrysh & Zaichkowsky, above n 20, 42. 
See also Y Noda "The Rules ofGiri" in Y Noda Introduction to Japanese Law (Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1982). 
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Punke attempts to gloss such inherent difficulties within his definition. He reasons 
that the essence of culture is "permanence" and suggests that cultural factors have an 
independent significance that contributes to the complexity of the relevant trade restriction 
and gives it an essential feeling of resilience and "immutability":44 
Underscoring the permanence of culture, one author has contrasted culture with mere attitudes, 
arguing "culture implies a certain permanence, inherence and immutability that does not apply 
to other attitudes". Culture differs from economic and political motivations in the same respect - it 
is far more permanent and resistant to change.45 
Field accepts Punke's approach but proceeds further. 46 She suggests that cultural 
trade barriers may be broadly divided into two groups - "attitudinal" barriers and 
"institutional" barriers. Attitudinal barriers involve the psychological manifestation of culture 
to create a trade impediment based largely on perception; such as a negative view of foreign 
products by local consumers or officials. Clearly such attitudinal traits are not unique to 
Japan. Most of the world's peoples exhibit some form of psychological resistance to foreign 
products and display an inherent preference for local produce. In New Zealand, for example, 
such resistance is exemplified by our "Buy Kiwi-Made" campaigns - which have even received 
direct government funding. 
Attitudinal barriers may themselves be roughly sub-divided into two groups. They 
seem to occur in the form of either consumer preferences, such as a reluctance to buy foreign 
products. Or the perceptions of officials, such as the rejection of imports because they do not 
meet domestic technical criteria. The latter attitudinal barrier clearly overlaps with a wider 
category of trade restrictions known as "technical barriers to trade". 
44 Hawrysh and Zaichkowsky note that given the complexities of culture, most studies have used "country" as a surrogate for 
"culture". Yet they argue "culture" is not something granted only to citizens of a country, it is something learned from 
exposure to an environment. Similar environments provide similar influences and hence shape similar behaviour. Hence, 
in their view, culture influences behaviour by shaping habits, skills and styles from which people construct "strategies of 
action" or persistent ways of ordering behaviour through time. For example, Japanese and Americans have different 
negotiating strategies. The Japanese consider a personal and trusting relationship to be an essential prerequisite to business 
and place a greater emphasis on status ( according more respect to buyers than sellers). Japanese decision-making also tends 
to be made by group consensus ("ringi"). See Punke, above n 41, 59. See also Hawrysh, above n 20, 28. See also JL 
Graham "The Japanese Negotiation Style : Characteristics ofa Distinct Approach" (1993) 4 Negotiation J 123, 123. 
45 Attitudes are a settled way of thinking. For example: "Japan cannot afford the luxury of importing expensive foreign 
products", or "Japanese products are of superior quality to foreign products". They may reflect cultural beliefs and 
values, but they are readily amenable to change. 
Beliefs are the acceptance of something as fact. For example, religious beliefs such as Confucianism and Buddhism inform 
Japanese that the highest good is the good of society ru1d that the worst blemish is egotism and selfishness. Similarly, 
Shinto (a native Japanese religion) emphasises harmony throughout all aspects of life, including social and business 
relationships. Beliefs and values are often strongly rooted in custom and tradition, they are ''far more resistant to change". 
Values are moral ideals, principles and standards. For exan1ple since World War II the Japanese have embraced the twin 
ideals of peace and affluence. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution 194 7 states "The Japanese people forever renounce 
war .... and the use of force as a means of settling international disputes". Beliefs and values tend to be entrenched and 
more "permanent". See P West "Cross-Cultural Literacy and the Pacific Rim" (1989] 2 Business Horizons 3, 7. 
46 See Field, above n 34, 174. 
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The second broad category of cultural trade barrier mooted by Field was the 
"institutional" trade barrier. These barriers occur where trade discrimination is caused by an 
organisational pattern within an economy and this pattern has a predominately cultural 
basis.47 Institutional barriers are often extraordinarily complex, with the most intractable 
examples occurring where the pattern causing the discrimination is central to the unique 
cultural identity of the society itself. Hence the dismantling of the trade barrier would require 
a deconstruction of deeply entrenched national values and beliefs. This predicament is 
manifested by Japan's corporate keiretsu and retail distribution system. 
A direct attack on a deeply entrenched institutional barrier would clearly prove 
counter-productive as it could easily be misinterpreted as an assault on the culture of the entire 
nation.48 The associated issues of social identity and national pride are highly emotive.49 
Ideally such barriers should therefore be approached with extreme sensitivity. Any 
international pressure should be selective and incremental.50 The current United States' 
strategy towards Japan unfortunately appears extremely brutal and ad hoe. 
In order to assess the sensitivity and effectiveness of current international legal 
techniques for addressing cultural trade barriers, it is first necessary to detail the essential 
character of the cultural trade barriers themselves. Japan provides an ideal case study. Japan 
is clearly not unique in exhibiting cultural barriers to trade. Cultural barriers seem to arise 
whenever there are large cultural differences between nations, however, Japan currently 
manifests the most studied examples. 
47 These are not to be confused with "structural trade baniers" (which concern fil!Y organisational pattern within a society 
constituting a banier to trade). The term "structural banier" is derived from microeconomic theory. See Field, above n 34, 
174. See Geroski, above n 16, 28. 
48 By illustration, an editorial in theNikkei (a leading Tokyo newspaper) stated: "It must be clearly understood that what the 
United States was seeking in relation to the bilateral talks when it demanded that Japan change the structure of its 
distribution system was nothing less than a demand that the country also change its culture". See Nikkei Shinbun, 
Tokyo, 11 January 1992, editorial. 
49 Yachi comments that economic policies and institutions are amenable to legislative change, albeit at considerable cost and 
pain. But, when Japanese are told that their "distribution system" (in its socio-economic totality) is a banier, the issue 
becomes intractable. Difficulties in consumer behaviour are another example. When Japanese consumers are told that they 
"Don't buy foreign goods", again the matter is so ill-defined that it becomes intractable. Hence, while one party becomes 
progressively more assertive in their allegations of discrimination, the other party becomes increasingly defensive. See 
Yachi, above n 13,396. 
50 Y achi proposes three techniques for overcoming intractables ( such as cultural trade baniers ): 
fim, they must be defined narrowly. The issues should be narrowed to concern specific laws, policies and institutions, 
rather than criticising vague entireties (e.g. targeting the Japanese Large Store Law instead of criticising the entire Japanese 
distribution system). 
Second, a longer time-frame is required; intractables are not "unchangeables", they merely take substantially longer to alter 
(i.e. a sufficiently slow enough pace to allow changes in socio-cultural behaviour). 
Thirdly, cultural magnanimity is essential; cultural baniers surface largely because nations have very different cultural, 
historical, and traditional backgrounds. Interpreting another's behaviour using one's own cultural perceptions will 
inevitably lead to misperceptions (i.e. judgemental behaviour is a recipe for cultural conflict). 
See Yachi, above n 13, 397. See also JH Park "Trading Blocs and United States-Japan Relations" (1992) 15:3 World 
Competition 50, 55 . 
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ill ATTITUDINAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 
A Japanese Consumer Preferences : From Barbie Dolls to Mercedes Benz Cars 
Over the past four decades there have been numerous allegations made by American 
firms that Japanese consumers unfairly discriminate against American products. 51 Claims of 
a universal "Buy Japanese" mentality within Japan have been received with considerable 
sympathy from the United States Congress. This has in turn perpetuated an elaborate myth, 
premised largely on cultural misunderstanding, that has remained to this day. 
At first sight there appears to be substantial anecdotal evidence of discrimination by 
Japanese consumers against foreign products. 52 Yet on closer analysis, the facts reveal that 
the issue is not that simple. Much of the alleged discrimination has a more innocuous 
explanation - such as product unsuitability, inferior product quality, or consumer 
unfamiliarity. American companies have frequently blamed a Japanese nationalistic attitude 
for their failures, rather than questioning how well their products were tailored to the differing 
demands and requirements of the Japanese market in the first place.53 
Many recent articles have been extremely critical of the manner in which American 
companies have blamed this "pervasive buy-Japanese attitude" rather than accepting 
responsibility for their own ineptitude.54 Dr VR Alden, a leading figure in the United States-
Japan trade debate, has noted that when many of the anecdotes are investigated systematically, 
the allegations of discrimination are not substantiated.55 Frequently the product has been 
revealed as fundamentally unsuitable for the Japanese market.56 For example, Alden explains 
that Mattel's "Barbie Doll" had appalling sales figures within Japan - then her curly blonde 
hair was changed to straight black, and her sales rocketed. Similarly with Johnson & Son Inc, 
who encountered severe difficulties selling their "Lemon Pledge" furniture polish - then they 
51 These have even included allegations of xenophobia and overt racism. See Moitry, above n 43, 12. 
52 See Punke, above n 41, 62. 
53 The writer talked with Professor George Fields (International Business Consultant and Professor of Marketing at 
Pennsylvania University) who commented that the essence of the difficulty seemed to concern "brand engineering". The 
American fmns had not identified t11e different stinmli that are required to trigger consumers to buy a product in different 
nations. Fields noted that anywhere in the world the physical needs of consumers are fundamentally the same. However, 
the differences in culture will require products to be adapted to fit the differing emotional and sensory characteristics (and 
perceptions) that will encourage consumers buy the product. Fields considered that this was the essence of the perceived 
"attitudinal" cultural barrier to trade. 
54 This ineptitude seems more a misunderstanding oftl1e different marketing approach required, tlie different requirements of 
Japanese consumers, and the different strategies for doing business witliin Japan. The Japanese market is one of the world's 
most competitive and is extremely "high paced". Fashion products, for example, typically last only half the life-span that 
they would last in most Western nations. Firms are therefore required to expend considerable amounts of energy and 
money in understanding the consumer, keeping ahead of competitors (research, design and development), and retaining 
their existing market share. See PR Maurer Competing in Japan (Japan Tinies, Tokyo, 1990), 19. 
55 See VR Alden "Who Says You Can't Crack Japanese Markets?" (1987) 65 Harvard Bus Rev 52, 53. 
56 See Alden, above n 55, 56. 
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realised the polish smelled like latrine disinfectant widely used in Japan in the 1940s and with 
a change of odour the sales soared. 
It also appears that many of the more frequently quoted "Japanese attitude" anecdotes 
have been sensationalised by the media, and deliberately exaggerated by foreign businesses 
and American politicians. Alden cynically suggests:57 
The most prosperous companies often keep quiet about their success and join the chorus of 
allegations. After all, they don't want to spread the word about the lucrative market too widely for 
fear of attracting competition. 
Other commentators also highlight the successes of many American companies 
within Japan. 58 Coca-Cola commands a 60% market share of the Japanese domestic market 
and Schick razors have achieved a virtual monopoly with their 73% share. American fast-
food store franchises, such as MacDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Seven-Eleven, are 
also found on almost every main road in Japan. 59 Alden's simple advice is that "no one in 
Japan is going to hand you a market share on a platter - in Japan you must earn it" .60 
57 See Alden, above n 55, 55. 
58 See Maurer, above n 54, 72. See also Alden, above n 55, 57. See also Punke, above n 41, 60. 
59 Henry suggests that one key reason for the failure of most foreign firms is their inability to fathom the complex social 
networks that support business life within Japan. By the process of shogai katsudo (external relations), a successful 
Japanese firm maintains an external focus that allows it to gather critical information by leveraging external contacts. The 
significance of this process is so critical in Japan that a firm will typically devise separate corporate strategies to win in two 
separate markets: the "product/service" market and the "intelligence" (information) market. The intelligence market is 
divided into six clear segments: Ministries and agencies; trade and business associations; mass media and trade journals; 
university and research centres; the Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP"); and business partners. Given the close proximity, 
and tight inter-relationship, of the segments within this market in Tokyo, the Japanese often refer to the market as the 
"Tokyo Loop". Henry explains that "Co-operation in daily reciprocal information exchanges among all parties creates 
a lightly interrelated network based upon close personal relationships. Communication between the parties acts as the 
foundation for corporate and institutional interaction. Since interaction is daily, informal, personal and often indirect, 
public relations and law firms are of limited assistance in gaining long-term insider status within the loop". Henry 
notes that a large Japanese firm will typically devote an entire department (shogai-bu) to this information gathering 
process. 1n relation to Government Ministries, Henry comments ''Maintaining and nurturing relationships requires the 
company to have at least one person visiting the Ministry daily". Such visits are very informal with value placed on the 
number of visits (frequency is an indication of sincerity). 1n relation to the Liberal Democratic Party, Henry notes that the 
most influential parliamentarians head their own private "economic support groups" (conduits for political funds). Finns 
are expected to sponsor parliamentarians in return for access to their powerful personal contacts and intelligence network. 
Henry suggests that one of the key reasons for the failure of foreign firms in the Japanese market is that they have failed to 
recognise the critical importance of this system. Henry comments that while the Tokyo Loop is accessible to the foreign 
finn, very few foreign firms have entered it. He considers this "surprising .. .. when one considers that most of these 
companies enjoy in their home countries a high level of sophistication in dealing with government, media, and 
academic circles". Ms Kuni Sato of Cosmos Public Relations Ltd also told the writer how she had organised a "Diet 
Doorknock" last year to lobby influential LDP politicians about the concerns of foreign businesses within Japan. Sato 
commented that the politicians were extremely open and genuinely interested. They jumped at the opportunity to gain a 
new insight into the foreign complaints. Surprisingly they had not been approached directly in that manner before. This 
tends to confirm Henry's suggestions. See EK Henry "Shogai Katsudo (External Relations) and the Foreign Firm" (Sophia 
University, Tokyo, 1992). 
60 Makino notes that an intimate knowledge of the traditional buyer-dominated relationship is the key to successful marketing 
by foreign firms in Japan. This includes a knowledge of the different characteristics of the Japanese market, including the 
continuity of the contractual relationship (written and unwritten), tailored industrial marketing and manufacturing systems, 
product management, quality control and quality improvement. Makino notes that "a relationship that is distinctly long-
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While there was statistical evidence a few decades ago that suggested the Japanese 
had an aversion to foreign products, times have now definitely changed. Recent statistics 
demonstrate that at least 66% of Japanese consumers do not discriminate in any way between 
imported products and domestic equivalents.61 Indeed, the average Japanese consumer is no 
less discerning or sensible then any other consumer anywhere else in the world. Foreign 
products are even coveted as status symbols within Japan - such as German BMW cars, or 
French "Louis Viton" handbags.62 The Japanese, as with all consumers, choose to buy a 
product by assessing its design, function, price, quality and suitability.63 
In summary, while there seems little doubt that the Japanese have long placed a 
premium on supporting locally made products, these attitudes have clearly faded over the past 
few decades. The alleged "Buy Japanese" attitude of today seems more a misconception by 
foreign firms about the desirability of their products. Much of the Japanese "consumer 
resistance" derives from a fundamental lack of understanding by foreign firms of the differing 
needs of Japanese consumers. The Japanese live within a society that customarily provides an 
outstanding level of service to the customer - they thus have a high social expectation of 
quality. 64 Yet once foreign products have established themselves as quality products - they 
will be bought just the same as any other. 
B Bureaucratic Perceptions : Technical Barriers to Trade 
While purported "Buy Japanese" consumer preferences appear more fictional than 
factual, Japanese bureaucratic perceptions remain an unfortunate reality. This is best 
illustrated by the ostensible "cult of uniqueness" that allegedly permeates modern Japanese 
term oriented and collaborative is vital for success in Japan" . See above Alden, n 55, 57. See S Makino A Foreign 
Supplier in Japan (Sophia University, Tokyo, 1991), 27. 
61 While 2.3% favoured imports and 26.4% preferred domestic products. The researchers therefore concluded that the 
competitive power of the foreign product determines its success more than its foreign origin. See ME Peters "Free Trade as 
the Solution to Bilateral Trade Relationships : Japan" (1990) 28 Columbia J Transntn'I L 499, 519. 
62 The BMW story provides a classic exan1ple of niche marketing, product differentiation and persistence. While Japanese 
car producers are mass-production oriented, BMW took a different route, targeting Japanese consumers "who search for 
something more than average". To sell cars in a market with ten domestic makers was often ridiculed as: "Trying to sell 
snow to the Eskimos". Traditionally foreign cars had been priced out ofreach of the Japanese consumer, this had led to a 
negative perception of foreign cars. From 1981 , BMW mounted intensive marketing activities to erase in the minds of the 
Japanese consumer t11e border that clearly separated domestic cars from inlports. BMW used a two-pronged strategy: 
exclusive dealership and corporate identity. Exclusivity became a hallmark, with a direct servicing link established 
between customer and manufacturer - unique in Japan. Recognition of inlported cars spread among the younger generation 
who saw the merit of buying them at the san1e price as a domestic car. Young Japanese thus set themselves apart from the 
rest of car owners by owing an inlported car that strongly appealed to their individual taste. German BMW cars quickly 
acquired citizenship in Japan and lost their prior inlage of "foreign-made car", having replaced it with one of "individual 
taste". See C Kinias "Foreign Product Strategy in Japan: The Case of BMW" (Sophia University, Tokyo, 1993). 
63 See Peters, above n 61,519. See also Maurer, above n 54, 86. 
64 Maurer comments that consumers must ideally be "wrapped in a cocoon of information and service" to maintain their 
loyalty. Management must remain alert to customer requirements at all times. In Japan, the "customer is king". See 
Maurer, above n 54, 102. 
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society. While there has been much sensationalisation of this trait, the allegations and 
anecdotes have been supported by quantifiable research - and have a clear cultural basis. 
The Japanese "cult of uniqueness" reflects an assertion by some Japanese people that 
they are unique from the populace of other nations and cultures. 65 This sense of uniqueness is 
exaggerated by a heightened consciousness within Japanese society as to who is Japanese and 
who is not. Discrimination against foreigners within Japan dates back to at least AD815 and 
long spans of isolation from the rest of the world have further reinforced this segregational 
habit and insulated Japan from Western ideas and influences. 66 Japanese society remained 
essentially homogeneous. The resulting insider-outsider mentality perpetuated an underlying 
nationalism that seemed to take endless fascination with the purported unique characteristics 
of the Japanese people. 67 This was further exaggerated by the intense nationalistic 
propaganda expounded by the Japanese military until 1945. Today the attitude persists more 
with the older generation. 
However, this cult of uniqueness has been frequently manipulated and exploited by 
Japanese business interests and officials for protectionistic purposes. There have been many 
well-documented instances of a tangible bureaucratic resistance to foreign goods. Some of the 
more absurd examples are outlined by Deputy Assistant United States Trade Representative 
ES Fukushima.68 These include a quota placed on American beef, where Japanese officials 
resolutely asserted that American rice was "unfit for Japanese consumption" because the 
Japanese reputedly had an extra 10 metres of intestines. A restriction was placed on 
American construction companies who supposedly would be unfamiliar with the unique 
composition of Japanese soil. It was also claimed that American timber was unsuitable for 
Japanese housing - which must survive frequent earthquakes and a higher fire risk. At one 
65 There are clearly problems with generalising here, especially where evidence is partly anecdotal. But a significant number 
of academic articles, supported by statistical evidence,justify this statement. See Fukushima, above n 22,463. 
66 Moitry comments that the consensus against foreignern derived from the "siege mentality" perpetuated during the sakoku 
(closed centuries) during the Japanese Tokugawa shogunate. The opening of Japan was imposed by foreign powern and 
following the signing of the "Unequal Treaties" of 1858. See T Yano "Gaijin: One Word Locks the Door to Japanese 
Society" (1980) 9 Japan Times Weekly 22, 24. See also Moitry, above n 43, 11. 
67 Professor E Frost remarks that books and theories suggesting Japanese are somehow unique, superior or different to other 
races ''found an instant audience" within Japan: "New theories about the supposed uniqueness of the Japanese brain, 
or nose, or tolerance of alcohol, or some other characteristic find an instant audience. Higher scores for Japanese 
children on comparative international IQ tests lend lo be interpreted in racial rather than motivational or socio-
economic terms, Some older Japanese are even said to believe such things as body temperature and the length of 
pregnancy are different for Japanese" . See Frost, above n 39, 60. See also Punke, above n 41, 60. 
68 There are many more examples. In one recorded case, a plan to import gasoline was abandoned when government officials 
successfully pressured the prospective importer's Japanese bank to withdraw financing. In another case, small fibreglass 
boats were kept out of the Japanese market by subjecting them to inappropriate testing procedures ( designed for concrete 
boats) - such as dropping them. Particularly intriguing was the long-standing Japanese customs practice (now 
discontinued) of slicing open Dutch tulip bulbs to check for insects, Dr J Bhagwati cynically comments that: "once the 
bulbs were severed, even Japanese ingenuity could not put them back together again". See Bergsten, above n 4, 72. 
See also Punke, above n 41, 60. 
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stage a Japanese official even asserted that as Japanese snow was different to European snow, 
European skis were unacceptable to Japanese skiers. 69 
It is clear that many governmental regulations have been deliberately tailored to 
exclude foreign goods. 70 The most dramatic example is provided by the "American baseball-
bat case". Professor PR Pempel explains that when American aluminium baseball-bats began 
to secure a large share of the Japanese market, the Japanese baseball-bat manufacturers 
exerted intense pressure on their Government and ... : 71 
The size, shape and, by at least one account, the sound, of American imports, were declared 
inappropriate for Japanese batters, and the American product was shut out in favour of presumably 
lower quality, but more culturally acceptable Japanese equivalents. 
These anecdotes all suggest an extreme application of technical barriers to trade -
supported by a token cultural and pseudo-scientific justification. As is the case in any country, 
officials and regulators are swayed by the protectionistic interests of big business. 72 These 
absurd Japanese product standards are therefore less motivated by culture; they are more a 
reflection of Japan's extremely cosy relationship between business and bureaucrat.73 
69 However, best-selling Japanese writer Nakazawa Kazuo is fiercely critical of these anecdotes : "Many of the best-sellers 
about Japan written by Westerners shun broadly based economic and social evidence in favour of anecdotes designed 
to appeal to the instincts of the reader. One such anecdote features a ski equipment dispute, when a single narrow-
minded Japanese claimed that snow here is different to snow in Europe and that the ski equipment must therefore be 
built to different standards. Overnight this incident was transformed into a symbol of the closed mentality of the 
Japanese and was widely reported around the world .... A well-chosen anecdote can capture peoples attention and 
thereby provide an effective opening for the presentation of economic theory. But the anecdote about the Japanese 
who opposed decontrolling beef imports on the grounds that the digestive tracts of Japanese are supposedly different 
from those of Westerners has no place except perhaps as a bit of light conversation over cocktails". See Kazuo, above 
n 12, 54. 
70 Jackson comments that "much of the controversy and, indeed, anger about Japan's apparent unwillingness to import, 
centres on practices such as [gerrymandering the technical standards for imports)". See JH Jackson "Statement on 
Trade Policy Before the United States Senate Committee on Judiciary, 18 June 1992" (1992) 4:5 World Trade 11 I, 119. 
71 See Pempel, above n 6, 439. See also JJ Schott "The Law of the United States - Japan Trade Relationship" (1990) 24:2 
World Trade 37, 39. See also "European Union Raps Japan for Keeping Trade Barriers", Jiji Press Ticker Service, 
Tokyo, 19 May 1994. See also "Golden Opportunity : Washington Sees a Chance to Redraft Its Japanese Policy" Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 21 July 1994, 
72 Product liability law, until recently, was extremely weak in Japan. This was accentuated by the very high burden of proof 
placed on plaintiffs and an extremely slow, costly and inaccessible court system. Japanese were forced to rely heavily for 
product safety on an extensive system of bureaucratic standards, testing, and certification. In practice this system is readily 
susceptible to political capture by producer interests and can produce significant non-tariff barriers to imports. Numerous 
cases exist in which Japanese standards were written or changed to exclude imported products - often after imports had 
begun to significantly penetrate the market. However, in December 1993 the Japanese Social Policy Committee 
recommended the adoption of legislation that would create strict liability where a product was defective amd the plaintiff 
could prove the defect and causation. The legislation was passed into law on 22 June 1994, with enforcement commencing 
on l July 1995, and largely followed the Committees recommendations [Law No. 85 of 1994). The new Product Liability 
Statute removes the theoretical need to prove fault but does not provide new mechanisms for consumers to bring actions. 
However, it appears to signify a symbolic shift of power from the producer to the consumer within Japanese society. See 
Bergsten, above n 4, 73. See Z Kitagawa (ed) Doing Business in Japan (Matthew Bender, New York, 1994), Vo! 6, 20. 
73 Punke notes that foreigners generally do not belong to the associations assigned the task of developing specific product and 
safety standards. Not surprisingly, safety regulations often seem disproportionately burdensome to foreign companies. 
Such standards, testing and certification barriers are often encountered in concentrated or cartelised industries. See 
Bergsten, above n 4, 74. See also Punke, above n 41, 63. 
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IV INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 
"Institutional" cultural trade barriers refer to discriminatory organisational patterns 
within a society that exhibit an undeniable cultural basis. In the Japanese context these 
institutional barriers take three primary forms: administrative guidance; the corporate 
keiretsu; and the Japanese retail distribution system.74 
A Administrative Regulation and the Business-Bureaucrat Symbiosis 
A salient feature of the Japanese regulatory system is the close symbiosis between 
business and government. 75 Powerful Japanese business interests may dramatically influence 
the shape and development of governmental regulation, yet in return will submissively abide 
with bureaucratic requests. This relationship permits trade discrimination to occur in two 
principal forms. First, domestic firms and organisations may successfully lobby the 
government for overt regulation that is discriminatory against foreign producers. Second, 
discrimination may occur via the tacit effects of a more covert form of Japanese governmental 
influence known as "administrative guidance". 
1 Indirectly Discriminatory Governmental Regulation : The Complex Shaken System 
Where governmental regulations directly discriminate against foreign products they 
are challengeable under the GAIT. Most such overt discrimination has now been eliminated 
from the Japanese regulatory system. 76 This paper is therefore concerned with governmental 
74 Bergsten comments that: "Neither we nor other analysts have been able to quantify the 'contribution' to the total 
calculated implied non-tariff barrier effect of specific structural features of the Japanese economy, such as the 
government's industrial policy, corporate keiretsu relationships and absence of aggressive anti-trust policy, the 
distribution system, land use policy, or the product liability system. Formal border protection is light, but there is a 
trove of evidence suggesting that the government intervenes to limit imports of manufactures and sanctions limitations 
by the private sector". A seemingly contradictory view is outlined by the GAIT Secretariat which comments : "The extent 
to which practices such as keiretsu and the distribution system inhibit imports is difficult to ascertain. Available 
evidence suggests that the restrictive impact of these arrangements may be less important than is often claimed". See 
Bergsten, above n 4, 32. See also GAIT, above n 2, 11. 
75 In January 1993, the GAIT Trade Policy Review of Japan, conducted by the independent GAIT Secretariat, stated : "The 
Government continues to consult closely on trade issues with the private sector through a large number of advisory 
bodies. Interactions between the advisory bodies and the Government remain relatively informal and are not 
generally subject to public scrutiny, thereby strengthening the discretionary powers available to the Government." For 
example, there are numerous interest-articulation and aggregation groupings for the benefit of commercial and industrial 
interests. These operate very actively on a national scale in the form offederations, the four largest being the Federation of 
Economic Organisations ("Keidanren"); the Japan Chan1ber of Commerce and Industry; the Japan Federation of 
Employers' Associations; and the Japan Committee for Economic Development. Each of these associations has the ability 
to sway voter support in elections and they use this ability, plus their economic muscle, to influence politicians. They also 
put their own representatives onto various types of government commissions, and their views on important social and 
political questions are frequently reported to the media. See GAIT, above n 2, 4. See also W Akio Government and 
Politics in Modern Japan (Tokyo University, Tokyo, 1994), 13. 
76 The GAIT Secretariat names 33 overtly protectionistic laws in Japan. Most of these relate to agricultural products and are 
perpetuated by the politically powerful Nokyo agricultural co-operative. See above GA TT, n 2, 231 . 
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regulation that is indirectly discriminatory. Such regulations fall into a GAIT "grey-area" 
and have stubbornly persisted within the Japanese economy. The shaken automobile 
regulations provide a controversial example. 77 
The Japanese shaken automobile regulations sprang into the international limelight 
during the 1995 Japan-United States auto-trade dispute.78 These regulations are administered 
by the Japanese Ministry of Transport, one of the more notoriously heavy-handed regulators of 
the Japanese bureaucracy.79 The shaken regulations form a pervasive and elaborate web of 
rules and procedures that are intended to promote vehicle safety and protect the Japanese 
consumer. 80 However, while these regulations prima facie apply equally to both Japanese and 
foreign cars, allegations of discrimination have arisen because all shaken repairs must be 
conducted at Government-certified garages. And most of these certified garages are currently 
monopolised by domestic Japanese auto companies - hence practically all of the car parts they 
stock are Japanese. Foreign car parts are mostly found at Japan's independent, but non-
certified, garages. 81 
This tight repair-inspection linkage indirectly discriminates against foreign 
automobile suppliers. 82 It illustrates how Japanese companies have influenced their regulators 
into enacting laws that are not directly discriminatory, but are calculated to have a 
discriminatory effect when interacting with other features within the market environment. 83 
The extent to which such overt governmental regulation can be said to be "culturally" derived 
77 Pronounced "shar-ken". 
78 The auto trade dispute involved a stand-off between the United States and Japan on 28 June 1995. The United States was 
demanding that Japan implement a voluntary import expansion to boost the presence of American cars and car parts within 
the Japanese domestic market. The United States threatened to impose NZ$10 billion worth of tariffs against 13 models of 
Japanese luxury cars. These tariffs would have priced the cars completely out of the American market. See "What the 
United States-Japan Auto Debate is About", The Dominion, Wellington, 17 May 1995. See also "American Trade 
Sanctions Could Hit Japanese Autos This Weekend", Asian Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong, 17 May 1995. See also 
"Japanese Luxury Car-Makers Face Dilemma Due to United States Tariff'', Asian Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong, 18 
May 1995. See also "Japan Cites Urgency: Sanctions Saga Moves to WTO", Asian Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong, 30 
May 1995. See also "Negotiators Work Hard to Beat Deadline", CNN News, New York, 28 June 1995. 
79 See "Japan Transport Chief Stops Traffic At Auto Trade Talks" Asian Wall Street Journal, 30 May 1995, 1. 
80 See "Push to Open Car-Components Sector May Create Few Jobs at Home", Asian Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong, 25 
May 1995. See also "Car Battle Seen as Key Case for WTO", The Dominion, Wellington, 17 May 1995. 
81 Japan argues that changing the system would undermine Japan's tough auto safety standards. Earlier this year, following 
three years of intense American pressure, the Japanese Ministry of Transport pledged to relax the shaken licensing 
requirements for new garages. This avoided a WTO Panel scrutiny of the issue. See "Both United States and Japan Play 
Politics With Trade Talks" Asian Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong, 18 May 1995. 
82 Ironically the loudest complaining American company, Ford, is now achieving dramatic success in penetrating the Japanese 
market. Its 1994 Japanese sales reached 11,250 cars, an increase of 121 % on 1993. This figure is all the more remarkable 
when considering that Ford offers just two right-hand-drive models in Japan - the Ford Mondeo and the Ford Probe. See 
"Japan is Said to be Mulling Auto Subsidies" Asian Wall Street Journal, 16 June 1995, 1. 
83 Another example is provided by the Pharmaceutical Industry. The Pharmaceutical Affairs Law is not directly aimed at 
limiting imports of cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, but it has this restrictive effect. Under the Law, the importation and 
manufacture of all pharmaceuticals must be licensed. Only fonts resident within Japan are pennitted to hold import 
licenses, and all drugs must be approved by the Japanese Pharmacopoeia. As a result the non-tariff barrier for cosmetics 
and toilet preparations was estimated by the Institute for International Economics at 660% - the highest rate among the 50 
product groups they studied. See Sazanarni, above n 11, 27. 
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remains unclear. Arguably its pervasiveness within the Japanese economy results from the 
close historical symbiosis between Japanese government and industry. 84 
2 Administrative Guidance and Selective Enforcement : A Covert Form of Regulation 
In contrast, the more covert form of governmental regulation known as 
administrative guidance ("gyosei shido") appears deeply rooted within Japanese culture. 
Administrative guidance occurs when a Japanese bureaucrat requests a party to "voluntarily" 
act in a specific way to further some governmental ambition. 85 It is conducted via directions 
("shiji"), requests ("yobo"), warnings ("keikoku"), suggestions ("kankoku"), encouragements 
("kansho"), and notices ("tsuutatsu"). Its fundamental characteristic is that it remains 
unenforceable at law, the executive branch of government is simply expressing a general 
expectation that an action should be undertaken or conducted in a certain manner. 86 
While this can also be highly discriminatory in its effect, administrative guidance 
remains less amenable to judicial review because of its high legal obscurity. Professor W 
Lockwood comments:87 
84 A disadvantage of the close ties between Japanese Government and industry is the considerable degree of cormption. Until 
recently, parties with deeply vested interests monopolised the most influential positions within Japanese society and formed 
a closely knit alliance to block reform. But many forces acted to topple the old regime: 
(i) Ongoing sex, bribery and cormption scandals amongst elected officials provoked universal elector outrage; 
(ii) The collapse of Japan's economic bubble revealed the inefficiencies of the over-regulated Japanese economy; 
(iii) The US was pressuring Japan to deregulate and used severe measures such as Super 301 to enforce this "hard-line"; 
(iv) There was an increasing threat from East Asia - China's expanding economic power, and the Korean instability. 
Under the weight of proof of cormption, and the refusal of Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa to implement electoral 
changes, dissidents split from the Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP") in June 1993. This broke the LDP's 39-year 
stranglehold on political power. Japan went through four governments in the space of a year. On 29 June 1994, the 
previous coalition Government under Prime Minister T oshiki Kaifu collapsed and a new coalition under Prime Minister 
Tomiichi Murayama voted itself to power. The Murayama Government was a bizarre and highly unstable coalition 
between former bitter political enemies - the LDP and the Social Democratic Party. It seems they united solely in an 
attempt to slow the pace of reform. The critical final piece oflegislation to implement sweeping reforms to Japan's electoral 
system was indefmitely delayed. Clearly this was running against the wishes of the Japanese voting public. Only 35% of 
Japanese voters had confidence in the Murayama Government. This compared with popularity levels of 80% for the 
previous Governments of Prime Minister's Hosokawa and Hata. See "Recent US-Japan Trade Efforts Undercut by Japan's 
Political Turmoil", Management Briefing, New York, 6 July 1994. See "Expediency Triumphs Over Ideology in 
Coalition Politics" Far Eastern Economic Review, Singapore, 14 July 1994, 22. See "Conservatives and Socialists 
Sacrifice Principle for Power" Asiaweek, Hong Kong, 13 July 1994, 19. 
85 The GATT Secretariat defmes administrative guidance in the following terms : "The term "administrative guidance" 
covers informal regulation by the Government which seeks to persuade private enterprise to co-operate in achieving a 
particular policy objective. While this exists to some extent in all countries, it is alleged that its role and influence in 
Japan has been especially strong". Compliance is voluntary insofar as an agency carmot employ the judicial system of an 
administrative enforcement organ to compel a regulated party to obey the directive. See GATT, above n 2, 88. 
86 The GATT Secretariat comments : ''Administrative guidance works through persuasion and, being informal and not 
legally enforceable, cannot generally be challenged by private parties". The GATT Secretariat notes that a number of 
reported case illustrate how the practice has been used. In the Lions Oil case, for example, informal reports suggest that 
MIT! requested financial institutions to stop supplying finance to Lions after the company, despite admonition from MIT!, 
"reported" its intention to import gasoline commercially. See GA TT, above n 2, 88. 
87 Quoted in MK Young "Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance : Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute 
Resolution in Japan" (1984) 84 Columbia LR 923, 925. 
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The hand of the Japanese government is everywhere in evidence, despite its limited statutory 
powers. The ministries engage in an extraordinary amount of consultation, advice, persuasion and 
threat. The industrial bureaus of the Ministry for Trade and Industry proliferate sectorial targets 
and planes; they confer, they tinker, they exhort. This is the "economic by admonition" to a degree 
inconceivable in Washington or London. 
It seems administrative guidance has expanded the scope of regulatory activity beyond its 
legal limits to pervade almost every aspect of Japanese business life. 88 
Administrative guidance is constitutionally validated by a set of expansive discretions 
accorded to the key Government Ministries by the Japanese Diet. 89 The constituting laws of 
these Ministries confer them with capacious quasi-legislative, executive and quasi-judicial 
powers. Japanese officials may allude to these nebulous powers when interpreting, applying, 
or enforcing the law. It seems that historically the discretions were framed so diffusely as to 
be effectively urueviewable by the judicial system. 90 However, over the past couple of decades 
the Japanese judiciary have made substantial inroads into this administrative mire and have 
developed a radical legal doctrine empowering them to challenge such regulatory 
techniques. 91 
Historically, administrative guidance was most frequently employed by the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance ("MOF"), the Ministry for Trade and Industry ("MITI"), and the Bank of 
Japan.92 MITI was largely responsible for guiding Japanese industry out of its World War II 
88 Y amanouchi charges that administrative guidance permits agencies to regulate not only beyond the limits of the law, but 
also on occasion, in direct violation of the law. Such contravention is possible because any judicial enquiry into the 
propriety of the regulatory objective will be limited. See K Yamanouchi "Administrative Guidance and the Rule of Law" 
(1974) 7:22 Law in Japan 35, 37. 
89 For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MIT!") is established by the Tsuha Sangyo Setchi Ho, 
Law No 275 of 1952, art 3. The statue provides that the MITI shall be an "administrative organ with the responsibility of 
effectuating in a unified manner the national administration of the following: ... including the adjustment and promotion 
of commerce and the administration of foreign exchange relate to commence, and the promotion of international co-
operation in the trading economy". 
90 Judicial review of administrative guidance is particularly challenging due to the theoretically voluntary nature of 
compliance. See Young, above n 87,953. 
91 Historically, administrative guidance was non-justiciable. Then, in 1971 and 1972, two cases challenged this blank.et 
rejection. In Shioda v Ministry of International Trade & Industry 22 Gyoosei Jiken Saibun Reishuu 1758 (Tokyo 
District Court, 1971 ), a bankrupt company sued MITI alleging the Ministry was solely responsible for its bankruptcy. The 
Court declared an administrative notice invalid, but held the associated warning was a mere request and thus non-
justiciable. Similarly, in Sawarabi Kabushiki Kaisha v City of Kyoto 691 Hanrei Jihoo 57 (Kyoto District Court, 1972), 
planning restrictions promulgated by administrative guidance were held to be "exercise of public authority" and thus 
entitled the plaintiff to an award of damages. These case became the thin end of the wedge. A large body of caselaw has 
now evolved establishing broad legal principles within which administrative guidance must comply. Yet this developing 
doctrine is restrictive. The Japanese judiciary remain highly reluctant to intervene. See also Nakatani Hanten Goomei 
Kaisha v Tokyo 955 Hanrei Jihoo (Tokyo Court of Appeal, 1979). See Young, above n 87,940 
92 The Ministries most frequently involved in trade policy formulation, and their main concerns are the: Ministry for Trade 
and Industry ("MITI") (general trade policy); Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (agricultural policy); 
Ministry of Finance ("MOF") (government revenue); Ministry for Foreign Affairs (co-ordination; international 
negotiations); Economic Planning Agency (long-run economic planning); and the Fair Trade Commission (enforcement of 
competition laws). Historical tradition in Japan allowed the Executive, in particular the MITI and MOF, to become the 
supreme regulators. See Moitry, above n 43, 16. 
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devastation and used its powers of administrative guidance to control Japanese markets and 
fend off foreign competition.93 It is MITI's current use of administrative guidance that forms 
the most significant barrier to international trade.94 Yet it now seems that the role of 
administrative guidance within the Japanese economy may be slowly fading.95 
Why is administrative guidance so effective in Japan? Despite its intrinsic legal 
unenforceability, compliance with such guidance appears to be a Japanese norm. 
Commentators have highlighted three principal explanations: consultation, coercion, and 
culture. First, administrative guidance is usually implemented only after intensive informal 
consultation with affected Japanese businesses.96 It frequently summarises the results of 
extensive negotiations and often constitutes the official expression of a negotiated course of 
action.97 This element offait accompli clearly mitigates potential insurgence.98 
93 The Ministry for International Trade and Industry was able to implement a number of laws as early as the fifties in order to 
increase exports, rationalise production, and more spectacularly to limit the exports of cars into the United States in 1981 
and electronic goods in 1987. On the basis ofan agreement between the United States and Japan in 1981, an overall quota 
of 1.68 million units was granted to Japanese producers and then allocated by MlTI. See Moitry, above n 43, 8. 
94 Under American occupation, the domestic legal structure for current trade policy in Japan was established. Two pieces of 
legislation were passed under the provisions of the 1947 Constitution : the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control 
Law; and the Foreign Investment Law. These two legislative acts allowed the United States Government in Occupation 
considerable power to protect Japanese industry to achieve post-war economic stability. Japan's subsequent independence 
in 1952 did not result in any major reformulation of trade legislation. The basic economic policy of Japan remained guided 
by protectionism. Key provisions of the two Jaws provided considerable administrative latitude to the development of trade 
policy and its implementation. The Cabinet was authorised to elaborate and expand the provisions of trade legislation as 
Japan's trade policy required and Ministerial ordinances further supplemented matters. In 1979 the Japanese passed the 
detailed Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law 1979. This established a broad framework for regulation and 
delegated further authority to MOF and MITI. Much of the enforcement of the law was envisaged as occurring via 
administrative guidance. The GATT Secretariat notes, for example, that export cartels have often been formed under the 
Japanese Export and Import Transaction Law following administrative guidance from MITI. Adams notes 
that:"Protectionism was essentially accomplished by presumptively restricting all foreign exchange and foreign trade 
transactions" . See GATT, above n 2, 39. See Adams, above n 17, 47. 
95 The bureaucracy will steadily lose its ability to guide the economy as a result of globalisation and the inexorable increase in 
the economy's complexity and market orientation. Moitry comments that the Ministry for International Trade and 
Industry's powers have considerably diminished but remain important in respect of customs duties and restructuring, 
Conversely, in competition law, the Ministry finally seenlS to have lost its battle agairlSt the Competition Committee, 
although there are still a few clashes. See Bergsten, above n 4, 9. See also Moitry, above n 43, 16. 
96 Young notes that consultation can take a variety of fornlS depending on the nature of the problem and the agency's desired 
objective. All ministries utilise fonnal and informal consultative and advisory committees that comprise of industry 
representatives, academics, bureaucrats and representatives of other organisations, such as research institutions, the media 
and, on rare occasions, labour or consumer groups [note discussion above n 59]. When bureaucrats consult with the 
industry representatives, they sometimes focus on general business associations such as the powerful Keidanren, and the 
Keizai Doyukai (two powerful associations of prominent Japanese business leaders). At other times they may consult with 
specific trade associations, composed of representatives of all the companies within a particular industry. See Young, 
above n 87,939. See also K Uchihashi "Behind the Scenes at MIT!'' (1983) 10:4 Japan Echo 35, 37. 
97 Young notes that administrative guidance without consultation may meet with disobedience and, in rare cases, litigation. 
Japanese society favours group consensus; consultation is thus seen as a vital part of commercial etiquette. Agencies avoid 
potential disobedience by delegating much of the formulation and implementation of the guidance to the regulated parties 
themselves. This means the regulated parties may minimise the distortions of particular regulatory burdens (and may also 
"tilt the scales" against competitors). See Young, above n 87,940. 
98 Young comments: "Administrative organs in Japan often seek to enshrine bargaining and negotiation between parties 
as the principal device for allocating regulatory burdens". This pattern of forced bargaining and negotiation has an 
identifiable cultural basis in Japan. A study of the history of conciliation in Japanese law by Henderson highlighted Japan's 
historical tendency towards such "backward coercion" by administrators. Henderson identified the historical basis as an 
interest in protecting dominant classes from the otherwise valid clainlS of lower classes. See Young, above n 87, 941. 
. ,/ 
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The second factor encouraging obedience is the employment of subtle, non-legal 
forms of coercion by Japanese administrators. At the most extreme, these coercive techniques 
may include the publishing of names of businesses (resulting in negative publicity and loss of 
face), or costly and damaging legal investigations via selective enforcement of antitrust or tax 
legislation.99 But the most overwhelming coercive technique operates tacitly by a form of peer 
pressure. Bureaucrats play a key strategic role within the Japanese business environment and 
businesses will not wish to jeopardise their critically important relationship with the relevant 
Ministry by deliberately flouting bureaucratic requests. 
The third element contributing to the success of administrative guidance is cultural. 
Administrative guidance is steeped in culture, with Japanese bureaucrats performing the 
traditional role of the ancient feudal underlords ("daimyo"). 100 A Japanese official's requests 
are accorded a degree of reverence and respect that is unfamiliar to modern Western 
societies. 101 In his 1976 article, MS Johnson commented: 102 
99 Fingleton notes that selective enforcement gives Japanese officialdom great leverage. The concept of selective enforcement 
is historically derived, with the ruling daimyo of feudal Japan inventing the concept as a tool of power. Selective 
enforcement is also the hidden dynamic behind most of Japan's political scandals, including the "Recruit" scandal of the late 
1980s in which prominent Japanese politicians and bureaucrats were accused of insider trading and receiving company 
shares at below-market prices. See E Fingleton "Japan's Invisible Leviathan : The Ministry of Finance" (1995) 74:2 
Foreign Affairs 69, 78 
100 Essentially, up to and during Japan's Meiji period, the powerful ruling samurai and daimyo classes of Japan were 
transformed into a new class of administrators - the bureaucrats. They retained their elite status and their strong sense of 
duty and obligation to their traditional feudal masters (this role now assumed by cabinet ministers and military leaders). 
Prior to the Meiji period (also known as the "Meiji restoration"), Japan was feudally stratified - with a roughly pyramidal 
Confucian system of power based on the production of rice. The military samurai class (who owned the land) were at the 
top, the farmers (who produced the rice) were in the middle, and the merchants (who delivered the rice) at the bottom, of the 
feudal socio-economic pyramid. But with the dramatic increase in trade, the now economically powerful merchants began 
to challenge their socio-economic position - leading to a fundamental restructuring of Japanese society. Yet modern Japan 
retains echoes of this feudal culture. The top university graduates head for careers as administrators in the public service; 
the next-best graduates are employed by large Japanese corporations (generally, the bigger the company one is employed 
by, the higher one's own social status); and the graduates of "lesser" universities are employed by small and medium 
enterprises. See Nariai, n 14, 36. 
101 Johnson notes that one chief characteristic of justice in the Tokugawa period (1603-1868), was the tendency of the under-
lords ("daimyo") to: "Consider all the circumstances of individual cases, to confide the relaxation of principles to 
judicial discretion, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of a given course anew in each instance - in short to 
make justice personal... The result was a universal resort to arbitration and compromise as a primary means of settling 
disputes. It was, and still is, an ingrained principle of the Japanese social system that every dispute should be 
smoothed out by resort to arbitration". The bureaucrats of the modern Japanese government are not unlike the ancient 
daimyo of 200 years ago in Tokugawa Japan. They still display the characteristics of paternalism, autonomy, and an 
inclination to settle disputes informally. It is because of these bureaucrats who regulate business that great attention must 
be paid to administrative policy and guidance rather than strictly to formal law and legal considerations. Johnson describes 
this as a "legal consciousness" that "pervades almost every aspect of doing business in Japan". See MS Johnson "The 
Japanese Legal Milieu and its Relationship to Business" (1979) 13 American Bus LJ 335,341. 
102 Johnson noted that a key reason for the development of administrative guidance was the historical legacy of the 
administrative elite. Kaufinan also notes that both the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the 
omnipotent Ministry of Finance are a daily force in the lives of Japanese corporations. They are run by an elite corps of top 
graduates from prestigious universities (90% from Tokyo University). Historically the officials from these two Ministries 
have guarded their power jealously and, for example, historically MIT! sometimes refused to relinquish procedural controls 
over imports even when political leaders had publicly committed Japan to greater openness. See Johnson, above n 101, 
343. See also CS Kaufinan "The United States - Japan Semiconductor Agreement: Chipping Away at Free Trade" (1994) 
12 Pacific Basin LR 307,343. 
Japanese Cultural Trade Barriers: A New Generation of Issues in International Trade 
The Japanese bureaucrats are the successors to the ancient daimyo who were empowered to 
legislate, adjudicate, and execute justice within their own feudal estate. Today, in Japan, the 
prerequisite for becoming a bureaucrat is education. The best students from the most eminent 
universities compete for the privilege of joining the most desired profession : the governmental 
service. With this sense of inherited authority and educational elitism, the Japanese bureaucrat 
wields seemingly unlimited authority in interpreting or applying laws, recognising and resolving 
conflicts and disputes ( either economic or political) and effecting solutions to problems. 
How does administrative guidance act as an institutional barrier to trade? 
Administrative guidance is expedited by the extremely close ties between Japanese business 
and government. 103 Foreign companies are generally alienated by this insular system and 
prevented from exerting the same degree of influence over their regulatory environment. 
Consequentially, they may find themselves unable to solicit vital market concessions, or they 
may find incumbent Japanese firms actively soliciting administrative guidance to carefully 
slant the regulatory system against them. 
Yet ironically administrative guidance has also proved beneficial to foreign nations 
in their desire to open the Japanese market. 104 It has provided a convenient mechanism for 
the Japanese Government to exert pressure on Japanese industry to adhere to "voluntary 
restraint agreements" negotiated between Japan and the United States. 105 Such a situation 
occurred with the Japan-United States Semiconductor Accord in 1986. 106 Ironically, it may 
not be in the best interests of foreign countries, such as the United States, to seek the 
elimination of administrative guidance at the present time. 107 
103 Foreign companies are generally excluded from the "old-boy" network of former and government officials. After an early 
retirement (aged 50 or 55), Japanese administrators generally accept positions in major Japanese corporations, usually the 
same ones they regulated during their tenure in government. This process, known as amakudarai, or "descent from 
heaven", provides a substantial link between the companies and the current bureaucrats and assures a particularly good 
reception for the former bureaucrat's current employer. Foreign companies generally remain outside this important conduit 
into the administrative process. See M Dean "Administrative Guidance in Japanese Law : A Threat to the Rule of Law?" 
[1991] J Bus Law 52, 55. 
104 The GATT Secretariat comments : "Much administrative guidance exercised my Ministries enables Japan to meet 
concerns raised by major trading partners. Import and export guidance has, reportedly, been used to ensure that 
Japanese firms do not inflame trade frictions with trading partners, or to encourage firms to fulfil bilateral trading 
undertakings." See GATT, above n 2, 89. 
105 The American unilateral pressure for trade goals could actually backfire. It forces the Japanese government to use 
administrative guidance to meet demands. Thus American pressure to improve access to the Japanese market provides a 
new basis for extra-legal bureaucratic control over the industry - which in tum could engender renewed discrimination 
against foreign finns. See Takeshi, n 21, 18. 
106 1n relation to the semiconductor agreement. MITI in effect began to establish a production cartel, issuing quarterly 
"forecasts" of semiconductor demand and production that carried an implicit administrative imprimatur. Subsequently 
MIT! issued "requests" for production cutbacks. Although there was some initial resistance, within a month all the fums 
had fallen into line. Lastly, MIT! provided "opinions" to firms on their investment plans. See Bergsten, above n 4, 131. 
107 The GATT Secretariat notes the Government of Japan announced in its report for the Structural Impediments Initiative 
talks with the United States that it would ensure that administrative guidance is not intended to restrict market access nor to 
undermine fair competition: "Administrative guidance would be implemented in writing as much as possible and, unless 
good reasons exist not to do so, would be made public when implemented." 1n order to foster greater transparency in the 
role of administrative guidance and meet its commitments for administrative reform to the United States, the Japanese 
passed new legislation known as the "Administrative Procedure Law" which came into effect on 1 October 1994. This 
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3 The Pervasive Influence of the Nokyo: An Omnipotent Agricultural Co-operative 
The Nokyo is a mammoth agricultural cartel traversing the Japanese agricultural 
sector. 108 It is pyramidal in structure and administered by the Tokyo-based "Central Union of 
Agricultural Co-operatives" ("zenchu"). Prefectural agricultural co-operatives within each of 
Japan's 47 prefectures form an intermediary tier and these control an estimated 3,000 regional 
co-operatives. 109 The Nokyo is another remnant of Japan's feudal past where farmers had a 
high status within society due to their critical role in the supply of rice. 
The Nokyo cartel is extremely well organised and is intimately linked with the 
political system. 110 Rural electorates in Japan account for a large percentage of Japanese 
parliamentary seats and tend to be dominated by Nokyo-sympathetic politicians. These 
politicians are frequently bankrolled by the Nokyo itself. This concentration of political power 
seems singly responsible for the outrageous prices Japanese pay for food. 111 Price controls 
have elevated the price of rice to seven times that of other nations - similarly with beef and 
selected fruits. 112 National farm subsidy programs are estimated to cost Japan around NZ$50 
billion annually. 113 
stipulates revived procedures for issuing administrative guidance and extensive transparency provisions. It requires all 
guidance to be given in writing, except where business secrets are involved. All guidelines from Ministries on 
administrative guidance must be published. See above GATT, n 2, 39, 89. See also "Japan : A Very Different Legal 
Environment" East Asian Executive Law Reports, Hong Kong, 15 October 1988, I. 
I 08 Domestic agricultural production in Japan is protected from foreign competition through tariffs, quotas, state trading 
monopolies, and when formal barriers are insufficient, informal barriers to imports. See above Bergsten, n 4, 100. 
I 09 At the local co-operative level , for example, Nokyo groups traded ¥6.3 trillion ($US63 billion) worth of agricultural 
products in the year to March 1993. The co-ops had outstanding deposits in their financial services outlets of¥69.5 trillion, 
more than any private Japanese bank. And their insurance-service assets amounted to ¥22.6 million, more than all but one 
of Japan's insurers. See Y Yasuhiko "A New Perspective on the Rice Issue" (1994) 21 :1 Japan Echo 63, 65. 
110 Bergsten concludes "Close examination of individual industry case studies indicates that regulatory barriers tend to 
emerge in industries where domestic producer lobbies are strong; either primary-product sectors where there are well-
established producer lobbies, or highly concentrated or cartelised manufacturing and service sectors where the small 
number of producer firms facilitates the organisation of industrial lobbies. This confluence of public and private 
barriers inhibits entry by newcomers, whether foreign or domestic". The GATT Secretariat also comments "Japanese 
producers, including farmers representatives, are much more strongly represented than consumers in the advisory 
bodies". See above Bergsten, n 4,72. See also GATT, above n 2, 4. See also K Nishimoto "Nokyo : Pressure From the 
Co-ops" (1972) 7 Japan Interpreter 3, 7. 
111 Japanese generally pay 60% more than Americans on food with the Nokyo the principal beneficiary. 
112 Until a poor harvest in 1993 (caused by a series of typhoons and a cold summer) pushed the government to allow rice 
imports, the Japanese policy of self-sufficiency meant a virtual ban on rice imports. In 1992 the OECD estimated the 
subsidy to Japanese rice producers at US$19 billion. In January 1995, the Washington-based Institute for International 
Economics calculated an implied non-tariff barrier on milled rice of737%. See Yasuhiko, above n 109, 63. 
113 According to OECD estimates, the total transfers from Japanese consumers to producers during 1992 for agricultural 
products were estimated at US$600 per capita (substantially above the US$440 average for all other OECD nations). The 
GATT Secretariat comments: "Various studies have attempted to measure the economic costs of Japan's agricultural 
policies. Vincent (I 989), using a general equilibrium model to simulate the gains to the Japanese economy, found that 
the removal of agricultural supports could increase Japan's export earnings by some 3% (equivalent to annual gains 
ofYl ,200 billion at 1985 prices). He estimated that Japan's agricultural policies could curtail manufacturing output 
by between 0.3 and 2% and reduce manufacturing employment demand from 0.4 to 4%. Similarly, Anderson and 
Tyers (1987) estimated the domestic welfare costs of Japan's agricultural assistance to be some US$20 billion annually 
(1985 prices), equivalent to over 1% of Japan's GDP". See Sazanami, above n 11, 40. See also GATT, above n 2, 136. 
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During the GA TT's Uruguay Round the Japanese finally agreed to opened their rice 
markets to foreign imports. Yet the political influence of the Nokyo dramatically limited the 
extent of the concessions. 114 For example, a 500% tariff on Californian rice is now only being 
incrementally reduced over a five year period. Yet there now seems to be an anti-Nokyo 
rebellion among Japanese farmers based on perceived injustices and extreme corruption. 115 It 
seems the cartel is progressively disintegrating and losing its pervasive political influence. 116 
This culturally-derived association, embodying the historical feudal power of Japanese 
farmers, is now losing its potent political power to erect overt Japanese barriers to trade. 
B Relational Contracting and the Japanese Keiretsu (Corporate Groupings) 
The infamous Japanese keiretsu are groups of interlocking companies that facilitate 
anti-competitive practices within their particular industries. 117 The keiretsu exist as thousands 
of cartels ranging from small affiliations to enormous multinational corporate networks. 118 
The 200 principal keiretsu in Japan control approximately 12,000 medium-sized companies -
roughly one third of Japan's business capital. 119 
In the West such commercial structures are frequently outlawed as they allow firms 
to manipulate prices and inhibit competition. 120 Yet in Japan such behaviour is an 
incontrovertible feature of business life. While keiretsu networks are theoretically 
114 Japan gives substantially more overt protection to agricultural products then to industrial products. These agricultural 
policies are justified as ensuring food security and stable prices (rice and wheat), to stabilise farm income (dairy and meat), 
to promote a structural shift to new crops (fruit and vegetables), and to maintain farm income parity (sugar). The GAIT 
Secretariat comments "State trading in agricultural products in Japan is used by the Government as a means of 
stabilising supplies to consumers and controlling imports to assist domestic producers of rice, wheat, barley and milk 
products (mainly skimmed milk powder and butter)." See Sazanami, above n 11 , 20. See also GAIT, above n 2, 87. 
115 See "Farmers Reap Greater Profit By Skirting Nokyo Co-ops and the Law : Agricultural Groups Losing Viability as 
Markets Evolve", The Nikkei Weekly, Tokyo, 18 July 1994. 
116 It also seems that despite high levels of assistance, the number of full-time farmers in Japan has fallen rapidly, reflecting the 
changing structure of Japan's economy. Over four-fifths offarmers are now part-time and, for two-thirds of these, non-farm 
income is by far the predominant source of income. See GAIT, above n 2, 136. 
117 In 1995 in the Japanese pulp and paper industry, for example, the Japan Fair Trade Commission ("JFfC") is investigating 
the absence of written purchase orders for many transactions among Japanese firms (which allow non-transparent 
contracting practices to flourish) and the custom of making post-transaction price adjustments (which give Japanese firms a 
second bite at competing for orders). The impact of such practices was calculated by the Institute for International 
Economics to be reflected in an implied non-tariff barrier rate of 19%. See Sazanami, above n 11, 25. 
118 Until recently the term "keiretsu" was used by Japanese to refer predominately to the six major industrial groupings of 
Mitsui, Mitsubushi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa and Dai-Ichi Kangyo. These groupings, were typically assembled around a 
major bank and/or common trading company and involved formal and informal links that frequently included cross-
shareholding among the member firms. However, over the past two decades the term keiretsu has been extended to 
describe vertical integration of firms: often stretching from the production of raw materials, through manufacturing, to tied 
wholesale and retail distribution outlets. Such continuous links are found particularly in automobiles, consumer 
electronics, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and photographic equipment. For example, Matsushita, Toyota, Sony, Nissan, 
Hitachi, Nippon, Toshiba, and Sanyo. See A Helou "The Nature and Competitiveness of Japan's Keiretsu" (1993) 27:2 
World Trade 99, 102. 
119 See N lwao "Opening Up Fortress Japan" (1990) 17:3 Japan Echo 8, 12. 
120 Keiretsu are inherently discriminatory. Firms within the group receive preference over those outside. 
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independent of the State, the influence of the keiretsu permeates throughout Japanese 
business, politics, and society. RL Cutts comments: 121 
Japanese society is organised by the grouping of families of interest in business, government 
bureaucracies, political parties, and even universities. The nation is largely lashed together by a 
web of informal cartels, as well as their formal derivatives, keiretsu. Politics, society, and business 
are ensnared because the Japanese believe that these insular arrangements maintain the security of 
the nation, provide full employment, and distribute the burden of risks of all sorts. 
Historically, keiretsu originated during the Japanese Meiji era of 1869-1912. The 
rude awakening of the hitherto secluded and feudal Japan to an industrialised world resulted 
in national humiliation borne of economic inferiority. The Japanese administration remained 
alive to the threat of colonisation by superior Western powers and embarked on a systematic 
and state-co-ordinated policy of rapid industrialisation and militarisation. To achieve such 
rapid reform, the Japanese administration arrogated itself economic power and forged vast 
state-sponsored industrial networks that mirrored the feudal associations of the past. 122 The 
wealthy merchant houses of Japan's Edo period were transformed into gargantuan financial 
and industrial conglomerates; the "zaibatsu" .123 These zaibatsu permitted Japan to swiftly 
develop a colossal economic and military advantage - until the Japanese defeat in the Second 
World War. 
With Japan's surrender to the United States in 1945, the United States Military 
Government in Occupation enacted legislation to disband and outlaw the zaibatsu. 124 By 
121 See RL Cutts "Capitalism in Japan: Cartels and Keiretsu" (1992) 70 Harvard Bus Rev 48, 49. See also See JD Richards 
"Japan Fair Trade Conunission Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business Practices : An Illustration of 
Why Antitrust Law is a Weak Solution to US Trade Problems with Japan" (1993] Wisconsin LR 921,925. 
122 The opening of Japan was imposed by foreign powers in 1858. Moitry notes that this context of national humiliation and 
economic inferiority precipitated a close collusion between State and industrial interests. State leadership advanced a 
systematic policy of industrialisation and export orientation. At first loyalty of businesses to the State was sufficient, but 
during the 1920s that specific means were created - exporting companies. The government allocated production and export 
quotas to these select companies and even imposed requirements of co-operation on all companies operating in the same 
field. This provided the zaibatsu with fertile ground in which to develop. See Moitry, above n 43, 11. 
123 Nariai notes that during the great recession of the 1920s, almost all Japanese industries had formed cartels to survive, and 
repeatedly resorted to agreements on marketing, prices, or production. At first the binding power of these cartels was not 
very strong, but after the severe crisis that followed the lifting of the gold embargo in Japan, cartels became popular. The 
number of cartels snowballed, particularly because the government tried to promote industrial rationalisation by enforcing 
the Important Industry Control Law, which encouraged cartels. Against this background, the existing zaibatsu thrived. 
During World War Two the "zaibatsu maintained their control over industries, but the government's control was so 
strong that the zaibatsu virtually served as agents for the government". See Nariai, above n 14, 23, 27. 
124 Following World War II the Japanese legal system was completely remodelled largely at the instigation of the American 
Military Government in Occupation. The codes of the Mei.fi era, of French and German inspiration, were modified and a 
new Constitution replaced that of 1889. The spirit of American law has now infused many of Japan's statues. In 1947 the 
US Military Government passed the Anti-Monopoly Law [Statute No. 54 of 1947]. By Article 9 "state holding 
companies", the zaibatsu, were abolished. These vast financial conglomerates had allowed Japan an enormous economic 
and military advantage. [The modem-<iay Korean chaebol were modelled on the zaibatsu]. However, Fingleton notes that 
the militarist years had left the Japanese Ministry of Finance ("MOF") with a legacy of massive regulatory powers. When 
the Americans shut down the military and attempted to break up the zaibatsu this created a massive power vacuum into 
which the MOF stepped. Today, power in Japan is concentrated within a robust pyramid headed by the MOF. See 
Fingleton, above n 99, 78. See also S Zen'ichi "A Texan Raid on a Japanese Company" (1989) 16,4 Japan Echo 61, 65. 
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American standards they were considered anti-competitive and economically ine:fficient. 125 
They also constituted a threat to American firms and were perceived as being singly 
responsible for the awesome power of the Japanese military machine. However, the 
companies of the former zaibatsu began acquiring large volumes of stock in each other and 
confined their business intercourse to other firms within the original structures. The Japanese 
bureaucracy quickly reverted to its former ways and permitted, even encouraged, the financial 
and industrial groups to retain their power. 126 The keiretsu networks of today were born. It is 
this keiretsu system which catalysed Japan's "economic miracle". 
The keiretsu have now become a paradigm for Japanese economic supremacy. So 
much so, that commentators have suggested the keiretsu evidence Japan's own unique brand 
of capitalism.127 Instead of adopting a Western consumer orientation, Japanese society places 
the interests of the producer first. 128 Yet this does not mean competition does not exist within 
the Japanese economy. 129 Cutts notes that there is nothing sentimental about the keiretsu.130 
125 The GATI Secretariat comments that examining the role and efficiency ofkeiretsu groupings in Japan has proved difficult 
and controversial: "Even defining the keiretsu remains contentious". Bergsten comments that a number of important 
studies have examined the possible impact of keiretsu on Japan's trade pattern : Krenin (1988), Petri (1991), Lawrence 
(1991), Fung (1991), Noland (1992). He noted that each of these reports had its shortcomings, but the consistency in the 
results, obtained independently by different researchers using different models and data sets, suggested that keiretsu have a 
significant impact on Japanese trade patterns. See GATI, above n 2, 109. See also Bergsten, above n 4, 182. 
126 For example, the Mitsui keiretsu consists of24 major companies : Mitsui Bank (the group's main bank), Mitsui Trust (also 
a bank), Mitsui Bussan (a trading company), Mitsukoshi (a retailer), Mitsui Construction, Sankai Engineering, Mitsui Real 
Estate, Toray (textiles), Mitsui Toatsu (chemicals), Mitsui Petroleum, Mitsui Mining, Hokkaido Coal, Onoda Cement, Oji 
Paper, Japan Steel Works, Mitsui M & M (non-ferrous metals), Toyota Motors, Mitsui Shipping, Toshiba (electronics), 
Mitsui OSK (shipping), Mitsui Warehouse, and Nippon Flour. Cross-shareholding accounts for more than half of all the 
shares of these finns, and the main bank finances around one-fifth of all their borrowing. See Bergsten, above n 4, 75. 
127 There is now widespread recognition of important differences between the Japanese and US brands of market economy. 
Over a decade ago, C Johnson (1982) portrayed Japan in the earlier post-war period as a "developmental state" akin to 
mercantilist nations ofa previous era. More recently, C Prestowitz, Jr (1988), has called attention to Japan's emphasis on 
production, which contrasts sharply with America's emphasis on consumption. E Sakakibara (1992) portrays his country 
as a "non-capitalist market economy". N lwao (1992) makes a useful distinction between American "market capitalism" 
and Japanese "network capitalism". S Okita (1992) labelled Japan's model, which he regarded as very useful for 
developing and emerging market economies, "catch-up capitalism" or "the capitalism of the latecomer". 
128 Bergsten comments that the post-war economic policies of the United States and Japan suggest that they have pursued two 
very different sets of economic priorities : "The United States set out to create the world's greatest consumer society and, 
within a single generation, attained a standard of living for most of its people beyond anything history had seen before. 
Japan, in contrast, set out to create a production machine that would restore both its economic security and its 
respectability in the family of nations. It too succeeded beyond all historical precedent - the formidably competitive 
manufacturing sector that emerged is the enry of the world." Bergsten notes that while both countries achieved their 
intended goals in spectacular fashion, their policy-makers never dreamed that realisation of these fundamentally different 
national purposes would bring them into frontal conflict. See Bergsten, above n 4, 12. 
129 The differences between the Japanese and American economies relate primarily to methods of corporate governance, 
financial markets, labour-management relations, interactions between government and the private sector, and linkages 
among companies - the keiretsu system. Japanese companies respond to the interests of a wide array of stakeholders 
(notably employees, suppliers, and affiliated firms) rather than mainly to the interest of the shareholders as American finns 
do. Many of these stakeholders, including the "main banks" and other members of financial keiretsu, take a long-term view 
of the firm, provide a "patient capital" that emphasise long-term market shares rather than immediate profits, and block 
attempted take-overs. Japanese labour, thanks largely to the promise of lifetime employment and extensive participation in 
corporate decision-making, has been enormously supportive in raising corporate productivity. The Japanese government, 
particularly in earlier periods, has provided a system of systematic and sustained support for important domestic industries, 
both sunrise and sunset. See Bergsten, above n 4, 8. 
130 See Cutts, above n 121, 53. 
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They are totally ruthless with each other and each resembles a fighting clan, uniting its 
business family against rival keiretsu in the battle for market dominance. Indeed, for products 
such as automobiles, the Japanese market is one of the most fiercely competitive in the world. 
Until relatively recently the keiretsu were actively encouraged by the Japanese 
government, although they would clearly violate the strict anti-trust laws of most Western 
nations. 131 Despite intense American pressure, the use of keiretsu has remained an intractable 
feature of Japanese business and society. 132 Yet why have the keiretsu become such an 
integral part of Japanese culture? Professor N Iwao of Osaka University theorises it is because 
keiretsu practices mirror the Japanese cultural propensity to build long term relationships of 
trust: 133 
The Japanese are inclined to value a relationship of trust built up between two organisations over a 
number of years more highly than factors directly tied to competitiveness in the marketplace. 
Japanese firms unquestionably operate within the context of tightly knit corporate relationships. 
Extending far beyond the confines of short-term business transactions, these relationships entail 
inter-organisational co-operation on all levels. Herein lies the essential difference between Japanese 
style capitalism and the American brand, with its emphasis on short-term performance. Herein, too, 
lies the key to Japan's spectacular post-war success. 
Yet it is also apparent that the keiretsu networks tacitly operate to exclude foreign 
products. 134 R Dore notes the dilemma facing foreign firms: "imports penetrate into markets, 
131 Many cartels are not legally sanctioned by the Japanese Government. For example, a purely private cartel in which 
Japanese companies agree to control the export prices without the approval of Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
would violate the Export and Import Transactions Law [Law No 299 of 1952) (Yushutsunyuu Torihiki Hoo). Although 
such a cartel would become legal if sanctioned by the MITI. See Peters, above n 61,522. 
132 In 1974 the United States pressured Japan into establishing the Japan Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") to enforce the 1947 
Anti-monopoly Law and prevent the zaibatsu reforming. But the JFTC rapidly became notorious for its ineffectiveness. 
Under American pressure this has recently changed. Following discussions between the United States and Japan in 1989, 
the JFTC was strengthened and its independence enhanced. The JFTC drafted new guidelines on anti-competitive 
practices, especially in the distribution system, clarifying which practices were illegal and which were not. The Japanese 
Government endorsed this process : "Jn accordance with the increasing globalisation of economic activity, it has 
become an important policy objective to make the Japanese market more open and to protect consumer welfare". The 
JFTC has boosted surveillance of many keiretsu and enforcement of unfair trading practices has tripled. The JFTC is now 
playing a significant role in increasing market access for foreign firms. It has been estimated by the JFTC that almost 90% 
of all domestic business transactions within Japan are "among parties involved in long standing relationships in the 
nature ofkeiretsu". See JF Rill "Statement on Japanese Competition Policies and the United States Response Before the 
US Senate Judiciary Committee, 29 July 1992" (1992) 16,1 World Competition 143, 143. 
133 Keiretsu reflect a Japanese cultural emphasis on continuity of the contractual relationship. Verbal and psychological 
contracts are considered to be as binding as written contracts. Reneging on these verbal contracts often brings swifter and 
more unforgiving sanctions than any court penalties. Contracts are assumed to be continuous, and this carriers real cash 
value as a form of insurance against uncertain outcome. The continuity of the business relationship often has sufficient 
economic value to a subcontracting firm to outweigh discounts or other benefits offered by new suppliers or customers. 
See above Iwao, n 119, 12. See also Makino, above n 60, 36. See also Maurer, above n 54, 24. 
134 The problem with this argument is that discrimination carries a well-known efficiency cost. Firms that do not source from 
the most efficient suppliers place themselves at a competitive disadvantage. The proven ability of the Japanese electronics 
firms to compete in world markets implies that they are not competitively disadvantaged in any significant way. Bergsten 
suggests one possible reason is that vertical integration can capture "significant pecuniary externalities". Another is that 
keiretsu might prefer to source from affiliated companies as part of a kind of profit sharing and insurance scheme. See 
Bergsten, above n 4, 134. 
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but where there are no markets, only a network of established 'consumer relationships', it is 
hard for them to make any headway". 135 There is growing anger amongst foreign nations that 
Japan is engaging in "unfair business practices". 136 Sustained international pressure is being 
placed on Japan to eliminate the keiretsu. 137 
While the Japanese are slowly responding to this external pressure, it is clear that the 
keiretsu remain deeply entrenched within Japanese business culture. 138 The interaction of the 
keiretsu with Japanese society and government has a largely impregnable barrier to 
international trade. 139 The Japanese automobile industry is illustrative. 
1 The Advantages of Vertical Keiretsu : The Japanese Automobile Industry 
The Japanese auto industry is notorious for its exploitation of keiretsu techniques and 
manifests the two key "vertical" keiretsu techniques used by modern Japanese industry: closed 
supply pyramids, and discriminatory distribution networks. 
135 See R Dore & I Masamichi "Japan and the United States : Reviewing the Structure of Japan-US Relations" (1992) 14 
Japan Echo 37, 40. See also I Ken'ichi "The Legitimacy of Japan's Corporate Groups" (1990) 17:3 Japan Echo 23, 25. 
136 The keiretsu issue was brought to a head in March 1989 when Texas oil magnate T Boone Pickens attempted to take-over 
the Japanese auto-parts supplier Koito. He demanded representation on Koito's Board of Directors but was refused. 
Enraged, he complained to the United States Congress. The Japanese argued Pickens had been treated no differently to 
any other hostile company. They explained the keiretsu cross-shareholding system was designed to ward-off hostile take-
overs per se. They also highlighted the fact that in Japanese companies the interests of the employees, not shareholders, 
reigned supreme. Hence under Japanese law there was no duty to appoint nominees of Pickens to the Koito Board. But 
allegations of Japanese discrimination were sympathetically received by Congress and much cynicism was directed at the 
Japanese when they invoked cultural differences to justify their stance. See Zen'ichi. above n 124, 66. 
137 Further pressure from the US recently led to a revamping of the Japanese Trade and Investment Ombudsmen's Office. It is 
now completely independent of the Japanese Government and consists of a panel of industry experts with great statutory 
powers to enforce market opening mechanisms. This is another major step in reducing the power of the keiretsu. Keiretsu 
are also under scrutiny from the Japanese Judiciary. The Tokyo District Court recently blocked a ploy to escape a hostile 
take-over bid attempted by two keiretsu supermarket giants Chuujitsuya and Inageya against the hostile real-estate giant 
Shuuwa The two finns had issued stock to each other at a discount to dilute Shuuwa's share. See "Sweeping Overhaul of 
Trade Ombudsmen" Japan Times Weekly International Edition, Tokyo, Japan, 7 June 1994, 3. 
138 Sheet glass illustrates the problem. Japan's sheet glass market is supplied primarily by three producers : Asahi Glass, 
Nippon Sheet Glass, and Central Glass. Not surprisingly, the implied non-tariff barrier in 1989 was calculated by the 
Institute for International Economics to be 62%. The United States - Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) took up 
the claim by a US flat glass maker that the domestic distribution network ( controlled by the three Japanese producers) was 
being used to impede market access. The Japanese government eventually agreed to facilitate foreign exports to Japan with 
an import expansion programme and directed the Ministry of Construction to help foreign finns comply with glass 
standards used in Japanese construction. At the end of 1993, following continued complaints by American exporters, the 
JFTC again surveyed conditions in the Japanese glass market The JFTC reported that it had found "no violations" of 
Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law. However, the JFTC simultaneously "encouraged" the 3 glass producers to tenninate a system 
of sales targets for distributors that "may have a negative effect on imports". See Sazanami, above n 11, 26. 
139 It seems that global economic forces will gradually weaken the power of the keiretsu. Globalisation offmancial markets 
will weaken financial interdependence and equalise the cost of capital across countries (access to cheap capital has been a 
major advantage for Japanese companies in the past). Japan's is beginning to apply antitrust policy more aggressively and 
has started to liberalise its distribution system; both of these initiatives will also erode the keiretsu over time. The GATT 
Secretariat also notes that "keiretsu-hopping" by Japanese finns now appears to be increasing, while foreign finns, in line 
with Japan's recent policies of de-restricting inward foreign investment, are becoming increasingly involved with keiretsu-
affiliated finns. The Secretariat concluded that in light of these fmdings, the role of the keiretsu was weakening 
dramatically. See GATT above n 2, I 10. See Bergsten, above n 4, 9. 
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The supply-side of the vertical keiretsu existing within the Japanese auto industry 
typically comprise horizontally and vertically integrated pyramids of hundreds of suppliers 
and component manufacturers, tightly ordered into a single structure as if they were a single 
enterprise. 140 Together they supply all the requirements of the principal auto manufacturer. 
Subcontracting companies receive cheap financing from contracting companies but in return 
must enter into long-term supply agreements and typically the contracting companies will also 
own large share-holdings in their sub-contracting companies. 141 This system has been 
recognised as providing superb product quality, increased security, and greater manufacturer 
control - yet it shuts out foreign suppliers. 142 It is also fairly harsh in its operation with the 
smaller "dispensable" companies at the bottom of the pyramid bearing the brunt of tight 
business conditions. 143 
The distribution-side of the vertical keiretsu regulates the flow of products from the 
manufacturer to the consurner. 144 In the car industry these take the form of "dealerships" 
whereby Japanese dealers agree to sell only selected brands of cars - as frequently occurs 
140 Richards notes that keiretsu may be categorised into two distinct forms: 
fim, the Mitsubushi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Daichi Kangyo and Sanwa groups are all examples of horizontal keiretsu. An 
example of a powerful horizontal keiretsu is provided by the Mitsubishi Group, which includes Japan's largest chemical 
company, its largest brewery, its fifth largest bank, and its fifth largest automobile company (Mitsubushi's member 
companies number nearly 190 with annual sales amounting to NZ$500 billion). Such horizontal groups share the 
following characteristics : a central role played by the group's bank and trading company; mutual stock ownership and 
interlocking directorships between the member firms; the key companies concentrate on the group's main function while 
other companies in the group provide supplementary functions; and a common tendency to bring together representatives of 
member finns to consult, make policy, and monitor activities within the group. 
The second type ofkeiretsu, particularly common in the automobile and electronics industries, has a vertical structure with 
a large parent company having a considerable number of small and medium sized companies under its aegis. Toyota, for 
example, has 175 primary suppliers and 4000 secondary suppliers. Although the small and medium sized companies are 
subcontractors to the larger company, the Japanese view subcontracting as an intermediate view of business relationship, 
existing somewhere between a supplier in the open market and an in-house manufacturer. When most of these contractor-
subcontractor relationships were being formed, Japanese measures to nurture the economy prevented foreign companies 
from operating in the Japanese market • and the long-term nature of relational contracting in the Japanese business 
environment means that they are now effectively excluded. See Richards, above n 121, 925. 
141 At the hub of each keiretsu is a bank or cash-rich company (for example a large manufacturer) which provides low cost, 
"patient" capital. A prime reason for entering a keiretsu group was to gain access to this credit. Under the regulated 
financial system was not readily available through normal channels. But deregulation of the financial system has now 
lessened the need to maintain these links. See GATT, above n 2, 110. See also Richards, above n 121,923. 
142 For example, the ''.just-in-time" ("kanban") system minimises inventories. This implicitly excludes foreign companies from 
the automobile component market. Bergsten also comments that some aspects of keiretsu behaviour are not only 
acceptable, but worthy of emulation: "long-term cross-holdings of corporate shares provide 'patient' capital and 
encourage effective monitoring of management. Some aspects of vertical corporate integration, such as the 
"designing-in" of components and just-in-time inventory deliveries, enhance efficiency". See Bergsten, above n 2, 213. 
See Iwao, above n 119, 10. See Alden, above n 55, 53. 
143 The Japanese argue that the keiretsu system is simply a cousin of the corporate networks that are found throughout the 
industrialised world. Both systems are simply following acknowledged business practices by entering into continuous 
relationships to ensure that the supply, quality and price of inputs and outputs remain at satisfactory levels. Both systems 
exploit a nexus of very complex explicit and implicit contracts. See A Morita "Partnering for Competitiveness : The Role 
of Japanese Business" (1992) 70 Harvard Bus Rev 76, 82. 
144 For example Matsushita owns a chain of 25,000 retail outlets throughout Japan which generate roughly 50% of 
Matsushita's domestic sales. These retail outlets sell only Matsushita goods. Similar patterns exist with other 
manufacturers within the pharmaceutical, newspaper, processed food, camera and automotive fields. See I Motoshige 
"Creating a Competitive Commercial Sector" (1990) 17,3 Japan Echo 17. 
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within other nations. Most Japanese car firms officially permit their dealers to sell foreign 
brands, but only about 20% of Japanese dealers do so. 145 The reason, according to American 
officials, is that tradition and informal pressure from Japanese auto makers coerce most 
Japanese dealers to stock only Japanese vehicles. 146 Yet the Japanese argue that American 
companies will never establish their own dealership networks in Japan until they make 
American vehicle parts and servicing more readily available to Japan's notoriously fastidious, 
and quality-conscious consumers. 147 
2 The Dangers of Relational Contracting : Dango Collusion in the Construction Sector 
Other arrangements, known as the dango, exist within the public works construction 
industry. 148 These take the form of an omnipresent bid-rigging system that pervades the entire 
industry, allowing designated bidders to quietly decide among themselves who will win a 
tender; then they arrange their bids accordingly. 149 Corrupt public officials often provided 
dango contractors with inside information concerning the ceiling prices for each contract. 
Technically this practice is illegal and was estimated to cost Japan 50% more than an 
honest sealed-bid system. Yet until recently, the dango contractors remained the single 
largest donors to the powerful Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP") and accounted for up to 60% 
of total contributions. 150 Political corruption was rife and enforcement extremely lax.151 In 
1993 the former LDP Minister of Construction, Kishiro Nakamura, was convicted of receiving 
NZ$200,000 for blocking criminal accusations against the Japanese construction company 
145 BMW and Volkswagen have 160 outlets in Japan, but complain that the biggest impediment to business is the outrageous 
cost of land. 1bis thwarts the establishment of car-inspection centres and alike. Ford has established 300 dealerships 
shared with its Mazda Corporation affiliate. GM European has 200 Opel showrooms (via a long-established Japanese car-
importer). See "Imports Sell if Japanese Get What They Want" Asian Wall Street Journal, 20 May 1995, I. 
146 An irony is that an American auto manufacturer, GM, is one if the worst offenders in the use of such practices. In the 
United States it actively discriminates against dealers who wish to adopt other franchises. See "United States-Japan Car 
Talks Show That Wide Rift Remains" Asian Wall Street Journal, 13 June 1995, 6. 
14 7 Makino notes, from his experience as a supplier to larger Japanese corporations, that his manufacturer customers were 
seldom satisfied with an "acceptable quality level" or "adequate industry standard". He comments that a strong drive to 
improve product quality is built into the Japanese manufacturing system. The manufacturing customers demand, and get 
(almost without exception) both quality improvements and scheduled price reductions from suppliers. Suppliers are 
pressured continuously to improve quality and cut production costs. See Makino, above n 60, I 0 
148 Problems of foreign market access in Japan sue to collusive public and private actions are particularly evident in the area of 
construction, engineering and architectural services. See Bergsten, above n 4, 161. 
149 The legal impediments to entry include a complex system of firm licensing and the selection of firms as designated bidders 
on particular projects. The primary effect of this institutional arrangement is to create a cartel of licensed general 
contractors. 1bis cartel generates rents, and the inability of the cartel to completely deter entry encourages excessive local 
entry and the existence of a fringe of small, inefficient firms. The need then arises for a mechanism to distribute cartel rents. 
1bis is achieved via the practice of dango, a form of bid-rigging in which firms negotiate with each other as to which firm 
will participate in bidding on a given project and at what price. See Bergsten, above n 4, 162. 
150 Given the importance of construction-industry political contributions to Japanese politicians, the dango issue runs directly 
to the heart of the Japanese political system, meaning that reforms are difficult to obtain. See above Bergsten, n 4, 167. 
151 For example, the JFTC angered the Japanese public when it declined to press charges against a Saitama prefecture dango 
case. 1bis reportedly involved 66 construction fmns (including Taisei, Japan's largest) and as much as $700 million in 
public contracts. See Bergsten, above n 4, 78. 
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Kajima Incorporated during an independent governmental inquiry into the rigging of a major 
construction project bid. 
The Japanese construction market is the world's most lucrative, worth an estimated 
NZ$650 billion annually, yet foreign construction companies were strictly excluded by the 
dango.152 Yet on 5 May 1994, under intense pressure from the United States, the Japanese 
Government tightened bidding practices for public works projects and increased overall 
transparency. 153 It seems the dango practice may now have diminished.154 
C Relational Contracting and the Japanese Retail Distribution System 
Another characteristic feature of the Japanese economy is the excessive complexity of 
the retail distribution system. 155 It has been described as "an archaic, fragmented and multi-
layered system of small middlemen and retail outlets". 156 Yet this distribution system is 
another aspect of Japanese life shrouded in history, tradition and culture. Retailing played an 
integral role within Japan's feudal "Eda" society and has retained its prominence, and family-
oriented infrastructure, into the present day. 
152 As mentioned above [n 149], impediments to entry comprise a complex licensing system, and the selection of firm to be 
designated bidders on particular projects ( a pre-tender selection process). Experience within Japan is an important part of 
this approval and selection process, and this creates a Catch-22 situation for foreign firms. They cannot get into the market 
because they are not licensed, but they cannot get licensed because they don't have any experience. This has the secondary 
effect of forcing foreign firms to seek Japanese partner.; for joint venture work in order to gain the experience necessary for 
licensing and to increase the likelihood of being selected as a designated bidder. See above Bergsten, n 4, 162. 
153 The dango issue was one of the most frustrating for the United States with nine year.; of futile high-level negotiations 
accompanied by threats of retaliation and counter-retaliation. In 1987, Senator F Murkowski instigated legislation that 
barred foreign firms from the American market if they had not granted reciprocal access. This was implemented against 
Kiewet Construction and Kajima Engineering in reaction to a 1988 Washington DC subway project - leading to a shocked 
reaction by the Japanese. Simultaneously, in 1988, the Reagan administration began moving strongly towards the 
extraordinary act (at that time) of self-initiating a section 301 case against Japanese construction. Increased threats in May 
1988 finally forced an understanding between United States and Japan negotiator.; on increased transparency of bidding 
procedures for major Japanese public works procedures. This included the giant US$7.6 billion Kansai International 
Airport project (the creation of a giant 1,482 acre man-made island, followed by construction of a massive international 
airport). The agreement was known as the "Major Projects Agreement". In May 1991, and May 1994, this Major Projects 
Agreement was progressively strengthened: requiring the provision of more information to foreign firms; creating a dispute 
settlement mechanism; creating guidelines for a new category called "design and build" work; and toughening overall 
enforcement against the dango. See Bergsten, above n 4, 163. 
154 Yet clearly some elements of the dango remain. This is illustrated by the Kansai International Airport construction project. 
American firms were excluded from the initial design stage, as Japanese officials were quoted as saying that US firms did 
not under.;tand the unique characteristics of Japanese soil [mentioned above n 153 and n 68]. Yet apparently the Japanese 
project managers did not either! The engineering consultant hired to estimate sinkage rates predicted that the island would 
sink 23 to 39 feet over the next 50 year.;. Kansai International Airport officials adopted the lower estimate and acted 
accordingly. Unfortunately the higher figure appears more accurate, and at current sinkage rates the island will be only one 
metre above the water line sometime in the next century. Observer.; jokingly predict that the airport will only be operable 
at low tides! More seriously, the problen1 has led to massive cost overruns (exacerbated by the dango) and concerns about 
the viability of the airport as originally envisaged. See Bergsten, above n 4, 164. See Punke, above n 41 , 58. 
155 See Pempel, above n 6,442. 
156 There is a considerable overlap here with the distribution function of the keiretsu: many of the major Japanese consumer-
goods producer.; have captive distribution networks, sustained by practices that would be illegal in countries such as the 
United States. See above Wallis, n 9, 385. 
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The Edo period in Japan lasted from 1603-1867 and signified the unification of 
Japan and the establishment of a national capital in Edo (now known as Tokyo). 157 This 
proved a major turning point in Japanese history with Shogun (Feudal Lord) Tokugawa Ieyasu 
able to rationalise Japan's feudal configuration to bring lasting peace and stability to Japanese 
society. 158 Within this period a slow social revolution occurred as the warlike rule of the 
Japanese samurai was supplanted by rising mercantilism. 159 
Today, in modern Japan, the channels between wholesaler and retailer remain long 
and complex with goods often changing hands repeatedly among tiers of intermediate 
distributors. 160 This extreme level of inefficiency has escalated Japanese retail prices. 161 It 
seems that retail prices in Japan are on average 320% greater than wholesale prices, this 
compares with only 70% for the United States. 162 
The distribution system has also acted as a kind of latent Japanese social welfare 
system. The vast numbers of intermediary wholesalers have acted as a mechanism for 
absorbing much of Japan's unskilled labour. 163 Professor Lee Seung Jai of Tokyo University, 
during an interview in 1990, observed: 164 
The distribution sector served as the largest receptacle for people in search of work. It functioned as 
a sort of employment security system for the potentially jobless throughout the country. The 
commercial ethic that has followed and developed as a result isn't one that follows an objective 
criterion of economic rationality. Instead we have a system that has developed along the lines of the 
Edo-period religious teacher Ishida Baigan, one where multiple layers of distributors are able to 
coexist. From a domestic perspective there's nothing wrong with this set-up. If the surplus workers 
hadn't been absorbed into the distribution system, they would have perhaps had to go into the 
military, or else they would have been treated as charity cases and put on welfare, as in the United 
States. But foreigners resent the fact that the costs of this unofficial safety net add to the barriers 
they face when they try to export to Japan. 
157 See Thatcher, above n 42, 531. 
158 However, it has been suggested that Japan's unique situation encourages an abundance of small stores because of the 
limited storage space in most Japanese homes and the low re-order costs ofretailers. See GATT, above n 2, 112. 
159 The Tokugawa shogunate lasted until 1867 when the feudal system collapsed under increasing international pressure. 
Emperor Meiji was restored as Sovereign and Japan began opening to the outside world. See Motoshige, above n 144, 21 . 
160 There are about 429,000 wholesalers and 1.5 million retailers in Japan, nearly twice the number in the US on the basis of 
number of stores per population. Over 73% of wholesalers have fewer than 9 employees and 75% of retailers have fewer 
than 4. Combined sales of wholesalers are 3.6 times as large as those ofretailers. It is about 1.8:1 in the US, 2.03 :1 in the 
UK, 1.7: 1 in Germany and 1.2:1 in France. See MIT! 21 st Century Vision for Distribution (MIT!, Tokyo, June 1995). 
161 Trade barriers penalise Japanese households and industrial purchasers by restricting demand and rising prices, but they also 
enable domestic firms to maintain higher output and price levels. In addition, non-tariff protection creates "quota rents" -
artificial scarcity premiums - that are captured by importers and distributors at the expense of society at large. See 
Sazanami, above n 11 , 21. See also S Taichi "Retailing on the Eve of a Revolution" (1990) 17,3 Japan Echo 12, 13. 
162 The Japanese economy is extraordinarily inefficient in some places. The retail sector a classic example with the 
cumbersome distribution system generally increasing price and decreasing the availability of goods. 
163 In 1989 the distribution system employed about 11 million workers. Small family-operated stores and small scale 
businesses, which employed less than five people, constituted 57% of retail sales, versus 3% in the US and 5% in the UK. 
See ST Anwar "Efficiency in the Japanese Distribution System : New Developments" (1995) 29: l World Trade 83, 84. 
164 See above Motoshige, n 144, 21. 
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In his best-selling controversial work "The Japan That Can Say No", S Ishihara commented 
that a streamlining of the Japanese distribution system would immediately produce 300,000 
redundancies. It now seems that his estimate was highly conservative. 165 This extreme labour 
intensivity has also cultivated the intricate packaging associated with many Japanese products. 
Which in turn has become an integral part of modem Japanese retail custom. Japanese 
retailers remain proud of the immense intricacy and beauty of their packaging, while Japanese 
consumers now have an expectation of such high quality service. 
There seem to be two primary reasons why the distribution system discriminates 
against foreign products. 166 First, foreign importers must negotiate with a prolific number of 
small retailers in order to ensure that their products reach the Japanese consumer. Field notes 
that these negotiations rarely succeed "due to a limited understanding of the cultural and 
historical forces underlying the Japanese retail system" .161 The second reason concerns the 
policies of the Japanese Government - which have sustained this complex system via 
legislation, regulation and administrative guidance. These regulations have frequently been 
influenced by incumbent Japanese firms to tilt the distribution system against foreign 
competition. 168 
Attempts by foreign companies to circumvent the distribution system have been 
strongly resisted by the Japanese. But demands for reform are not confined simply to foreign 
companies. All producers, including Japanese producers, must contend with its unwieldy 
complexity. Many Japanese corporations, including Sony and Sanyo, have resoundingly 
criticised their Government's policy of encouraging the conglomeration and claimed that 
Japanese consumers are paying too high a price. 169 Yet the entire distribution system is 
currently undergoing radical reform. It seems likely that such measures will change the very 
fabric of traditional Japanese society. An example is provided by the recent repeal of the 
Japanese Large Retail Store Law 1970 ("Large Store Law").170 
165 Punke suggests that the Japanese preference for small stores reflects a cultural valuation not unlike the United States 
preference for the traditional individual farmer versus the corporate farm. See Punke, above 41, 62. 
166 Bergsten also notes the influence of the keiretsu within the distribution system creating discrimination via "vertical 
foreclosure" : "Vertical foreclosure occurs both in consumer and in capital goods. Vertically integrated firms refuse to 
carry products of competitors, and product return and rebate systems are used to tilt retailer incentives toward 
domestically produced products. Sophisticated economic research by Ariga points to administered prices in sectors 
where there are strong vertical relationships or keiretsu, suggesting that control of the distribution system acts as an 
effective barrier to entry. Although recent reforms have narrowed the scope of permissible vertical restraints, 
enforcement remains lax." See Bergsten, above n 4, 76. See also T Nishimura Relational Contracting and the 
Japanese Legal Consciousness (Kusuda Smick, Tokyo, 1990), 217. 
167 See Field, above n 34, 179. See also "Oriental Renaissance: Survey of Japan" The Economist, 9 July 1994, 16. 
168 Bergsten notes that both these problems are worsened by the preponderance of smal~ poorly capitalised stores in the 
Japanese retail system. The relative weakness of the retailers increases both the discriminatory impact of government 
regulations and the likelihood of capture by large manufacturers. The numerous small shopkeepers also act as a domestic 
pressure group to maintain regulations that impede the establishment oflarge retail stores. See Bergsten, above n 4, 76. 
169 Sony and Sanyo have both criticised the circuitous paths their goods must follow to reach consumers. 
170 Large Scale Retail Store Law 1970 (Daiten-Ho) . 
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1 The Repeal of the Large Store Law: Bowing to Foreign Pressure 
In 1990 the Japanese Government bowed to foreign pressure and repealed its 
regulations governing the size of Japanese retail outlets. This legislative action was taken 
largely in response to the United States-Japan "Structural Impediments Initiative", a series of 
American-initiated bilateral negotiations between Japan and the United States aimed at 
reducing the United States trade deficit. Previously the Large Store Law had strictly regulated 
the size of stores in order to promote smaller, family operated, retail outlets. 171 Within Japan 
there were an estimated 1.6 million of such traditional small, family operated shops 
employing about 6 million Japanese people. 
The Large Store Law required prospective store developers and operators to submit a 
report to the local government outlining the proposed site, size and operating hours of any 
new retail store above 500 square metres. 172 Local officials could then effectively veto the 
proposal on any of a number of grounds - and typically did. An extremely close relationship 
existed between local politicians, retailers, and the estimated 430,000 wholesalers. 173 
This effective veto on development maintained the viability of the numerous small 
stores by preventing the construction of potentially more efficient larger stores (such as the 
hypermarkets and large shopping malls familiar in the United States). It prevented larger 
retailers using economies of scale to provide greater product variety at a lower price. The 
existing distribution system was therefore sheltered by the government at the expense of the 
Japanese consumer. Yet the repeal of the Large Store Law is now causing a proliferation of 
new larger stores that are dramatically changing the face of the current Japanese retail 
industry. 174 
171 The principal targets of the Law were large Japanese mass retailers, but the provisions effectively kept foreign retailers out 
as well. For American trade negotiators, the experience of the United States toy retailer Toys 'R' Us became the cause 
celebre. See "For 'Toys-R-Us' Chief the Playground is Global", Chicago Tribune, Chicago, 19 December 1993. 
172 The GA TT Secretariat comments that prior to the amendment of the Law, any store of more than 500 sqm had to be 
discussed by a committee of the Council for Co-ordination of Commercial Activities and "under these complicated 
arrangements and practices, its was often also necessary to get the agreement of neighbouring stores prior to 
submitting an application for a building permit. This resulted in major delays being incurred in processing 
applications". The Secretariat noted that the time required to build and operate a large retail store could be anything 
between 2½ to 10 years and quoted from Itoh and Maruyama (1991): "In essence, the law and its implementation can 
virtually stop the construction of a large retail store if the neighbouring stores oppose it". See GATT, above n 2, 112. 
173 Subsequent revisions of this law greatly increased its pervasiveness, and the administration of the law was captured by local 
advisory committees dominated by small shopkeepers. Similar laws were adopted at the local and the prefectural level, 
with the result that the time required to gain approval to open a large store stretched to a decade. See Bergsten, n 4, 160. 
174 The changes have dramatically reduced the time taken to approve applications, and according to the GATT Secretariat 
application times are down from between 2 ½ and I O years, to only one year. This has resulted in a marked rise in the 
number of applications for large shop constructions being processed. The GATT Secretariat notes that in 1991 and 1992, 
some 2,300 cases were processed, compared with between 400 and 500 for similar periods previously. See GATT, above n 
2, 112. See also Import Promotion Department The Japanese Market Continues to Open Up : A Business Person's 
Guide to the Japanese Market (Japan External Trade Organisation, Tokyo, 1995), 6. See also See JO Haley "Lessons 
from a Changing Japan" (1993) 1 Pacific Basin L & Poly J 103, 107. 
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PART TWO: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES 
The first half of this paper outlined some of the characteristics of the more 
omnipotent and pervasive cultural trade barriers that have thwarted foreign access to the 
Japanese domestic market. These include the use of administrative guidance, the existence of 
corporate keiretsu, and the inefficient Japanese distribution system. 
This part of the paper now explores the existing legal mechanisms that could be 
applied to cultural trade barriers, and summarises their overall effectiveness. These legal 
techniques include: 
(i) the GA TT 1994 and its new WTO Dispute Settlement Body; 
(ii) international competition law, including the UNCTAD Code on Restrictive 
Business Practices 1980; 
(iii) unilateral and bilateral responses by individual states, such as the United 
States' use of Super 301 and Voluntary Restraint Agreements; and 
(iv) alternative dispute resolution procedures, such as the proposed APEC 
Dispute Mediation Service. 
This paper also briefly outlines the Japanese Ambassador to New Zealand's novel proposal to 
the Japan-New Zealand Business Council in 1994; he mooted the creation of a commercial 
dispute mediation body to assist trading relations between Japan and New Zealand. 
V THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) 1994 
Public international trade law is guided by a complicated set of international treaties 
and institutions coalescing around the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 175 
The GATT was established in 1947 with the fundamental objective of promoting free 
international trade and thereby enhancing the overall welfare of all nations. 176 To achieve this 
objective the GA TT created a framework for the progressive reduction of tariffs. The GA TT's 
key principle of "Most Favoured Nation" treatment obliged each contracting state to extend to 
every other contracting state the same favourable tariff concessions that it had granted to any 
175 Many of the original GAIT obligations have been supplemented by separately negotiated treaty instruments known as 
"Codes". See JH Jackson "National Treatment Obligations & Non-tariff Barriers" (1989) 10 Michigan J Int'I L 207,208. 
176 The GAIT was drafted in Geneva in 1947 based on generally accepted principles of fair trade with the signatories 
"recognising that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to 
raising standards of living. ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of income and effective 
demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods". 
These objectives were to be attained by "entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to 
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international countries". See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 61 Stal (5), (6) TIAS No 1700, 
55 UNTS 194. See also GAIT Text of the Genera/Agreement of the GATT (GAIT Secretariat, Geneva, 1986), 1. 
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other individual GAIT member. 177 In the period following the Second World War, the 
GA TI proved highly successful in reducing tariff barriers and thereby freeing the flow of 
international trade between the GA TI nations. 
Since 194 7, rounds of intensive multilateral negotiations have gradually 
supplemented, extended and strengthened the provisions of the original agreement. There 
have now been eight Rounds of GA TI multilateral negotiations. The first five rounds did not 
substantially alter the form and intent of the original agreement, and they largely dealt with 
progressive tariff reductions via employment of legally enforceable "tariff bindings". These 
tariff bindings set out maximum permissible tariff rates for each traded good in gargantuan 
product lists. Yet the more recent Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds proceeded further, 
generating substantive reforms to the GA TI itself. 178 These reforms have greatly enhanced 
the impact of the GAIT within the international community. 
The Tokyo Round of GAIT negotiations (1977-1979) directly addressed the issue of 
non-tariff barriers (such as cultural trade barriers), and resulted in the adoption of six 
specialised non-tariff "codes" by the GAIT Contracting Parties. These codes took the 
character of discretionary guidelines, and "left the countries free to develop non-tariff barriers 
as a response to domestic political economic interests" .179 Although the Tokyo Round 
marked a significant step towards resolving non-tariff barriers to trade, it proved largely 
ineffective. 
The subsequent Uruguay Round of GA TI multilateral negotiations proved to be the 
most revolutionary round of them all. In December 1993 the Uruguay Round was concluded 
after a marathon seven years of negotiations. Many important changes to the GA TI have 
resulted that have extended and altered the regulation of international commerce and reshaped 
the framework of the global multilateral trading system. 180 In relation to cultural trade 
barriers, the most important of these changes involve the creation of the World Trade 
177 Article I obliges contracting parties to accord all GA TI trading partner.; the same customs and tariff treatment as any 
individual GA TI trading partner. Article I: 1 of the GA TI provides: ''.Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties". 
178 The 1994 WTO Undemanding carried over the rules and principles of the pre-WTO regimes, yet at the same time, 
introduced innovations mainly intended to overcome the pre-WTO regimes' deficiencies. 
179 See Adams, above n 17, 54. 
180 The "Uruguay Round" was the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations under the GATI and commenced in Punta 
del Este in Uruguay on 20 September 1986. It was the longest of the GATI rounds, being delayed by a major deadlock 
between the United States and the European Community over agricultural subsidies. The United States and Japan were the 
main mover.; of the Uruguay Round, the Europeans (i.e. France) the main obstructers. The Round was completed on 15 
December 1993, with the Final Act signed on 15 April 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco. See GATI Final Act and 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Uruguay Round 
(including GATI 1994), Marrakesh, Morocco 15 April 1994. See also J Schott The Uruguay Round : An Assessment 
(Institute of International Economics, Washington DC, 1994). 
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Organisation ("WTO"), its Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"), and the adoption of a new 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. 181 
A The Jurisdiction of the WTO : Discovering the Grey Areas of GATT Legality 
Does the jurisdiction of the GA TT extend to encompass cultural trade barriers such 
as those manifested by Japan? This is by no means clear. As a treaty concluded between 
states, the GA TT is an instrument of public international law and its obligations accrue pact a 
sunt servanda to the government of each contracting party. While Japan was admitted to the 
GATT in September 1955 and is clearly a "contracting party", only certain elements of non-
tariff barriers can be identified with the obligations of the Japanese Government. 182 Those 
aspects of cultural trade barriers that cannot be attributed to the Japanese Government will fall 
outside the current ambit of the GATT. 183 
While a variety of GA TT provisions can be applied to cultural trade barriers, the 
strongest arguments are associated with Article ill, the "National Treatment" obligation. 184 
Article ill obliges the GA TT contracting parties to treat all imported goods no worse than 
domestically produced goods. It is concerned with the treatment of foreign goods once they 
have passed through customs checkpoints and entered the stream of commerce of the 
importing nation. 185 Articles III : 1 and IIl:4 provide: 
181 Many additional legal instruments and institutions have been negotiated into the GAIT 1994 : a new unified 
administering body - the World Trade Organisation ("WTO"); improved Dispute Settlement Procedures; a General 
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"); and an Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"). 
This has significantly enlarged the legal system within which international trade will be conducted. See Russell McVeagh 
McKenzie Bartleet & Co "Understanding The Uruguay Round : International Trade Law Update" (1994) 2 Russell 
McVeagh McKenzie Bartleet Client Newsletter 1, 3. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Trading Ahead : 
The GATT Uruguay Round-Results for New Zealand (New Zealand Government, Wellington, 1993), 68. 
182 Japan was admitted to the GAIT with full-membership status in September 1955. This represented a major effort by Japan 
to re-enter the international community following the termination of the post-World War II American occupation and 
Japan's subsequent independence in 1952. Japan first applied for membership of the GAIT in July 1952, but the initial 
application was vetoed by the Europeans. Finally, with the influence of the United States, Japan was accepted as a GAIT 
member. Only with Japan's escalating economic power in the late 1960s was Japan targeted for the reduction of tariff 
barriers (this occurred in the appropriately named "Tokyo Round"). See Adams, above n 17, 55. 
183 Bergsten concludes "Our analysis of a number of individual sectors, however, confirms the view that Japan's access 
problems represent a complex mix of public policies and private business practices. Government intervention is 
present in every case studied, and a share of each problem should thus be susceptible to traditional modes of 
international negotiations. However, restrictive corporate behaviour, usually the expression of oligopoly practices of 
one type or another, is also omnipresent. This too, could, in some cases be addressed through changes in government 
policy, and in particular, through more rigorous antitrust enforcement, but it frequently lies beyond the reach of 
official action". See Bergsten, above n 4, 220. 
184 An Article I action would require proof that the cultural trade barriers favoured one foreign country's products in preference 
to other foreign countries. An Article III action that would require proof that cultural trade barriers favoured domestic 
products favour to foreign products. Ironically the pressure from the United States on Japan may lead them away from 
Article III, but towards violation of Article I (whereby American products are able to penetrate the cultural trade barriers, 
but other countries' products are not). This allegation was part of the European Community case against Japan in the 
Semiconductor case: Japan - Trade in Semiconductors (1988) GAIT Panel Report adopted 4 May 1988, BISD 35S/ l 16. 
185 A 1958 GAIT Dispute Panel report, Italian Discrimination Against Agricultural Machinery, provided a fundamental 
interpretation of the National Treatment clause. In that case the United Kingdom complained that an Italian banking 
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1. The contracting parties recognise that....regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products .... should not be applied to 
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production. 
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable then that accorded to like products 
of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transport or use. 
It should be clarified at the outset, as Professor J Klabbers succinctly points out, that 
there is "no such thing as a GAIT jurisprudence" because Panel Reports have no formalised 
precedential value. 186 Yet there can be no doubt that in practice the GA TI Panel Reports do, 
to some extent, serve as authoritative precedents for subsequent decisions. 187 There have been 
a variety of Panel Reports that have grappled with the construction of Article III and these 
provide a ready insight into its potential application. 188 
1 Article Ill and Indirect Discrimination: Conceptual Problems with the GAIT 
Article III "jurisprudence" appears to involve three key issues of interpretation: (i) 
identification of "like products"; (ii) clarification of the scope of the phrase "laws, regulations 
and requirements"; and (iii) testing for discrimination. The second and third issues are 
relevant to this paper; the third issue is undoubtedly the most complex. 
measure provided favourable loans to Italian farmers buying domestically made tractors. The panel interpretation of 
Article III was accepted by the GATI Contracting Parties and reasoned "the intent of the drafters was to provide equal 
conditions of competition once goods have been cleared through customs". Hence, once imported goods have entered 
the internal stream of commerce, no government regulatory measure may assist the purchase of domestic goods without 
doing the same for imported goods. See Italy-Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery (1958), GAIT 
Panel Report adopted 23 October 1958, BISD 76/90, para 13. 
186 See J Klabbers "Jurisprudence in International Trade Law: Article XX of the GATI" (1991) 25:2 World Trade 61, 65. 
See also Jackson, above n 175, 228. See also JH Jackson "The Jusrisprudence of International Trade : The DISC Case 
Under the GATI" (1978) 72 Am J Int'l L 747, 749. 
187 In the majority of panel proceedings, reference is made to the findings of previous panels. For example, in the report 
Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (1983) [GA TI Panel Report adopted 7 February 1984, 
BISD 30S/l 40, 151 ], Canada's argument specifically relied on two previous panel reports with regard to the interpretation 
of Article IIl:5 of the GA TI. Panels themselves often refer to previous reports, especially the more recently established 
panels. For instance, in Canada - Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt (1989) [GA TI Panel Report adopted 5 
December 1989, BISD 36S/68, 84] the Panel relied to a considerable extent on a number of other panel reports, among 
them were the Foreign Investment Review Act case; Japan - Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products 
(1987) [GATI Panel Report adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/163, s2(d)]; and European Community-Restrictions on 
Imports of Dessert Apples: Complaint by Chile (1989) [GATI Panel Report adopted 22 June 1989, BISD 36S/93]. See 
Klabbers, above n 186, 66. 
188 The recent Tuna Dolphin case drew on these previous reports to summarise the current Panel conceptualisation of Article 
III: "Article 111:2 ... obliges contracting parties to establish certain competitive conditions for imported products in 
relation to domestic products ..... the words in Article 111:4 call for effective equality of opportunity for imported 
products in respect of the application of laws, regulations or requirements affecting the sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and this standard has to be understood as applicable to each 
individual case of imported products" [emphasis added]. See United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna: 
Complaint by Mexico (1991), GAIT Panel Report 10 January 1994, BISD 41S/187. 
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The scope of the phrase "laws, regulations and requirements" was discussed in an 
action taken against Canada in 1983, the Foreign Investment Review Act case.189 This 
concerned legislation which required foreign investors to purchase goods of Canadian origin 
in preference to imported goods. The issue related to the construction of the Article ill:4 term 
"requirements". Canada argued that "requirements" should be interpreted as "mandatory 
rules applying across-the-board'' . The Panel rejected this view and reasoned that this concept 
was already aptly covered by the term "regulations" and the drafters of the GAIT must 
therefore have had "something different in mind'' when adding the word "requirements".190 
In applying this conclusion to the facts, the Panel noted that while undertakings by 
foreign investors in Canada were not obligatory, the Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act 
stated that once any such undertaking was accepted by the Canadian government it became a 
binding condition on the investor - and compliance could be legally enforced. In the view of 
the Panel this legal enforceability sufficed. 191 This suggests that in order for cultural trade 
barriers to fall within the ambit of Article III they must concern either laws, regulations, or 
legally enforceable requirements attributable to the Japanese government. However, the 
GA TT Panel clearly left the door open for a broader interpretation if necessary. 
In relation to the examples of cultural trade barriers outlined in the first part of this 
paper, this Article III interpretation would unequivocally apply to discriminatory Japanese 
product standards, 192 the shaken regulations, 193 and the Large Store Law; 194 as these are all 
legally enforceable "laws" and "regulations" . However, it is doubtful Article III would apply 
to administrative guidance. 195 The essence of administrative guidance is its legal 
unenforceability. However, the Semiconductor case of 1988 suggests that in some 
circumstances a mandatory effect may be imputed to administrative guidance. A broader 
189 See Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (1983), GAIT Panel Report adopted 7 February 
1994, BISD JOS/140. 
190 See Italian Agricultural Products above n 189, para 5.5. The GATT Panel reasoned: "The Panel could not subscribe to 
the Canadian view that the word 'requirements' in Article 111:4 should be interpreted as 'mandatory requirements 
applying across-the-board' because the latter concept was already more aptly covered by the term 'regulations' and 
the authors of the provision must have had something different in mind when adding the word 'requirements'. The 
mere fact that the few disputes that have so far been brought before the Contracting Parties regarding the application 
of Article 111:4 have only concerned laws and regulations does not, in the view of the Panel, justify an assimilation of 
'requirements' with 'regulations'." 
191 See Italian Agricultural Products above n 189, para 5.4. The Panel stated: "The Panel noted that written purchase 
undertakings - leaving aside the manner in which they have been arrived at (voluntary submission, encouragement, 
negotiation, etc) - once they were accepted. became part of the conditions under which the investment proposals were 
approved, in which case compliance could be legally enforced. The Panel therefore found that the word 'requirements' 
as used in Article 111:4 could be considered a proper description of existing undertakings". While the Panel in the 
Semiconductor case found that legal enforceability was a sufficient requirement; the question now arises - was it also a 
~ requirement? 
192 See text associated with footnote n 65. 
193 See text associated with footnote n 76. 
194 See text associated with footnote n 171. 
195 See text associated with footnote n 85. 
Japanese Cultural Trade Barriers: A New Generation of Issues in International Trade 
interpretation of "requirements" may therefore include administrative guidance. 
Finally, it seems that dango and keiretsu practices may only be targeted under Article 
III if it were proved the Japanese government had passed legislation that either encouraged 
such practices or accentuated their discriminatory effect. 196 At present such evidence has not 
been forthcoming. Possible additional and alternative arguments that the GA TT imposes a 
positive duty on governments to pass legislation eliminating such pre-existing discriminatory 
practices have been regarded by commentators as "highly untenable" .197 
The second broad issue relating to Article III is unfortunately less soluble. It 
essentially requires a determination of the extent of any discrimination against the foreign 
product, and an assessment of the attributablity of such discrimination to the relevant "law, 
measure, or requirement". In Article III terminology, these two interrelated tests of 
discrimination and causation may be phrased in the following manner: Have the laws, 
regulations or restrictions been applied so as to "affect" the sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use of foreign products? Does the effect of this affect "afford protection to 
domestic production"? 
Panel reports have typically taken an expansive approach to this issue. They clearly 
advocate an extremely broad objective test for discriminatory effect, with the purpose of the 
law, measure or requirement appearing largely irrelevant. 198 However, there remains extreme 
uncertainty surrounding the appropriate scope of the assessment of causation. Previous panel 
reports have glossed questions surrounding the appropriateness of recognising indirect ("de 
facto") discrimination and as a result the causation test remains extremely ill-defined. It 
seems an analogy can be drawn to the tort of negligence and its unruly governing causal test 
offoreseeability. 199 
The leading GAIT Panel report on this issue is the often quoted case Italy-
Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery (1958) .200 Here the United 
Kingdom complained that Italy had extended special credit facilities to Italian farmers for the 
196 See text associated with footnote n 171. 
197 See WJ Davey "Dispute Settlement in GAIT" (1987) 11 Fordham lnt'l L.J 51, 63 . See also N Komuro "WTO Dispute 
Settlement - Coverage and Procedures of the WTO Undenrtanding" (1995) 29:4 World Trade 5, 27. 
198 Although the purpose of the law, regulation or measure may lead to a successful Article XX defence. See Klabbers, above 
n 186, 78. 
199 In tort law the test of foreseeability (causal proximity) was used to regulate the scope of the tort of negligence. From 
modest beginnings in Donoghue v Stevenson (1932] AC 562, the concept of foreseeability was incrementally extended 
(e.g. the Wagon Mound case (1961] AC 388). By the 1980s the concept of foreseeability had been expanded into such 
areas as emotional damage (e.g. McLaughlin v O'Brien [1983) 1 AC 410) and pure economic loss (e.g. Junior Books Ltd 
v Vie/chi Co Ltd (1983] 1 AC 520). In 1991 the expansion of the tort of negligence was abruptly halted by the House of 
Lords in the decision Murphy v Brentwood District Council [ 1991) AC 398. This demonstrates that issues of causation 
and "directness" can be highly arbitrary and they tend to defy rigid tests (these issues are also inherently expansionary). 
200 See Italian Agricultural Products, above n 185. 
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purchase of Italian agricultural machinery. In the view of the United Kingdom this favoured 
Italian products over British products and thus constituted a violation of the National 
Treatment obligation of Article ill. Yet the Italian Government defended that it would be 
inappropriate for the provisions of Article ill to be construed in such a broad way as to cover 
this situation. Italy charged that this would unnecessarily impinge on the sovereign right of 
GA TT contracting parties to formulate and implement their individual domestic economic 
policies. Italy also argued that the purpose of their law was not discriminatory and any 
discriminatory effect was indirect and wholly unintentional. The GAIT Panel considered the 
competing arguments and concluded:201 
The selection of the word "affecting" would imply, in the opinion of the Panel, that the drafters of 
the Article intended to cover in paragraph 4 not only the laws and regulations which directly 
governed the conditions of sale or purchase but also any laws or regulations which might adversely 
modify the conditions of competition between the domestic and imported products on the internal 
market. [emphasis added] 
In terms of the test for discrimination, it appears this panel finding clearly envisaged 
that a violation of Article III of the GA TT would occur if conditions or competition between 
the domestic and imported products were "adversely modified'' . In subsequent cases this has 
been understood in the broadest possible terms. 202 It now seems that any clear evidence of a 
discriminatory or protective effect will suffice. Commentators have labelled this test for 
discrimination the "effect test".203 
In relation to the test for causation, the GA TT Panel in the Italian Agricultural 
Product case clearly contrasts "directly" with "might adversely modify". The former suggests 
intentional discrimination, where foreign and local products are subjected to different regimes 
by law or regulation. The latter suggests legislation with the unintentional effect of modifying 
the competitive characteristics of the market so as to introduce a domestic bias. However, in 
application to the facts this causation test becomes extremely unclear and seems to "open the 
floodgates" to allow foreign nations to interfere in matters customarily within the domestic 
jurisdiction of sovereign states.204 Jackson describes this issue as "one of the most difficult 
conceptual problems of the GATT':205 
201 See Italian Agricultural Products, above n 185, para 12. Th.is reasoning was supported by another GAIT panel in US-
Section 337 of the Tariff Act 1930 (1989), GAIT Panel Report adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345, para 5.10. 
202 See, for example, United States -Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (1987), GAIT Panel Report 
adopted 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136. 
203 See Jackson, above n 175, 118. See also Field, above n 34, 182. 
204 Petersmann notes that the international law principle of sovereign equality of States leads to the same conclusion as the 
economic theory of comparative advantage. Domestic market failures and their correction via internal non-discriminatory 
laws should be considered as "matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State" and form part of the 
comparative advantage of the country concerned. Th.is is the basis for mutually beneficial trade. See EU Petersmann 
"International Competition Rules for the GAIT and World Trading System" (1994) 28:4 World Trade 35, 60. See also 
Charter of the United Nations; San Francisco, 26 June 1945; entered into force, 29 December 1945; (1976) 59 Stat 1031. 
205 See Jackson, above n 175, 118. 
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One of the most difficult conceptual problems of the GATI is the application of the national 
treatment obligation in the context of a national regulation which on its face appears to be non-
discriminatory, but because of various circumstances of the market, has the effect of tilting the 
scales against imported products. 
It seems the issue is not so much whether Article III includes de facto discrimination. 
It is submitted that the Italian Agricultural Products case makes it clear that it does. The 
issue therefore seems to be one of where to draw a line. There are two possible clues to the 
true scope of the causation test, yet both are ultimately ambiguous. It may be that the final 
determination of the matter is closely linked to state sovereignty and therefore requires a 
political solution - such as a new GAIT Understanding outlining the correct scope of Article 
111.206 Such an Understanding would go a long way to clarifying the legal positions of the 
United States and Japan in their current market access disputes. 
The first clue to the scope of the causation test is provided by the European 
Community's argument in the Section 337 of the Tariff Act case.207 Here the European 
Community noted that a previous GAIT Panel Report, Japanese Customs Duties(l987), had 
found that Article III:2 of the GAIT clearly applied to de facto discrimination caused by 
different tax regimes. 208 Article ill:2 provides: 
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. 
Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges in a 
manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1. [ emphasis added) 
The European Community argued that therefore "de facto, discrimination or protection was 
prohibited by Article 111, irrespective of how it was brought about or what kind of official 
measure caused it". 209 
Yet with respect to the European Community, this approach seems to gloss an 
inherent distinction within Article III between "internal taxes and other internal charges" and 
206 To justify holding a State to account for a discriminatory regulation it seems one should ideally assess the validity of the 
regulation, its effectiveness in addressing its purpose, and its overall discriminatory effect. There are therefore strong 
analogies to the European Community's current Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence. In practice these issues are addressed by 
the tests of Article III in conjunction with the defence of Article XX - but it seems that the GATI leaves huge "grey areas". 
See Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopulverwaltung far Branntwein (1979] ECR 649 (more commonly known as the 
Cassis de Dijon case). 
207 See United States - Section 33 7 of the Tariff Act 1930 (1989), GATI Panel Report adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 
36S/345, para 3.10. 
208 See Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages (1987), 
GATI Panel Report adopted 10 November 1987, BISD 34S/83, 5.9(c). In relation to this case the European Community 
noted "It has been found that Article Ill: 2 should be applied not only to the rate of applicable internal tax, but also to 
taxation methods and rules for taxation. . .lt has also been found that under Article 111:4 what mattered was whether the 
application of different regimes actually had a discriminatory or protective effect against imports". (emphasis added] 
209 See Section 337 of the Tariff Act, above n 207, para 3.10. 
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"laws, regulations and requirements". The words "indirectly or indirectly" were vital to the 
reasoning of the GAIT Panel in Japanese Customs Duties and these words are only used in 
paragraph 2 of Article III - which relates solely to "internal taxes and other charges". The 
words "indirectly or indirectly" are not used in paragraph 1 (which relates to both "internal 
taxes and other internal charges" and "laws, regulations and requirements"). 210 Indeed, if the 
conception put forward by the European Community were correct, one might easily argue that 
the words "directly and indirectly" in paragraph 2 are superfluous. The European 
Community's interpretation therefore seems to defy Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 
the Law of Treaties. 211 As yet the distinction remains unresolved. 
A second clue to the scope of the causation test is provided by the opinion of 
Professor JH Jackson, an eminent authority on GAIT law.212 He asserts strongly that Article 
III should be liberally interpreted to include de facto discrimination so as to give effect to the 
true spirit and intent of the GA IT:213 
Under the GATI it can be strongly argued that even though a tax (or regulation) appears on its face 
to be non-discriminatory, if it has an effect of affording protection, and this effect is not essential to 
the valid regulatory purpose (as suggested in Article XX),214 then such tax or regulation is 
inconsistent with the GATI obligation. 
However, Jackson immediately notes that there is a United States domestic case 
Schieffelin,215 that is closely in point and contradicts his arguments. Schiejfelin concerned a 
United States tax law that prima Jacie applied equally to both imported and domestically 
manufactured alcoholic beverages.216 Yet the law indirectly discriminated against foreign 
210 Paragraph I of Article III is set out in the text associated with footnote n 185. 
211 Article 31: l of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context in the light of its object and 
purpose". See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; concluded in Vienna, 23 May 1969; entered into force, 27 
January 1988; 1155 UNTS 331; (1969) 8 lLM 679. 
212 See Jackson, above n 175,210. 
213 Ironically this approach also draws on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and reflects the different 
bias accorded to Article 31 by different schools of thought on the interpretation of international treaties: should a purposive 
("teleological") approach be taken, or a literal ("textual") approach? Article 31 mixes elements of both schools of thought 
and essentially leaves the issue unresolved. Caselaw suggests that Article 31 essentially means that where the provision of 
a treaty are unclear, the interpretation best favouring the overall object and purpose of the treaty will be adopted ( e.g. the 
Ambatielos case). This approach therefore favours Jackson. Sir Geoffrey Palmer, commenting on his recent experience as 
a temporary judge to the World Court, noted that international judges from the common law tradition seem to incline 
towards a teleological approach, whereas judges from the civil law tradition favour a textual approach. See Ambatielos 
Case ICJ Reports (1952), 28. See also Sir Geoffrey Palmer Interview on National Radio, 11.45am, 26 September 1995. 
214 Jackson's reference to Article XX relates to the 1983 GATI Panel Report United States - Imports of Certain Automotive 
Spring Assemblies Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies (1983) GATI Panel Report adopted 26 May 1983, 
BISD 30S/ l 07. This concluded that Article XX exceptions, allowed "necessary" differences in the treatment of imports to 
secure compliance with patent, copyright, and certain other laws. 
215 Schieffelin & Co v United States 424 F.2d 1396 (1970). 
216 The law imposed a tax rate on all alcoholic beverages, with the rate of the tax determined by the condition of the alcohol at 
the time the tax was levied. A higher tax rate applied to "each gallon below prooj and meant that during its production, 
the alcohol could be taxed at a lower rate (alcohol is produced at proof and then watered down). However, this meant that 
local American whisky producers were able to opt for the levy of this tax while their whisky was at full proof, while 
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liquor imports by virtue of the unique circumstances of the United States market. It was 
unclear whether this indirectly discriminatory effect was intended, or even foreseen, by the 
American legislators. 
On legal action by an American importer, a United States court considered the 
American tax law.217 The Court held that "as the tax law applied to domestic and foreign 
companies equally, the national treatment clause was not violated'' . However, the relevant 
international treaty was not the GATT, but the Anglo-American Treaty of Friendship 1815 
which contained a similar national treatment clause. Professor Jackson argues that Schieffelin 
should now be distinguished as the 1815 Friendship Treaty did not employ the exact language 
of Article III of the GATT. 218 
It seems that Jackson is correct. The court in Schiefflin did not apply the "effect test" 
in the form that it is currently recognised. The "jurisprudence" of Article III of the GA TT has 
evolved considerably since 1970. Today a GATT Panel would not consider whether the tax 
law prima facie applied equally to both foreign and national products; a Panel would instead 
compare the effect of the tax law on both products and see if this effect was discriminatory. 
Indeed, in the Section 337 of the Tariff Act case, a GATT Panel reasoned that a government 
may in some circumstances have a positive duty to ensure that enacted legislation is prima 
facie applied differently between foreign and national products so as to ensure that fair 
conditions of competition are maintained. The strength of the current GA TT "effect test" 
means that Schiefflin can largely be discounted. 
How then do our conclusions relate to cultural trade barriers? The answer is that we 
are now placed squarely within one of the notorious "grey areas" of the GATT. Dr A Oxley, 
previous Chairman of the GATT Council, notes that such "grey areas" occur where offending 
parties contend that the GA TT cannot sanction them directly because their actions have not 
been demonstrated as being GATT illegal. Yet meanwhile the complaining parties are nearly 
unanimous in the view that the measures contradict the GA TT's market principles and are 
clearly intolerable. The issues quickly descend from the artificial realm of GA TT legality into 
the international jungle of power politics. 
Take, for example, the Japanese shaken regulations. Here there exist strong 
allegations made by the United States that the regulations were "captured" by the Japanese 
Scottish exporters (who exported their whisky bottled for immediate consumption) encountered the higher tax rate. To 
avoid this tax the Scottish importers would have had to have imported their whisky at I 00% proof and then bottled it in the 
United States. This would have proved extremely expensive and would have prevented the importers marketing their 
whisky as "Bottled in Scotland". See Jackson, above n 175,213. 
217 The American law predated the GATI so could therefore take advantage of grandfather rights. Jackson notes that several 
other cases also challenged this law as a violation of certain bilateral treaties, for example Bercut-Vandervoot & Co v 
United States 359 US 953 (1959). See Jackson, above n 175,213. 
2 I 8 See Jackson, above 175, 214. 
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auto industry and consciously drafted with a view to creating an indirect discriminatory effect 
against foreign imports. 219 However these allegations remain unsubstantiated and they would 
be almost impossible to prove.220 It can be argued vehemently by Japanese firms that the lack 
of penetration by American firms into the Japanese car industry is because they have not 
invested sufficient time, money or resources into the Japanese market - and have not fully 
adjusted to the different Japanese business culture. 221 In the view of the writer, such issues are 
so complex as to be effectively insoluble, hence any GA TI Panel would probably give Japan 
the benefit of the doubt. 
Ironically, the nature of GAIT "grey areas" means that such issues seem to be 
beyond GA TI resolution and are best handled by techniques of dispute resolution where a 
decisive "black and white" (right or wrong) answer is not required. The most difficult cases of 
de facto discrimination may be more amenable to resolution by mediation. 
2 Article XI of the GAIT : Administrative Guidance and the Semiconductor Case 
Article XI of the GAIT seems an unlikely champion of those determined to eliminate 
Japanese cultural barriers to trade, yet in the Japan - Trade in Semiconductors (1988) case 
Article XI proved to have a high degree of potency. 222 Article XI of the GA TI relates to a 
general prohibition of quantitative restrictions to trade and provides: 
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective 
through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by 
any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting 
party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other 
contracting party. 
The Semiconductor case concerned a situation where the United States had pressured 
Japan into implementing a "Voluntary Import Expansion" whereby the Japanese would 
aggressively promote the sales of foreign semi-conductors within Japan.223 This "aggressive 
promotion" was largely achieved by MITI with the aid of legally unenforceable administrative 
guidance. Hence the issue was not whether administrative guidance had occurred as Japan 
clearly admitted that MITI had utilised administrative guidance. The issue was whether the 
administrative guidance constituted a "quantitative restriction" under Article XI that 
consequentially nullified or impaired an Article II tariff binding. The GA TI Panel concluded 
219 As mentioned previously, the discriminatory effect of these regulations occurs only when they interact with the other 
cultural and legislative characteristics of the Japanese market. See text associated with footnote n 76. 
220 Even with the possibilities created by such cases as Corfu Channel. This suggested a lowering of the evidential burden of 
proof when the evidence at issue was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the offending state - and thus effectively 
unobtainable by the complaining party. See Corfu Channel (Assessment) Case !CJ Reports (1949), 244. 
221 The Japanese could point to the success of BMW as an example ofthe "correct" approach. See Kinias, above n 62. 
222 See Trade in Semiconductors, above n 184. 
223 See Trade in Semiconductors, above n 184, para 3. 
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that administrative guidance did constitute such a quantitative restriction. 
The critical issue concerned the construction of the word "measure". Japan defended 
that "measure" should be read in context with the words "quotas, import or export licenses" to 
mean a legally enforceable obligation. Japan maintained that administrative guidance was 
merely hortatory with no such legal effect. However, the Panel concluded that a "measure" 
did not necessarily need to be legally binding or mandatory. Ironically they pointed to a 
GATT Panel Report that had been decided only one month previously, Japan - Restrictions on 
Certain Agricultural Products (1989). 224 This previous case addressed the same Article XI 
issue with almost identical facts, yet Japan had argued the exact opposite (that administrative 
guidance was a measure).225 The Panel in the Semiconductor case noted this contradiction 
and then referred extensively to Japan's arguments in the Certain Agricultural Products case -
and the Panel conclusions in that case. 
In the Semiconductor case the Panel reasoned that in order to fall within the purview 
of Article XI, administrative guidance must satisfy two legal criteria. The first was whether 
there were reasonable grounds to believe that "sufficient incentives or disincentives existed for 
the non-mandatory measure to take effect" .226 The second was whether the operation of the 
measure was "essentially dependent on Government action or intervention".227 
On the facts of the case, the first criterion was satisfied because the semiconductor 
industry knew that the Japanese government had signed a binding agreement with the United 
States committing Japan to reduce semiconductor output and also knew that non-compliance 
would be detrimental to Japan. There was therefore an initial element of social peer pressure 
to comply. But this was dramatically exaggerated by the actions of MITI who required each 
firm to provide detailed information on a regular basis. Non-compliance could be easily 
detected by MITI and this would reflect badly on the loyalty of any non-complying firm - thus 
damaging the firm's credibility and jeopardising its future relationship with MITI. The Panel 
224 See Japan - Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products (1989), GAIT Panel Report adopted 22 March 
1988, BISD 35S/163. 
225 Japan had argued in this earlier case that: "to the extent that governmental measures were effective, it was irrelevant 
whether or not the measures were mandatory and statutory", because the governmental measures were "effectively 
enforced by detailed directives and instructions to local governments and/or farmers' organisations". This 
"centralised and mutually collaborative structure of policy implementation was the crux of government enforcement in 
Japan'. The Panel had also noted in the previous case that the "practice of administrative guidance played an important 
role in the enforcement of the Japanese supply restrictions" and that this practice was a "traditional tool of Japanese 
government policy based on consensus and peer pressure". The earlier Panel concluded that administrative guidance in 
the special circumstances prevailing in Japan could therefore regarded as a "governmental measure enforcing supply 
restrictions". See Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, above n 224. 
226 This seems to test the coercive power of the administrative guidance. Although the guidance was technically not 
mandatory, it seems the Panel was testing for circumstances that indicated the administrative guidance was backed by 
sufficient incentives or disincentives to create such an overall mandatory effect. 
227 This is clearly a causation issue and tests whether the government's involvement was essential to the overall result : But for 
the government's involvement, would the semiconductor producing finns have reduced their output? 
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concluded that this intense peer pressure, and a "climate suggestive of discrimination in the 
event of non-compliance", created a sufficient incentive for the non-mandatory administrative 
measures to have a mandatory effect. 228 
The Panel reasoned that the second criterion was satisfied because the administrative 
guidance had triggered the application of a cultural "structure" through which "strong peer 
pressure" to comply with the administrative guidance could be focused: 229 
An administrative structure had been created by the Govenunent of Japan which operated to exert 
maximum pressure on the private sector ...... This was exercised through such measures as repeated 
direct requests by MIT!, combined with the statutory requirement for exporters to submit 
information on export prices, the specific monitoring of company and product-specific costs and 
export prices and the institution of the supply and demand forecasts mechanism and its utilisation in 
a manner to directly influence the behaviour of private companies. 
The Panel concluded that this "complex of measures" exhibited the "rationale as well as the 
essential measures" of government export control. 
This reasoning is worthy of commendation and bypasses the difficulties associated 
with Article III. It now appears that if discriminatory administrative guidance fell within the 
criteria outlined by the GA TT Panel in the Semiconductor case, there would be a high 
probability of success in the GATT. Article XI is clearly the most appropriate GATT 
provision for handling this unique form of cultural trade barrier. 
3 Attitudinal Barriers and the GAIT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
Attitudinal barriers, such as those resulting from the Japanese "cult of uniqueness" , 
are directly targeted by the GA TT to the extent they are incorporated within prejudiced 
regulatory product standards to form "technical" barriers to trade. 230 Such product standards 
constitute another form of implicit discrimination that may violate the Article III "National 
Treatment" obligation. Yet unlike the other cultural trade barriers, those attitudinal barriers 
that are embodied within product standards are also subject to a special GA TT side-agreement 
- the "Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade" . 
228 In the previous Panel case, Japan had stated that: "although monitoring by the Ministry for International Trade and 
Industry was limited in scope, it was still meaningful because the Ministry represented a neutral and objective figure 
overseeing the entire industry while taking into account costs and prices among competing industries in Japan. 
Monitoring also helped to stamp out suspicion among companies that others were cheating or resorting to 
dumping ..... if the semi-conductor manufacturers were to pursue their own profits and ignore the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry's concerns, the whole dumping prevention mechanism, would collapse" (U6253, 
paragraph 29). See Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, above n 224. 
229 See Trade in Semiconductors, above n 184, 157. 
230 Blair comments: "When various national standards are compatible, they can facilitate international trade. When 
standards impose inconsistent requirements, however, they serve as impediments to trade". See A Blair "A Process for 
Implementation of the GAIT Standards Agreement in the United States" (1980) 20:3 Virg J Int'l L 699, 721. 
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There have been two successive Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade, with the 
most recent Agreement superseding the former. The first Agreement, derived from the Tokyo 
Round of 1979 and essentially re-stated the Article III "National Treatment" obligation, while 
clarifying and expanding its scope. 231 It outlined procedures that should be followed when 
developing and enforcing technical standards, and it envisaged consultation with affected 
foreign producers when setting product standards. The Agreement also injected a dose of 
natural justice into the standard-setting procedure by requiring that all affected parties be 
given an opportunity to present their arguments to standards-making bodies.232 Finally, the 
Tokyo Agreement urged further internationalisation of standards and the mutual recognition 
of product testing and certification procedures. 
The latest Uruguay Round agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade follows this 
Tokyo Round formula - yet with some dramatic improvements. The GA TT contracting 
parties are now required to follow a novel "Code of Practice for the Preparation, Adoption 
and Application of Standards". This Code replicates many of the Tokyo Round obligations, 
but now purports to place these obligations directly on the governmental standardising bodies 
(rather than on the governments themselves). These standardising bodies are themselves 
required to adhere to non-discrimination principles, to strive for internationalisation, and to 
ensure the necessary levels of consultation are achieved. All disputes are also now referred to 
the new WTO Dispute Settlement Body.233 
The Tokyo Round agreement proved highly successful, and the Uruguay Round 
modifications proceed further. 234 The GATT now appears to address attitudinal barriers (or at 
least those attitudes which have crystallised as discriminatory governmental product 
standards) extremely well.235 
231 The Agreement stated "Parties shall ensure that technical regulations and standards are not prepared, adopted or 
applied with a view to creating obstacles to international trade, Furthermore, products imported from the territory of 
any party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products originating in any other 
country ..... They shall likewise ensure that neither technical regulations, nor standards, nor their application, have the 
effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade". See Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, (1979) 18 lLM 1, GATT:BISD 26S/8 (1980), TlAS 9616, 31 UST 405. 
232 Jackson notes that the temptation of legislators and officials to shape regulatory or tax measures so as to favour domestic 
producers seems to be very great, and proposals to do this are constantly suggested. See Jackson, above n 175, 210. See 
also K Simmonds & B Hill Law and Practice Under the GATT (Vol II, Oceana, New York, 1994), 5. 
233 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade refers in its preamble to the following objectives : "to 
encourage the development of international standards and conformity assessment systems in order to improve the 
efficiency of production and reduce transaction costs; to ensure that technical regulations and standards, as well as 
testing and certification procedures; to not create unnecessary obstacles to trade; and to prevent no country from, 
among other things, taking measures necessary for the protection of human, animal and plant life or health, of the 
environment, or of its essential security interests". See Uruguay Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade in 
The GATT Uruguay Round Final Act and Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, above n 180. 
234 For example, the Agreement will extend the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade by broadening the 
definitions of "technical regulation" and "standards" to include also the processing and production methods related to the 
characteristics of the product itself See Petersmann, above n 204, 45. 
235 However, both agreements specifically note that Article XX of the GATT will continue to provide a valid defence. See text 
associated with footnote 236. 
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4 Legitimate Discrimination under Article XX: Exemptions for Cultural Trade Barriers? 
Article XX of the GA TI provides a general defence to allegations of discrimination 
by exempting situations where discrimination has occurred to achieve legitimate policy goals, 
(such as the protection of human health, public morals, the environment, national treasures or 
exhaustible natural resources). To prevent the potential exploitation of such an exemption by 
governments, Article XX explicitly tests the reasonableness of any such regulations by 
maintaining that they are: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade. 
Dr J Klabbers notes that caselaw on Article XX seems to have come into vogue, with 
ten GAIT Panel Reports now examining its scope.236 Most of these reports have been 
concerned with paragraph (d) which deals primarily with "measures necessary to secure 
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with [the GAIT]". There 
seems a general consensus that this nebulous paragraph hides four different "reasonableness" 
requirements. The first two apply to all the paragraphs of Article XX. The third applies to 
paragraphs (a), (b) and (d). The fourth is specific to paragraph (d). 
First, the measures implemented by the government must not result in "arbitrary or 
unjustifiable" discrimination. Second, such measures must not result in a disguised restriction 
to international trade. Third, measures taken must be necessary to reach the public policy 
purpose intended. Fourth, they must be taken in order to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations that are in themselves not inconsistent with the GA TI. 
On analysing eight of the ten cases, Klabbers notes that there is a broad consensus 
that Article XX calls for a restrictive interpretation as a broad interpretation would run 
"counter to the object and purpose of the GATT'.237 The case Canada - Measures A.fleeting 
Imports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (] 988) also clarified that because of this 
restrictive approach, all four of the reasonableness requirements must be satisfied in order to 
establish a valid defence. 238 
236 See Klabbers, above n 186, 64. 
237 See Klabbers, above n 186, 81. The cases Klabbers examined were: United States - Prohibition of Tuna and Tuna 
Products from Canada. GATT Panel Report adopted 22 February 1982, BISD 29S/91; United States - Imports of 
Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies (1983). GAIT Panel Report adopted 26 May 1983, BISD 30S/107; the Foreign 
Investment Review Act case (above n 189); the Japanese Agricultural Restrictions case (above n 187); the Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon case (below n 238); EEC - Imports on Spare Parts and Components, GAIT Panel Report adopted 
16 May 1990, BISD 37S/132; and Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GAIT 
Panel Report adopted 7 November 1990, BISD 37S/200. 
238 See Canada-Measures Affecting Imports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT Panel Report adopted 22 March 
1988, BISD 35S/98. 
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In relation to the Japanese cultural trade barriers outlined in this paper, it is apparent 
that the issues involved remain extremely complex.239 Some of the barriers would clearly fail 
to satisfy an Article XX defence, such as the anecdotal examples of Japanese technical barriers 
to trade. While other alleged barriers, such as the shaken regulations, seem to have a sound 
public policy basis - such as protecting the Japanese consumer. Essentially, a value judgement 
would be required by a GA TI Panel based on the strength of the relative arguments of each 
side. History demonstrates that such arguments are likely to be ingenious. 
The reasonableness requirement causing the downfall of most Article XX defences is 
the (third) requirement of "necessity". In the Section 337 of the Tari.ff Act case, the GAIT 
Panel outlined this requirement in the following terms:240 
It was clear to the Panel that a contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another 
GATT provision as "necessary" in terms of Article XX : (d) if an alternative measure which it 
could be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with any other GATT provision is 
available to it. 
It is highly likely that such measures as the shaken regulations could have been drafted in a 
manner that would have been less likely to cause their indirect discriminatory effect. 
B The 1994 GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure: Conflict Resolution Under the WTO 
The GAIT Dispute Resolution Procedure was harshly criticised in previous academic 
articles. 241 Commentators asserted that it was "ill suited to dealing with the problem of 
cultural trade barriers" or "not necessarily in a position to cope with most disputes of a 
cultural trade barrier nature".242 Many examples were cited of lengthy hearings, only to have 
the final report of the dispute resolution panel blocked by an effective veto at the critical 
adoption stage.243 However, with the recent completion of the Uruguay Round, the GAIT 
dispute resolution procedure has been dramatically modified - particularly in relation to time 
239 However, Grootzinger warns: "It is of/en no simple task ... to determine whether the intent behind the development of a 
particular standard was for [protecting health or safety] or whether it was created primarily to protect a domestic 
industry from foreign competition" See J Groetzinger "The New GATT Code and International Harmonisation of 
Products Standards" (1975) 8 Cornell Int'l Ll 168, 170. 
240 See Section 337 of the Tariff Act 1930, above n 207. 
241 Criticisms of the pre-WTO dispute settlement procedures centred around the adjudicative phases of the mechanism, ranging 
from complaints about the establishment of a panel to implementation of recommendations. For example, establishment of 
a panel was sometimes delayed because of resistance by the respondent party, as a reluctant party could block the Council 
decision to establish a panel. The panel process was also criticised for lacking transparency. And the adoption of panel 
reports could be blocked due to a consensus requirement. See, for example, Davey, above n 197, SS. 
242 See Davey, above n 197, 55. 
243 Up until March 1995, 195 cases have been brought under Article XXIII. In 98 of these cases, Panel Reports (including 
Working Party Reports) were circulated or prepared, whereas in the remaining 97 cases, a matter subject to consultations 
was not referred to Contracting Parties under Article XXIII:2 or a complaint was withdrawn after the establishment of a 
panel. In 81 of the above-mentioned 98 cases, Panel Reports were adopted, and in the 17 remaining cases, Panel Reports 
have not yet been adopted. See Komuro, above n 197, 89. 
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constraints and the infamous veto.244 There is now a comprehensive and streamlined 
procedure that wields substantive legal weight within the GA TI framework. 245 
The question arises, is the new WTO dispute resolution procedure better equipped for 
resolving matters relating to cultural trade barriers? This matter can only be determined by 
undertaking a close analysis of the procedural differences between the prior and present 
dispute settlement bodies.246 
1 Article XXIII - Nullification or Impairment : The Key to GA TT Dispute Settlement 
The GA TI dispute resolution procedure is accessed via Article XXIII: 1 of the GA TI 
which gives complaining parties a choice of three different procedures : l(a), l(b) or l(c). 
This requirement is continued by paragraph 3 .1 of the new "GA TI 1994 Dispute Settlement 
Understanding" which notes that the parties "affirm their adherence to the principles for the 
management of disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of the GAIT 1947". 
Article XXIII:l of the GATI provides: 
If any contracting party considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the 
GA TI is being nullified or impaired or the attairunent of any objective of the GA TI is being 
impeded as the result of: 
(a) 
or (b) 
or (c) 
the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under the GATI; 
the application by another contracting party of any measure; 
the existence of any other situation; 
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written 
representations or proposals to the other contracting parties which it considers to be concerned .. .. ". 
244 In early GA TI history a complaint would be heard and considered by the entire body of contracting parties or a working 
group of a substantial number of them (including the parties to the dispute). Over time, it became customary to assign a 
dispute to a panel of three or five experts. The I 979 Understanding codified this practice. The latest Uruguay Round 
agreement refines and modifies it in the light of its perceived failings. See P Pescatore "The GATI Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism : Its Present Situation and Its Prospects" (1991) 25:1 World Trade 5, 12. 
245 Since its accession to the GATI, Japan has been a defendant to 16 procedures: Silk Yarn (1977) BISD, 255110; Leather 
(1978) 26S/320, (1979) 27S/118, (1983) 3 JS/94, and (1985) U5826; Manufactured Tobacco (1980) 28S/ l 00; General 
Nullification and Impairment (1983) U5826; Agricultural Products (1986) 36S/163, (1986) U6070, (1988) L6322, 
(1988) U6333, and (1988) U6355; Customs Duties on Alcoholic Beverages (1986) 26S/!63; Semiconductors (1987) 
35S/116; Lumber (1987) 26S/167; and Copper (1987) U6456. And in 3 cases Japan has been the complainant: Anti-
dumping Measures by the EEC (1988) 37S/!32, (1992) ADP/781; and (1992) ADP/79. In 10 of the 16 cases against 
Japan, bilateral solutions were found, or measures were taken by Japan, so that the complaints were withdrawn prior to the 
completion of Panel proceedings. In one case, Japanese measures were found consistent with GATI provisions. In another 
case, conciliation was undertaken by the Director-General. In 4 panel cases, Japanese measures were found inconsistent 
with the GATI and Japan has now taken steps to implement Panel recommendations. See GATI, above n 2, 199. 
246 Panel reports were previously adopted by consensus of the Contracting Parties. Consensus is not defined in the GAIT and 
had been developed for political and practical reasons, for example, to avoid voting. Consensus differs from unanimity in 
that it is not prevented by an absence or abstention, but it is similar to unanimity in that both are subject to a veto by any 
Member present at the meeting. In the previous GA TI context, parties to a dispute were endowed with the right to 
participate in the Council's decision-making process and could, therefore, block the consensus adoption of panel reports. 
Thus the consensus rule, in conjunction with the right of attendence, conferred an effective veto power on disputing parties 
and considerably delayed the procedures. The practice of blocking considerably weakened the functioning of the GATI 
1947 dispute settlement mechanisms. See Komuro, above n 197, 30. 
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These three alternatives for bringing an action within the purview of the new WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body each result in a different burden of proof on the complaining party 
and an associated different procedural consequence.247 
Article XXIII: l(a) requires the complaining state to prove that the offending state 
directly violated a GATT obligation. This then triggers a presumption of "nullification and 
impairment" and the validity of the complaint is affirmed. Yet our previous discussion 
suggests that a direct violation of a GA TT obligation in relation to Japanese cultural trade 
barriers would be extremely difficult to establish. An Article III case typically faces extremely 
tough issues of implicit discrimination, or sound defences under Article XX. An Article XI 
action against administrative guidance may therefore be the only clear contender for a 
paragraph l(a) "Direct Violation" action. 
The second alternative, Article XXIII: l(b), bypasses the need to demonstrate a direct 
violation of the GATT. Instead the test becomes one of "nullification or impairment" of any 
GA TT objective or benefit. The basic objectives of the GA TT are stated within the GA TT 
preamble and are outlined in fairly broad terms as being the substantial reduction of tariffs 
and "other barriers to trade", and the "elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international commerce". This clearly a test with a much lower threshold.248 "Benefit" has 
also been interpreted extremely broadly by previous GATT Panels.249 However, Article 
XXIII:l(b) also requires some "measure" to have been taken by the offending state. This 
eliminates the potential for any 1 (b) actions to allege a breach of a positive duty to act. 
247 Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATI, which are too laconic to establish clear dispute settlement procedures, were 
supplemented by the following instruments of the Contracting Parties: (i) The 1966 Decision on Procedures Under Article 
XXIII for Developing Countries ("1966 Decision"); (ii) The Undemanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute 
Settlement and Surveillance of28 November 1979 ("1979 Undemanding") and its annexed Agreed Description of the 
Customary Practice of the GATI in the Field of Dispute Settlement ("Annex to 1979 Unden;tanding"); (iii) The 1982 
Decision on Dispute Settlement Procedures adopted at the Thirty-Eighth Session ("1982 Decision"); (iv) The 1984 
Decision on Dispute Settlement Procedures, adopted at the Fortieth Session ("1984 Decision"); and (v) the 1989 Decision 
on Improvements to the GATI Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures ("1989 Decision"). Finally, we now have the 
new Dispute Settlement Understanding of the Uruguay Round ("GATI 1994 DSB Understanding"). 
248 All panel reports, except one, concerning nullification and impairment relate to the nullification and impairment of benefits 
accruing from tariff concessions under Article II of the GATI. Past GATI practice suggests that non-violation 
nullification or impairment has only been found where the offsetting of a benefit accruing under tariff concessions could be 
proved (the test being one of"reasonable and legitimate expectation"). This practice, coinciding with the draft= intent that 
non-violation procedures "serve mainly to protect the balance of tariff concessions" (Oilseeds case) lest a benefit under 
the tariff binding be subsequently frustrated, does not preclude non-violation complaints from being filed because of 
nullification or impairment of a benefit other then a tariff concession. The 1985 Panel Report on Citrus Products coped 
with the question of whether a benefit accruing to the US in the form ofMFN treatment was being nullified or impaired as a 
result of tariff preferences on certain fresh citrus products extended under agreements between the EC and certain 
Mediterranean countries. Although this Panel found nullification and impairment, the Panel Report was unfortunately not 
adopted by the Contracting Parties. The Panel commented: "Although non-violation complaints have related to benefits 
arising from Article II on tariff concessions, this does not signify that non-violations are limited only to these benefit. 
The drafting history of Article XXIII confirms that this Article, including paragraph 1 (b) thereof. protected @r benefit 
under the General Agreement ... The basic purpose of Article XXIII: 1 (b) is to provide for offsetting or compensatory 
adjustment in situation where the balance of rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties has been disturbed'' . See 
Panel Report on EEC - Tariff Treatment of Citrus Products from Certain Mediterranean Countries, U5776 . 
249 See, for example, Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate (1952) GAIT Panel Report adopted 3 April 1950, CP4/39. 
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Paragraph 26.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding outlines the different 
procedural consequences for this second alternative. These include a requirement that the 
complaining state present a "detailed justification" to support any complaint. And if the panel 
finds against the offending state, then the offending state is not obliged to withdraw the 
offending measure, but may simply provide compensation to the complaining party. 250 
The third alternative, Article XXIIl:l(c), also bypasses the need to demonstrate a 
violation of the GAIT and the same test of "nullification and impairment" applies as in l(b). 
Actions under l(c) are termed "Situation Complaints" and do not require a "measure" to be 
taken by the offending party; they simply require "any other situation" - so l(c) is therefore 
extremely broad in scope.251 A complaining state only need prove nullification or impairment 
of a GA TT objective. 252 Yet there remain substantial procedural difficulties with Article 
XXIIl:l(c). 253 By virtue of Paragraph 26.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding: 
Where .... a panel detennines that the matter is covered by this paragraph, the proceedings of this 
Understanding shall apply only up to and including the point in the proceedings where the panel 
report has been issues to the Members. The dispute settlement rules and procedures contained in the 
Decision of the GAIT Council Representatives of 12 April 1989 (BISD 36S/61) shall apply to 
consideration for adoption, and surveillance, and implementation of recommendations and rulings. 
This means that actions taken under Article XXIIl:l(c) may not exploit the streamlined 
adoption procedures of the new WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Instead the GA TT Panel 
Reports must still be adopted by consensus. 254 This will give the offending state an 
opportunity to prevent adoption of the report by exercising their effective veto - which proved 
the major hurdle to effective dispute resolution prior to 1994. Hence, in relation to Japanese 
cultural trade barriers, any Article XXIII: 1 ( c) action may be stymied at the adoption stage by 
Japan voting against the report. 
250 The concept ofa "non-violation" impainnent of the GAIT seems to run contrary to the current trend towards a greater use 
of adjudication in GAIT dispute settlement. These non-violation actions are, by their very nature, more amenable to 
negotiation than adjudication. This tension is resolved to some extent by the new procedural modifications. See EA 
Verrnulst "An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement System and its Relationship with the Uruguay Round: Nice on 
Paper But Too Much Stress for the System?" (1995) 29:2 World Trade 131, 137. 
251 In 1983, the European Community requested the establishment of a working party, claiming that its benefits under the 
GAIT were nullified or impaired by situations "Peculiar to the Japanese economy which have resulted in a lower level 
of imports especially of manufactured products, as compared with other industrial countries". The complaint was, 
however, ultimately not pursued. See Japan - General Nullification and Impairment of Benefits to EEC, U5479. 
252 Komuro comments that it remains to be seen whether the non-violation provision could be invoked against governmental 
inaction (i.e. omission liability) since nullification or impainnent of a GAIT objective would be extremely difficult to 
establish in each case. For example, the complainant would need to establish that the government had a duty to legislate to 
restrict the anti-competitive practices of the Japanese keiretsu, and that the failure to do so nullified or impaired a GA TI 
objective. See Komuro, above n 197, 70. 
253 This clearly indicates that l(c) is seen as highly exceptional and not to be lightly invoked. See Vermulst, above n 250, 138. 
254 The 1989 Decision stated "The parties to the dispute shall have the right to participate fully in the consideration of the 
panel reports by the Council, and their views shall be fully recorded. The practice of adopting panel reports by 
consensus shall be continued, without prejudice to the GATT provisions on decision-making which remain applicable. 
However, the delaying of the process of dispute settlement shall be avoided". This means that panel reports are adopted 
by positive consensus. Parties to disputes, having the right to participate fully in the consideration of panel reports by the 
GAIT Council, can therefore block the adoption ofthe panel reports by a veto power. See also above n 246. 
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2 Conclusion : The New Procedure is Better Equipped to Handle Cultural Trade Barriers 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding of GATT 1994, incorporates, streamlines and 
substantially modifies the previous GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures.255 The central 
institution of the new Dispute Settlement Understanding is the Dispute Settlement Body. This 
comprises the General Council of the World Trade Organisation (constituting representatives 
from each of the member nations), fulfilling its administrative function between the biennial 
meetings of the "Ministerial Conference" (the governing body of the World Trade 
Organisation). The Dispute Settlement Body administers the dispute settlement process and 
allocates disputes referred to it to a "Dispute Panel" of 3 or 5 individuals. The Dispute Panel 
has a tight time frame within which it must hear the affected parties, investigate the situation, 
and then produce a report outlining rulings and recommendations. Issues of law may be 
appealed to a special Appellate Tribunal. 256 This entire process must be completed within a 
year. The final report is tabled before the Dispute Settlement Body who may only reject the 
report by a consensus decision. This creates an almost automatic acceptance mechanism. 257 
Once the report is adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body it takes international legal force. 258 
Cultural barriers to trade are extremely contentious in nature and must be approached 
with sensitivity. They typically accentuate trade conflicts by highlighting differences in the 
underlying values between the societies, as Professor GB Kaplan notes "where principles 
clash, conflict is the inevitable outcome".259 Disputes concerning cultural barriers are 
therefore typically expansive and highly emotive. 
255 The jurisprudence established by a series of panel rulings will continue to be useful. This is corroborated by Article XVI.1 
of the WTO Agreement which provides : "Except as otherwise provided for under this Agreement or the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and the customary practices followed by the 
Contracting Parties to the GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of the GATT 1947''. 
256 The creation of an appellate body is a completely new innovation under the World Trade Organisation as no parallel 
organisation existed previously. The appellate body, which will only review disputes on points of law, will be composed of 
seven persons who are unaffiliated with any government, any three of which will sit on appeal on a given case. The 
purpose of the appellate body is two-fold. First, it provides a review mechanism that will help ensure that the decisions of 
the panel are sound. Secondly, the review panel, through the consistency of its members, will help to ensure that there is a 
consistency amongst rulings. This in turn should help to promote legal certainty in international trade matters. See E 
Rowbotham "The Changing Nature of Dispute Settlement Under the GATT" (1995) 5 Global Env Change 71, 72. See 
also RA Brand "Competing Philosophies of GATT Dispute Resolution and the Draft Understanding on Dispute 
Settlement" (1993) 27:3 World Trade 117, 119. See also L Wang "Some Observations on the Dispute Settlement System 
of the World Trade Organisation" (1995) 29:2 World Trade 172, 179. 
257 Considering the inconvenience of the consensus rule, as well as the veto power of parties to a dispute, the WTO 
Understanding instituted the so-called "negative consensus rule" for decision-making by a newly created Dispute Settlement 
Body ("DSB"), which replaced the existing GATT Ministerial Council. Article 2.4 of the WTO Understanding provides : 
"Where the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for the DSB to take a decision, it shall do so by 
consensus". The footnote to this provision states "The DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter 
submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally 
objects to the proposed decision". This conceptual reversal is one of the major innovations achieved by the WTO and 
mean that decisions of the Dispute Settlement Body are adopted automatically, unless unanimously opposed. 
258 See PTB Kohona "Dispute Resolution Under the World Trade Organisation: An Overview" (1994) 28:5 World Trade 23. 
259 See GB Kaplan "The Use of Arbitration to Resolve Market Access Disputes" (1989) 22 Cornell Int'I U 469,475. 
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The Dispute Settlement Procedure of GAIT 1994 adopts a more legalistic approach 
based on adjudication. 260 Dr EA Vermulst comments, for example:261 
The consistent trend over the past decade has been to introduce more formal rules into GAIT 
Dispute Settlement and, hence, further legalise dispute settlement in international trade law. Against 
this background of slow change, the Dispute Settlement Understanding has leaped to the forward. 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding creates a system of rules that are not only more 
comprehensive than the body oflaw in force in GAIT Dispute Settlement, but which - on paper- is 
almost exemplary compared with dispute settlement in other fields of public international law. 
The mediatory aspects of the process have also been strengthened. 262 It seems the new 
Dispute Settlement Procedure provides a fair, impartial and sympathetic method for dealing 
with cultural issues and should dissipate much of the heat generated between the United States 
and Japan in their current trade disputes.263 Member nations confidently assert that this 
mechanism is both transparent and consistent, and will be used as the first step in resolving 
future trade disputes. It seems that while the GA TT clearly has some significant limitations 
in relation to cultural trade barriers, the politically or culturally sensitive characteristics of 
these barriers are no longer likely to be callously steamrollered or ignored. 264 
260 Recourse to a GAIT panel is a last step in a dispute, and consultation and conciliation efforts must first be exhausted. The 
new rules endow panel proceedings with a more pronounced litigious flavour and foster a more formal and rule-oriented 
approach to decision-making, The entire process is likely to become more adjudicatory and less diplomatic and panel 
reports could have an even greater precedential effect. The willingness of States to be bound by the rules, procedures and 
decisions of a supra-national authority is evidence of the willingness of States to cede some of their sovereignty and marks a 
significant departure from past practice. See Wang, above n 256, 179. 
261 See Vermulst, above n 250, 131. 
262 Parallel with a strengthening of the adjudicative procedure, the Dispute Settlement Understanding has maintained the 
negotiating aspects in the dispute settlement procedures. Panels are required to consult regularly with the parties and give 
them adequate opportunity to develop mutually satisfactory solutions to the dispute. The provision continues the emphasis 
on the primary objective of reaching solutions which are mutually acceptable. Other negotiating aspects, by which 
governments regain control of the adjudicatory procedure, may be found at various stages of the panel process : terms of 
reference; composition of panellists; principles to be adhered to by panels; and interim review of draft panel reports by the 
parties. They may also be seen in the provisions on informal dispute settlement procedures such as good offices and 
conciliation (paragraph 5.1). See Komuro, above n 197, 42. 
263 Kohona comments : "The approach to dispute settlement reflected in paragraph 3.2 is consistent with the objectives of 
those countries which sought to achieve a better rules-based international dispute settlement system to deal with 
international trade disputes ..... it will contribute towards enhancing the security, certainty and predictability of the 
system and provide a greater juristic basis for the decisions of the Dispute Settlement Body. However, this will require 
a sympathetic and sensitive approach from those charged with resolving disputes in view of the need to produce results 
which are compatible with the long-standing objective of the GATT system of seeking results which are generally 
acceptable to the parties and consequentially, effective." See Kohona, above n 258, 29. 
264 However, Vermulst also notes that now countries no longer have the option of blocking the adoption of Panel Reports, it is 
"expected the pressure on the dispute settlement system will shift to the implementation phase". Vermulst reasons that 
jurisdictions such as the European Community or the United States may simply refuse to implement politically palatable -
but adopted - panel decisions. An indication of this is provided by the American implementing legislation for the Uruguay 
Round Agreement. In an Agreement between the United States' Administration and Senator R Dole, the following text was 
adopted (11 lTR at 1865 (1994)]: "The Administration will support legislation next year to establish a WTO Dispute 
Settlement Review Commission. The Commission would consist of five Federal appellate Judges, appointed by the 
President .... .!/ will review all final WI'O dispute settlement reports, adverse to the United States, to determine whether 
the panel exceeded its authority or acted outside the scope of the Agreement.. .... Jf there are three affirmative 
determinations in any five year period, any member of each House may introduce a joint resolution to disapprove 
United States participation in the WTO - and if the resolution is enacted by Congress and signed by the President, the 
United States would commence withdrawal from the WTO agreement". See Vermulst, above n 250, 153. 
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VI INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 
Japanese keiretsu are non-governmental in character and thus fall outside the current 
ambit of the GA TI. Yet it appears keiretsu practices may be challengeable in international 
law if the Japanese Government had a demonstrable international obligation to enact anti-trust 
legislation to outlaw them. 265 At present the principal international law on this matter is 
provided by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") Code 
on Restrictive Business Practices. 266 
A The UNCTAD Code on Restrictive Business Practices 1980 
The UNCT AD Code was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in December 1980 and was intended to form a nucleus for the establishment of a 
new International Economic Order. 267 Customarily the United Nations has taken a hard line 
against restrictive business practices as exemplified by a General Assembly resolution in the 
Seventh Session:268 
Restrictive business practices adversely affecting international trade, particularly that of developing 
countries, should be eliminated and efforts should be made at the national and international levels 
with the objective of negotiating a set of equitable principles and rules. 
In contrast to the GAIT, the UNCTAD Code does not affect Governmental 
operations but instead targets private enterprise. The key is provided by section B(l) which 
defines "Restrictive Business Practices" as: 269 
Acts or behaviour of enterprises which, through an abuse of a dominant position of market power, 
limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrict competition, having or likely to have adverse 
effects on international trade. 
265 Japan already has an Antimonopoly Act that prohibits: private monopolisation; unreasonable restraints on trade; unfair 
trade practices; anti-competitive activities of trade associations; and anti-competitive mergers. The Act is administered by 
the Japan Fair Trade Conunission ("JFTC"), an independent agency attached to the Prime Minister's office and comprising 
a chairman and four conunissioners. Any person, or finn, may lodge a complaint with the JFTC about any practices which 
are suspected of violation of the Act and the JFTC then has powers to conduct investigations and hearings. Where the 
JFTC finds a violation, it uses a "cease and desist" order to eliminate the violation; it may also issues warnings in cases 
where suspicious conduct exists. The GATT Secretariat notes that in 1991, 33 warnings and 24 cease and desist orders 
were issued. However, complaints from foreign nations have highlighted the acute lack of resources of the JFTC and the 
resulting lack of enforcement of the Antimonopoly Act. See GA TT, above n 2, I 06. See also S Umezawa "The Main 
Policy of the Fair Trade Conunission for 1988" (1988) 22 :1 World Trade 117. 
266 See UNCT AD The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, 
UN Doc TD/RBP/10, Annex, adopted by consensus, UN General Assembly, Res 35/63, 35th session, 5 December 1980. 
267 The activities of UNCT AD have centred on three tasks: the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information; the 
development of model national laws; and the development of international codes. Although codes are of general 
application, they principally benefit developing nations. The information dissemination activities involved occasional in-
depth studies of restrictive business practices and annual reports on national anti-trust regulations. See TL Brewer 
"International Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices" (1982)16:l World Trade 108, I 11 . 
268 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3362 (S-VII), sect I, para I 0. 
269 Section B(l) ofthe UNCTAD Code. 
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Section D of the Code lists the practices that enterprises must refrain from following, these 
include price-fixing, collusive tendering, and general collusion. Firms are also obliged to 
desist from predatory behaviour, discriminatory pricing, and acquisitions that would hinder 
competition. By section E, the world's governments are urged to develop restrictive business 
practices legislation that would outlaw the various section D practices. And section F calls for 
increased international action to promote national policies and developments that are 
consistent with Code objectives.270 
Anti-competitive Japanese business practises, such as keiretsu collusion or dango 
contracting, would clearly fall within the ambit of the UNCT AD Code. 271 Yet it is also true 
that the Code would not apply to most governmental measures; these are within the proper 
jurisdiction of the GATT. 
However, the UNCT AD Code lacks a mechanism for effective dispute settlement and 
has been treated with a high degree of cynicism by developed nations.272 During the 
negotiation of the UNCT AD Code, the developing countries argued strongly for UNCT AD to 
adopt a dispute settlement role and suggested that the Secretary-General should be vested with 
a power to convene consultations. 273 The developed nations disapproved of this idea, yet 
agreed that "mechanisms to establish a framework for consultation should be an important 
aspect of the code".274 Therefore while the UNCTAD Code now provides that member states 
should "give full consideration to requests for consultation", and requires that all such 
consultations must be conducted in good faith, it contains no conflict-resolution procedures. 
The legal status of the Code is controversial. At most it is "soft" customary 
international law and only morally binding.275 Developed nations assert that it represents a 
set of aspirations, rather then binding legal precepts. 276 Contrary to the wishes of developing 
nations the Code was deliberately drafted in non-mandatory terms so as not to create legally 
binding obligations. Arguments that some of its provisions have crystallised into norms of 
customary international law are thus extremely tenuous. Professor TL Brewer concludes "the 
270 Vennulst notes that the basic goals of competition policy are to ensure the best possible functioning of the market by 
protecting the competitive system from distorting practices or restraints. See EA Vennulst "A European Practitioners View 
of the GATT System : Should Competition Law Violations Distorting International Trade be Subject to GATT Panels" 
(1994) 28:4 World Trade 5, 7. 
271 For example, the Japanese dango involves "collusive tendering" which is specifically targeted by the Code. See Brewer, 
above n 267, 115. 
272 This cynicism was largely caused by political conflict between developed and developing nations. 
273 Petersmann notes that when preparing for the Uruguay Round, proposals by less developed nations to include restrictive 
business practices on the agenda were resisted by developed countries (notably the US). See above Petersmarm, n 204, 40. 
274 See Petersmarm, above n 204, 42. 
275 For a discussion of the nature of "soft" international law see Sir Geoffrey Palmer "New Ways to Make International 
Environmental Law" (1992) 86 Am J Int'l L 260,269. 
276 Acceptance of these principles and rules is voluntary for both finns and governments. However, Brewer notes that the fact 
that the Code was approved by the United Nations General Assembly without dissent means it carries considerable 
authoritative weight See Brewer, above n 267, 111. 
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UNCTAD Code has no immediate effect as international law and does not include 
mechanisms for international enforcement".277 It seems clear the Code will not bind Japan. 
Yet it remains indicative of international pressure to tighten national anti-trust legislation. 
B The Draft International Antitrust Code and its Endorsement by the E.C. 
In January 1994, Dr K Van Miert, the European Community Competition 
Commissioner, endorsed a Draft International Antitrust Code based on the UNCTAD Code.278 
He contended that this should be adopted within the GA TT umbrella under an administering 
body known as the International Antitrust Authority.279 This Authority would aim to 
eliminate cartels and open markets closed by biased distribution systems. 280 
Article 19 of the Draft International Antitrust Code would grant the Authority broad 
powers. 281 Not only could it request action by national authorities, but it would take legal 
action itself if a national authority refused. The proposed Authority would also be empowered 
277 Brewer commented in 1982: "Although some developed countries may not regard resolutions of the General Assembly 
as being binding, even voluntary guidelines should be taken by developing countries as authorising the enactment of 
national legislation giving effect to the guidelines". The United Nations Resolution has actually taken the status of weak 
customary international law with many countries choosing to give effect to it capriciously. For a discussion of the legal 
weight of United Nations Resolutions, see LD Guruswamy, Sir Geoffrey Palmer & BH Weston International 
Environmental Law and World Order (West Publishing Co, St Paul, 1994), 129. See also Brewer, above n 267, 111. 
278 See Draft International Trust Code (1993) 5:5 WTM 126. The basic principles underlying the Code are, in part, similar 
to those of GA TT law: international minimum standards for transborder cases; incorporation of international rules into 
domestic laws and their enforcement via domestic competition authorities and courts; national treatment with regard to 
domestic and international competition; international dispute settlement proceedings; and integration into the GATT-WTO 
system. Yet Petersmann notes that many states will remain reluctant to transform soft law rules into hard-and-fast GAIT 
rules as long as the GAIT pennits them to maintain tariff safeguard measures. See Petersmann, above n 204, 39, 79. 
279 Indeed, Jackson suggests: "It seems quite clear that the subject of competition policy is one of the most important gaps 
in the structure of international economic relations ... as trade policy becomes more and more intricate and 
sophisticated, it is becoming increasingly clear that the lack of rules concerning competition can result in various 
actions which tend to undermine the goals of a liberal world trading system". Jackson comments that international trade 
policy cannot be completely separated from competition policy and notes that there are many examples of how trade law 
touches upon, or overlaps with, competition law. He personally advocates a modest "competition policy code" to be 
negotiated into the World Trade Organisation context. See Jackson, above n 70, 82, 86. 
280 Van Miert did not see an independent collective enforcement authority as feasible: "one should not even dream about a 
world-wide and independent competition authority". He instead envisaged multilateral adoption of minimum rules along 
the lines of the UNCT AD Code. Once these rules were accepted, they would be enforceable through national channels. To 
ensure international efficacy, enforcement would be backed by GA TT Dispute Settlement procedures and an authority 
established under the GAIT umbrella. A similar proposal was made by United States Assistant Attorney-General J Rill, 
who argued "ii seems timely to explore the desirability of creating a forum within the GATT for the exchange of 
competition goals, substance, and process among the world's largest economic partners. There are substantial 
precedents for such a structure for dialogue, including the G-7 on economic policy". See Rill, above n 132, 148. Yet 
the extent of support by the GAIT Secretariat is unclear, See, for example, their reservations in GATT, above n 2, 108. 
281 The OECD and UNCTAD have worked on a variety of such proposals for decades. For example, in 1976, the OECD 
adopted guidelines for multinational enterprises which included rules on restrictive business practices. The section on 
competition enjoined firms to "refrain from actions which adversely affect competition in the relevant market by abusing 
a dominant position of market power, by means of. for example, (a) anti-competitive acquisitions, (b) predatory 
behaviour, (c) unreasonable refusal to deal, (d) anti-competitive abuse of industrial property rights, (e) discriminatory 
pricing". See OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Annex : Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, June 1976. 
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to sue private parties. The Code clearly endows the Authority with considerable legal power 
to wield within the international community.282 
The International Antitrust Working Group suggested that draft Article 4 should 
define illegal restraints to trade to include horizontal and vertical distribution strategies; these 
would include "agreements, understandings, and concerted practices between or among 
competitors that fix prices, divide customers or territories, or assign quotas". 283 Article 13 of 
the Agreement would also provide: 
If in a non-competitive highly concentrated market, the market structure induces persistent abuses 
involving the exercise of significant market power adversely affecting at least one other party, the 
National Antitrust Authority of that nation shall order the restructuring of that undertaking. 
The Japanese keiretsu visibly fall within the ambit of the Code. Indeed, Van Miert noted that 
the proposal had been consciously drafted with a view to targeting the Japanese keiretsu and 
biased Asian distribution systems. He charged "it seems a good time to integrate the Korean 
and Japanese economies into the world market". 284 
As yet the idea remains conceptual and appears more of a political weapon for 
applying strategic pressure to Japan. The proposal has been raised and discussed within the 
OECD and Van Miert has advocated strongly that it should now be placed on the agenda for 
the next GA TT multilateral round. 285 If such an agreement was eventually adopted, the 
GATT's jurisdiction would then extend into the private sector.286 The original mandate for 
the GAIT included such restrictive business practices, but in 1960 the parties did not have a 
sufficient consensus to incorporate this issue within the GA TT Treaty. 287 In the meantime, 
keiretsu practices remain legal in international law. 
282 To fall within the ambit of the Code, any restraint on competition would have to affect at least two participating nations. A 
nation would be deemed to be "affected" if there were economic advantages (or disadvantages) from the anti-competitive 
behaviour within its territory, "or otherwise on its commerce"; or, alternatively, if citizens or companies based within the 
nation were the perpetrators or victims of the anti-competitive restraint. See Petersmann, above n 204, 42. 
283 The International Antitrust Working Group is a private institution comprised of 12 academic lawyers. They submitted the 
Draft International Antitrust Agreement to GATT Director-General P Sutherland, and the media, in July 1993. The Code 
was submitted "in order to avoid mutually harmful competition policy conflicts and overcome the vision gap and 
jurisdictional gap of national competition laws". See Petersmann, above n 204, 37. 
284 See "World Competition Code", Business Law Brief, Brussels, Belgium, 12 January 1994. 
285 Bergsten notes that there is widespread agreement that one of the objectives for the next GA TT round is to forge a new code 
on competition policies. Vermulst comments that a GATT framework for handling international and anti-competitive 
behaviour will possibly be established during the Berlin Round and "the ongoing work in the OECD will probably pave 
the way for this". See Bergsten, above n 4, 225. See also Vermulst, above n 270, 25 . 
286 Petersmann notes that international competition rules are more difficult to negotiate than international trade laws as 
national competition rules continue to differ widely: "in contrast to the world-wide consensus on an optimal ranking of 
trade policy instruments, there is no agreed theory and political consensus on an optimal ranking of competition policy 
instruments". The uncertainty in competition theory, the differences among national competition policies, and the higher 
legitimacy of national law militate against potent international anti-trust law. See Petersmann, above n 204, 48. 
287 Jackson notes that because of the close connection between trade policy and competition policy, competition policy was 
addressed within Sections IV (Commercial Policy) and V (Restrictive Business Practices) of the Havana Charter. As a 
result of the demise of the Charter, the emerging GATT attempted to take over this competition law role: "Several efforts 
were made to address the competition issues. A 1954 working party recommended postponement of consideration in 
. .. 
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VII UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL RESPONSES OF THE UNITED STATES 
The United States dominated global trade following the Second World War, 
permitting Americans to bask in economic prosperity. However, by the late 1960s many 
nations, including Japan, had rejuvenated their industrial muscle and began challenging the 
American position. Commensurate with this declining American competitiveness, United 
States producers faced burdensome discrimination in foreign markets. The resulting United 
States trade imbalance, especially with Japan, caused much consternation to American 
legislators. 288 They enacted the United States Trade Act 1974, with section 301 granting the 
President sweeping powers to take unilateral retaliatory action against unjustifiable or 
unreasonable trade practices employed by foreign nations: 
If the President determines that action by the United States is appropriate ... to respond to any act, 
policy or practice of a foreign country or instrumentality that...is unjustifiable, unreasonable and 
burdens or restricts United States commerce ... he shall take all appropriate and feasible action within 
his power to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy or practice. 
In reality such unilateral retaliatory action has rarely been taken. 289 But threatened invocation 
of section 301 has provided an invaluable device for coercing foreign nations to negotiate 
bilateral trade concessions.290 The United States' unilateral and bilateral responses to cultural 
trade barriers therefore seem inherently interlinked.291 
the light of activities then occurring in the United Nations ECOSOC. At a 1956 session of the GAIT Contracting 
Parties, a committee was charged with further work, and this committee set up a commission of experts on the subject." 
Eventually the working parties concluded that sufficient consensus did not exist. They also noted: "Such action would 
involve a grave risk of retaliatory measures which would be taken on the basis ofjudgements which would have to be 
made without factual information about the restrictive practice in question, with counterproductive effects to trade". 
See Jack.son, above n 70, 114. See Vermulst, above n 270, 10. 
288 Most economists agree that the main causes of the trade deficit were the misguided American economic policies in the early 
! 980's. Gradual changes in the global competitive environment also caused the United States to decline in international 
competitiveness. Thatcher comments: "The conflicting interests between the consumers and producers created a 
dilemma for planners and negotiators of United States trade policy. In the post World War II system of ostensibly free 
trade, American producers and exporters continued to be plagued by restrictive markets and industrial targeting in 
other countries, while United States consumers received a great boon in the variety of available goods." See Thatcher, 
aboven42, 510. 
289 Between 1979 and 1991, American firms filed a total of 5 countervailing duty and 58 dumping suits against Japanese 
exporters, 43 of these resulted in restrictions on trade. See Bergsten, above n 4, 70. 
290 An example of a bilateral initiative to address Japanese trade barriers was provided by the Structural Impediment Initiative 
("SU") talks. Here the US agreed to improve its education system and seek to lengthen the time horizon of its private 
investors. In return, Japan agreed to strengthen its antitrust enforcement to limit keiretsu collusion, and to amend its Large 
Store Law to open its distribution system to more efficient volume merchants (such as Toys 'R' Us). See K Shini'ichi 
"Japan and the United States: Opting for a Global Alliance" (1992) 14 Japan Echo 26, 28. 
291 Bergsten notes that in tactical terms the United States has deployed an extensive array of techniques against Japan. Some 
initiatives have been pursued multilaterally: these include exchange rate realignments in the G-5 and G-7, and efforts to 
improve access to the Japanese market through negotiations on tariffs, government procurement, subsidies, and other trade 
issues (i.e. the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay GATI Rounds). Other initiatives have been pursued in the bilateral mode: 
such as the Sil talks and the sector-specific negotiations that have produced VERs and VIEs. The United States has also 
taken unilateral measures against Japan (notably antidumping), and, in 1987, retaliated against Japanese non-compliance 
with the 1986 Semiconductor Trade Agreement. Unilateral retaliation has been repeatedly threatened in other instances as 
well. Another mode of dialogue, a regional one, could become available in the future if the recently established APEC 
evolves into a major forum for trade and broader economic relations. See Bergsten, above n 4, 17. 
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A A Unilateral Response : The Super 301 Provision 
The United States has a history of unilateral trade action that stretches back over 200 
years. 292 As early as 1794 the American Congress empowered President George Washington 
to restrict imports from foreign nations that were deemed to be unfairly discriminating against 
American products. As the flows of international trade gradually increased in magnitude and 
sophistication, this Presidential authority was progressively refined and strengthened. 293 
Section 301, and its amendments in 1979, 1984, 1988 and 1994, further expanded 
the scope for such unilateral action while enacting a new set of procedural guidelines. Matters 
could be brought to the President's attention by private complainants filing a petition with the 
United States Trade Representative ("USTR").294 The USTR would then consider the 
grievance and assess whether a full investigation should be conducted.295 A full investigation 
required consultation with both the American public and with the offending Government. 
Dispute resolution procedures could be applied if necessary. If the USTR's final 
recommendation was positive, the President was left with a broad discretion to take "all 
appropriate and feasible action within his power" to enforce the rights of the United States.296 
While the United States Congress repeatedly called for vigorous Presidential action, 
the President tended to adopt a more conservative approach. Sanctions were only invoked in 
exceptional circumstances with Section 301 employed more as a device for increasing 
American leverage in bilateral trade negotiations. Threats of use of section 301 were also 
utilised to assuage the protectionistic sentiment within Congress, and thus thwart potentially 
protectionistic American legislation. Professor KB Thatcher comments:297 
292 Horlick comments that unilateral action is the "stick" of American trade policy, with negotiations being the "carrot". See G 
Horlick "Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Will the United States Play by the Rules" (1994) 29:3 World Trade 164, 169. 
293 Current United States legislation on sanctions consists of six different laws: (i) Section 301 of the Trade Act 1974; (iii) 
Super 301; (iii) the revised Super 301 enacted by Executive Order in March 1994; (iv) Special 301 for the protection of 
intellectual property rights; (v) the Telecommunications 301 provisions (Section 1371-1382 of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988); and (vi) provisions involving government procurement (the Federal Buy-American Act as 
amended by Section 7003 of the Omnibus Trade Act). 
294 McCarthy describes trade policy within the United States as a "producer-oriented, complaint-initiated trade policy 
system." See CL McCarthy "Unilateralism, Bilateralism, Regionalism, Multilateralism and Functionalism" (1994) 4 
Transnat'I L & Cont Probs l, 38. 
295 Upon complaints from interested parties, or on his or her own initiative, the United States Trade Representative initiates 
investigations into the trade practices concerned, and at the same time enters into consultations with the relevant country. 
The United States Trade Representative then determines what action he or she should take within the statutory time limit. 
The time limit for trade agreement violations is 30 days after the conclusion of dispute settlement procedures or 18 months 
after the initiation of the investigation, whichever comes sooner). The time limit for other situations is twelve months. 
Finally the Representative may take action within thirty days of the decision to do so or within 180 days, in the case of 
delay. See Komuro, above n 197, 73. 
296 The scope of retaliatory action under section 30 l is wide enough to embrace various measures including: suspending, 
withdrawing or preventing the application of benefits of trade agreement concessions; imposing duties and import 
restriction on goods; and levying or imposing other restrictions on services (e.g. restricting market entry for companies from 
the offending country). See Komuro, above n 197, 74. 
297 See Thatcher, above n 42, 517. 
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In the face of crescendoing demands from Congress to use section 301 aggressively to retaliate 
against alleged offending nations, the President and the United States Trade Representative have 
held the deleterious effects of section 301 in check while at the same time using section 301 both as 
a safety valve against protectionistic sentiments in Congress, and as a negotiating lever to cajole 
trading parties to reduce barriers to United States exports. 
1 A "Super 301" Procedure : The United States Congress Takes a Tough Unilateral Stance 
Yet the fervently protectionistic Congress became increasingly dissatisfied with 
section 301. In their eyes the President's conservatism was obstructing its effective use.298 
The section was also restricted to the actions of the governments and the dispute settlement 
procedures appeared prohibitively time consuming. 299 Congress therefore passed the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act 1988 which streamlined the procedure and reduced the 
potential for Presidential inaction. These amendments became known as the "Super 30 l" 
provisions. While the previous scheme sanctioned retaliatory action against specific 
companies or products, Super 301 now permitted retaliation against entire nations. These 
amendments clearly signified an attempt by Congress to assert its role in the formulation of 
United States trade policy.300 
Within the Super 301 amendments, Congress also introduced a second procedure for 
unilateral action. This required the USTR to annually identify the foreign unfair trade 
practices imposing the greatest burden on American exporters, and to nominate "priority 
foreign countries" engaging in such unfair practices.301 After submitting these findings to 
Congress, the USTR was automatically required to initiate a full investigation into each 
priority country.302 C Svernlov notes that it was this mandatory initiation procedure which 
298 Thatcher argues that the legislative history illustrates the ambigous purpose of section 301: "On the one hand, there is a 
strong congressional call for vigorous Presidential action, while on the other, there are intimidations that the same 
strong language is only a threat to give United States negotiators additional leverage in bargaining for reductions of 
unfair trade practices by other nations". See Thatcher, above n 42, 498 
299 See Thatcher, above n 42, 506 
300 Super 301 was in part an effort by a Democratic Congress to force a Republican President to take a "tougher" approach to 
trade policy, especially on sector-specific issues and particularly with Japan; it also represented an effort to strengthen the 
hand of the agencies responsible for trade issues (the United States Trade Representative and Department of Commerce) 
vis-a-vis the foreign policy agencies (the Department of Defence, Department of State and the National Security Council). 
See Bergsten, above n 4, 231. 
301 For example, the countries with the largest trade surpluses with the United States - such as Japan (NZ$100 billion), South 
Korea (NZ$33 billion), the European Community (NZ$21 billion), and Brazil (NZ$10 billion). 
302 Under Super 301, the USTR was required to present a report to Congress within 30 days of submitting the National Trade 
Estimate to the President and Congress. In the report the USTR was required to identify: "trade barriers and trade-
distorting practices that deserved priority consideration during trade negotiations (''priority practices"); and countries 
that should be given priority attention in negotiations (''priority foreign countries")". Within 21 days of submitting the 
report, the USTR was required to initiate investigations of priority practices and, simultaneously, to enter into negotiations 
with priority countries. Unlike those under regular Section 301, these investigations were initiated without waiting for a 
complaint from interested parties. In case of failure to reach an agreement through negotiations, sanctions would be taken 
under Section 301. In 1989, Japan, India and Brazil were identified as priority countries, however investigations did not 
lead to sanctions. See C Svernlov "Super 301 : Gone But Not Forgotten" (1992) 26:3 World Trade 125, 128. 
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earned the 1988 amending provisions the nickname "Super 30 l" - as the mandatory procedure 
supplemented the discretionary initiation procedure.303 
Upon initiation of any Super 301 investigation, the United States Trade 
Representative was required to commence bilateral negotiations with the offending nation to 
eliminate, "or solicit compensation for", the unfair trade practice. Super 301 therefore clearly 
supported the use of bilateral negotiations. Indeed, Japan was singled out for special 
treatment in this regard, with the Act stating:304 
The Congress finds that: 
(7) Our trade and economic relations with Japan are complex and cannot be effectively 
resolved through narrow sector-by-sector negotiations; 
(8) A major problem between the United States and Japan is the absence of political will in 
Japan to import; and 
(9) Meaningful negotiations must take place at the highest level, at a special summit of 
political leaders from both countries. 
This entire procedure was governed by a strict three year time frame. If an agreement was 
reached, the investigation was terminated. If not, and a positive determination resulted, the 
President was obliged to: 305 
(A) Suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of benefits of trade agreement concessions 
to carry out a trade agreement with a foreign country .... ; or 
(B) Impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and, notwithstanding any 
other provision of law offers or other restrictions on the services of, the foreign country 
for such time as the United States Trade Representative determines appropriate; or 
(C) Enter into any binding agreements with such foreign country that commit the foreign 
country to: 
(i) eliminate, or phase out, the act, policy or practice; or 
(ii) eliminate any burden or restriction or United States commerce resulting from 
such act, policy, or practice; or 
(iii) provide the United States Trade Representative with benefits; 
that are satisfactory to the United States Trade Representative. 
303 See Svemlov, above n 302, 129. 
304 Bergsten argues that the nature of the Japanese political system almost makes it axiomatic that the United States should 
employ the maximum level of unilateral pressure in virtually every sectoral negotiation ( although he also notes this is now 
anachronistic in light of Japan now constituting a global economic superpower). Japan's political system usually operates 
on the basis of widespread consensus, which is difficult to achieve and takes a long time to formulate. This is especially so 
in cases that seek to disrupt traditional Japanese practices that are widely accepted throughout the country. Foreign 
pressure ("gaiatsu") has thus frequently proved necessary to galvanise the system - and has succeeded on numerous 
occasions. Bergsten suggests that the unilateral actions of the past, including those taken under Super 301, have had 
considerable success in opening the Japanese market - particularly when they have found Japanese groups that shared 
American interests. See Bergsten, above n 4, 230. See Adams, above n 17, 52. 
30 5 In summary: retaliation is mandatory if the act, policy or practice of a foreign government is either in violation of the 
GAIT or any other trade agreements, or is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce. Retaliation is 
also mandatory if United States rights under any trade agreement are denied by the foreign country. On the other hand, 
retaliation is discretionary if the act, policy or practice of the foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens 
or restricts United States commerce. See FO Boadu "Enforcing US Foreign Trade Legislation : Expanded Presidential 
Discretion?" (1990) 24,2 World Trade 79, 82. 
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In May 1989, Japan was formally cited under Super 301 and retaliatory action was 
threatened. 306 The Japanese were outraged and recalled similar action taken against them 
following alleged dumping of semiconductors in Asia.307 Japan threatened counter-retaliatory 
measures and a massive United States-Japan trade war loomed. This situation was likened to 
a trade version of the military "Mutually Assured Destruction" ("MAD") syndrome. Neither 
party would win, but each trader would propel the other (and the rest of the globe) into a 
severe economic depression. 308 But fortunately this heated stand-off gradually cooled and 
because Super 301 was situated within a three year "sunset" clause, it subsequently lapsed; yet 
friction remained.309 Measures taken by Japan largely proved unsatisfactory to the United 
States, with the newly inaugurated President Clinton re-adopting a hard-line approach.310 In 
March 1994, the Super 301 provision was reinstated for another five years.311 
Yet much concern has been voiced at the current highly strained state of US-Japan 
relations that has resulted. United States policy towards Japan has been perceived as 
"floundering in indecision".312 The United States has recently started advocating strict quotas 
for its products in an attempt to break cultural trade barriers via 'managed trade'. This policy 
has been severely criticised by both Japan, and the rest of the world, as contradicting the free-
trade ambitions of the GATT. 313 The United States successes do not necessarily mean that 
unilateral action is the best approach for resolving cultural trade barriers - in terms of 
remaining in amicable relations, it may well prove to be the worst.314 
306 See US Govemmentlnitiation of Investigation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act 1974 : Japan's Practice with Regard 
to the Manufacture, Importation and Sale of Tobacco Products, (1985) No 301-350, 50 Fed Reg 27, 609. 
307 The "semiconductor fiasco" involved the invocation of section 301 against Japan on the basis of dumping of 
semiconductors in Asia contrary to an explicit anti-dumping treaty with the United States. On 17 April I 987, the United 
States imposed a 100% punitive tariff on all Japanese semiconductors imported into the United States and similar tariffs on 
other semiconductor-related products. The situation was sensationalised by statistics showing that although American 
manufacturers shared 55% of the European semiconductor market, they only shared 8.5% of the semiconductor market in 
Japan. See K Ohe "A Case Study ofthe US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement" (1989) 17 Aust Bus LR 126, 135. 
308 See Nukazawa, above n 25 (and discussion in associated text). 
309 Super 30 I was situated in a three year "sunset" clause in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 1988. It thus lapsed 
early in 1991. See Y Taizo "The New United States Trade Act in Perspective" (1988) 15,4 Japan Echo 12. 
31 O The United States-Japan trade frictions in 1994 centred on improved access of foreign glass manufacturers to the Japanese 
market. The Americans were demanding that objective and "transparent" standards be created. A report by the JFTC in 
June 1993 had indicated that large kickbacks, associated with the dango cartel, were occurring within the glass market and 
this was hampering foreign competition. The United States threatened Japan with the use of Super 30 I and the two nations 
entered into bilateral negotiations which resulted in a "Glass Trade Accord". See "United States Seeks Objective Criteria 
on Glass Trade", Jiji Press Ticker Service, Tokyo, 22 July 1994. 
31 I 1n March 1994, President Clinton signed an Executive Order reinstating Super 301. The revised Super 301 provision 
differs from the original provision in two ways. First, the provision is not statutory legislation. The President can, 
therefore, terminate or amend the new Super 30 I provision at any time. Second, the revise Super 30 I provision allows the 
President more discretion in imposing retaliatory measures then did the original provision. See Komuro, above n 197, 75. 
312 See S Awanohara "Golden Opportunity : Washington Sees a Chance to Redraft Its Japanese Policy" Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 21 July 1994, 24. 
313 The GAIT Secretariat comments: "The tendency for major trading partners to press for, and Japan's readiness to 
agree to, management of specific trade problems as a means of addressing bilateral imbalances could, if left 
unchecked, subject the multilateral system to potentially damaging pressures" See GAIT, above n 2, 6. 
314 The United States Trade Representative Carla Hills herself said in 1991 "The current Super 301 is a clumsy device - not 
subtle, delicate or even appropriate". See Svernlov, above n 302, 132. 
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2 Holding the United States in Check: Is the Use of Super 301 Contrary to the GATT? 
Under the GAIT 1947, American unilateral retaliatory action in situations governed 
by GA TI rules would have violated the GA TI if such action was taken without prior GA TI 
Dispute Panel authorisation.315 The American Super 301 provision was therefore drafted to 
allow unilateral action to be abandoned if a GAIT Dispute Panel found against the United 
States.316 By virtue of paragraph 23 the new GAIT 1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding 
("DSU") this 1947 situation is maintained. Paragraph 23 of the DSU provides: 
23. Strengthening of the Multilateral System 
23.1 When members seek the redress of a violation of obligations .... under the covered 
agreements .... they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this 
Understanding. 
23.2 In such cases, members shall: 
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred .. .. except 
through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and 
proceedings of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination 
consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report 
adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding; 
Hence, the United States must still obtain Dispute Panel authorisation for any unilateral 
action.317 Yet these provisions arguably suggest that if the relevant circumstances are beyond 
315 Under the GA TI, retaliation is a last resort when the offending party fails to implement the recommendations of the 
Contracting Parties. The complaining party may take retaliatory action on a discriminatory basis vis-a-vis the offending 
party, subject to strict conditions prescribed by Article XXlII:2. ~ retaliation should be authorised by the Contracting 
Parties. Unilateral retaliation without the GA Tfs authorisation is prohibited. The purpose of requiring such an 
authorisation is to prevent the contracting parties from taking unnecessary and excessive measures in retaliation. Second, 
retaliation may only be authorised if, in the view of the Contracting Parties, "the circumstances are serious enough to 
justify such action". Third, the extent of such retaliation is limited, since retaliation takes the form of suspension of the 
application to the offending party of "such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as the Contracting 
Parties determine to be appropriate in the circumstances". Finally, once retaliation is taken, the party to which the 
retaliation is addressed: "shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such action is taken, to give written notice to 
the Executive Secretary of its intention to withdraw from this [the GAIT] and such withdrawal shall take effect upon 
the sixtieth day following the day on which the notice is received''. See Komuro, above n 197, 24. 
316 These provisions of US trade law are not necessarily in compliance with American obligations under the GATI. Legally 
speaking, for unilateral retaliation to be justified, two conditions must be met. First the subject-field of the retaliation, must 
not be covered by a WTO Agreement. For example, anti-competitive practices of a foreign country may be subject to 
unilateral retaliation. Yet the extent of the WTO'sjurisdiction is in such cases remains highly unclear, and is only likely to 
be resolved on a case-by-case basis as WTO caselaw develops. The second condition is that retaliatory measures must be 
consistent with the provisions of the GATI and its covered agreements. Accordingly, any introduction of quantitative 
restrictions or an increase of tariffs is forbidden without authorisation from the DSB. See Komuro, above n 197, 77. 
317 Although retaliation has been contemplated several times, the Council of the Contracting Parties authorised it only once (43 
years ago) in US - Restrictions on Dairy Products (1952), GATT Panel Report adopted 8 November 1952, BISD lS/62. 
The GATI Panel found United States import restrictions on dairy products inconsistent with the GATI provisions and, 
under the circumstances, they were sufficiently serious to justify retaliation by the Netherlands. The decision authorised the 
Netherlands to "suspend the application to the United States of their obligation under the General Agreement lo the 
extent necessary to allow the Netherlands to impose an upper limit of 60,000 metric tons on imports of wheat flour 
from the United States during the calendar year 1953". The decision emphasised three crucial elements for assessing the 
appropriateness of retaliation: the value of the trade involved; the impairment suffered by the Netherlands; and that the 
principal objective of retaliation is to contribute to the eventual solution of the matter in accordance with the objectives and 
spirit of the GATI. But the Council did not authorise retaliation in five subsequent GATI cases because the offending 
party in each case exercised its effective veto to stop consensus adoption [see French Import Restrictions BISD 1 lS/94; 
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the proper jurisdiction of the WTO, then any unilateral action will not violate the GAIT. 
Under the 194 7 rules, if a Dispute Panel found that the United States had violated the 
GAIT, the United States could still block the adoption of the Dispute Panel report thereby 
avoiding formal censure.318 Under the new Dispute Settlement Understanding this veto is no 
longer possible. PTB Kohona, an Australian negotiator during the Uruguay Round, explained 
that the United States wished to abolish and completely reverse the consensus requirement for 
adoption of Dispute Panel reports to eliminate the possibility of a veto. 319 The other GAIT 
members agreed, but only on the basis that the United States would refrain from taking 
unilateral action: 320 
Agreement on the new text was reached on the assumption that the United States had agreed to 
resort to the Uruguay Round Dispute Senlement Understanding to deal with international trade 
disputes, and not rely on unilateral trade measures. 
A GAIT Panel Report condemning the United States for unauthorised unilateral action would 
certainly result in unavoidable political humiliation for the American administration. 321 
It is theoretically possible for the United States to ignore any findings of a GA TT 
Dispute Panel as these reports are not self-executing in American law. However, such 
inaction would place the United States in further direct violation of the GATT.322 This may 
permit retaliatory action by other GAIT members (which is unlikely due to the political clout 
of the United States); the United States may lose credibility under the GAIT; or non-
compliance may undermine global confidence in the GA TT leading to retaliatory 
infringements by American trading partners. The publicity from any refusal by the United 
States to recognise a GA TT Dispute Panel finding would again undoubtedly prove severely 
politically damaging for the President of the United States. 
United States Sugar BISD 37S/228; United States Superfund BISD 34S/136; Canadian Alcoholic Drinks BISD 39S/27; 
EEC Oilseeds Subsidies BISD 39S/27]. See Horlick, above n 292, 169. 
318 In practice, the US blocked a number of reports including those concerning: Wine and Grapes; EC Wheat Flour Subsidies; 
Countervailing Duties on Brazilian Footwear; Anti-Dumping Duties on Swedish Pipes and Tubes; Anti--0umping Duties on 
Swedish Stainless Steel Plate; Anti--0umping Duties on Mexican Cement; Procurement of a Sonar Mapping System; 
Countervailing Duties on European Steel Products; and Income Tax Legislation. See Komuro, above n 197, 32. 
319 Kohona explains, ironically, that "some negotiating parties originally expressed a preference for the consensus 
approach to be retained in relation to the adoption of panel reports. The United States, on the other hand, supported 
changing this approach due to its perception that the consensus approach hindered effective dispute settlement and 
enforcement". See Kohona, above n 258, 39. 
320 See "Japan Takes Moral High Ground", International Herald Tribune, New York, 28 June 1994. See also "Japan's MIT! 
Panel Raps US Trade Policy" Jiji Press, Tokyo, 31 May 1994. 
321 A recognition of this potential scenario lead the General Accounting Office of the United States Congress to report in 1994 
: "Administration officials acknowledge, however, that the United States Government, in taking unilateral action must 
be careful not to impose sanctions that violate United States obligations or are otherwise actionable under the 
Uruguay Round Agreements. Use of such sanctions would violate United States obligations and give the offending 
country an opportunity to use the new WTO dispute settlement procedures to retaliate against the United States". 
Horlick comments that this reflects a new "acute consciousness" ofGATT obligations within the An1erican Government. 
See Horlick, above n 292, 167. 
322 See Svem!Ov, above n 302, I 31. 
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Commentators such as Professor KB Thatcher also argue that unilateral action in @Y 
situation would contravene GATT obligations.323 Unilateral action undermines the inherent 
multilateral doctrine of the GA TT embodied within such fundamental precepts as the Most 
Favoured Nation principle of Article 1.324 Unilateral action against a nation would remove 
most-favoured-nation treatment for that nation. Thatcher also notes the danger of moving 
away from the multilateral ambitions of the GA TT, and back towards inherently 
discriminatory bilateral altematives:325 
More than anything else, section 301 has caused frequent bilateral resolution of trade disputes 
outside the GAIT framework. This process has created short-tenn solutions to many trade 
problems , frequently at the expense of long-term possibilities for more open trade, and to the 
detriment of the GAIT as an organ for international dispute resolution. 
B A Bilateral Response: Voluntary Export Restraints and Voluntary Import Expansions 
Voluntary Export Restraints ("VERs") are ad hoe agreements negotiated bilaterally 
between governments, or between foreign industry and a government. 326 Their essential 
feature is that they are characterised by both parties as "voluntary" and are thus legally 
unenforceable. 327 To date they have been employed largely by the United States in a 
protectionistic attempt to reduce the quantity of particular imports. 328 
323 This view was supported by the Director-General of the GAIT who stated there was "no exception" to GAIT rules which 
prohibit a country from imposing retaliatory measures. However, Thatcher also suggests that the circumspect use of Super 
301 may be effective in: assuaging the protectionistic sentiment in the United States (especially within Congress); 
publicising trade barriers in foreign countries like Japan; and inducing other countries to lower their barriers. See Thatcher, 
above n 42, 494. 
324 Politically, only great powers can credibly resort to the threat of retaliation. This is another of the basic reasons for the 
creation of regional trade blocs which alone are capable of wielding the economic power necessary to resort to effective 
sanctions and to bring successfully into play the dissuasive effects of such a threat. Clearly this is unfair to small nations 
and encourages the type of discrimination and conflict that is anathema to the GAIT. See Pescatore, above n 244, 15. 
325 See Thatcher, above n 42, 516. 
326 The GAIT Secretariat defines them in the following way: "A Voluntary Export Restraint is a measure by which the 
Government or an industry in the importing country arranges with the Government or the competing industry in an 
exporting country for a restriction on the volume of the latter's exports .... but from an economic perspective, the 
problem of defining a Voluntary Export Restraint becomes largely irrelevant. Any Voluntary Export Restraint that 
operates in the exporting country to restrict imports to particular countries, whether or not directly involving the 
government of the exporting country, would have similar economic consequences. The word "voluntary" is of course a 
misnomer - these arrangements are generally undertaken at the insistence of importing countries which threaten 
retaliatory action .... They are therefore used by governments of importing countries as a means of managing trade to 
protect sensitive domestic industries. By this definition, the term "Voluntary Export Restraint" is a generic reference for 
all bilaterally agreed measures to restrain exports. See GAIT, above n 2, 115. 
327 Technically a Voluntary Export Restraint is unilateral and administered by the exporting country, being "voluntary" in the 
sense that the country has the fonnal right to eliminate or modify it But usually a Voluntary Export Restraint arises 
because of direct or indirect pressure from an importing country; it can be thought of as voluntary only in the sense that the 
exporting country may prefer it to alternative trade barriers that the importing country might use. See Bergsten, n 2, 45. 
See also GAIT, above n 2,116. 
328 Japan has also employed a Voluntary Export Restraint in relation to Korean knitwear in February 1989. The Voluntary 
Export Restraint restrained Korean exports to Japan, and allowed Chinese knitwear makers to increase their share of the 
Japanese market while making windfall profits. It proved highly counter-productive. See EC Emerson "Voluntary 
Restraint Agreements and Democratic Decision-making" (1991) 31 Virg Jlnt'I L 281, 281. 
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Voluntary Export Restraints date from the 1960s but were re-established by the 
Reagan administration in the 1980s for such products as automobiles, machine tools, steel and 
textiles.329 The most notorious VERs were negotiated in 1984 in an attempt to protect the 
American steel industry from the damaging effect of foreign competition. 330 These foreign 
competitors were exploiting new technology to produce higher quality steel at lower prices, 
thus undercutting the more inefficient American steel producers. The Reagan administration 
considered that some form of protectionism was essential as domestic steel production had a 
high strategic value (both economically and militarily) and employed 270,000 Americans. 
Voluntary Export Restraints are particularly pernicious as they constitute a form of 
protectionism that is unlikely to be challenged by other GAIT nations.331 They transfer 
wealth to the exporting country, and effectively bribe that country with "tariff-equivalent 
revenue" - hence complaints to the WTO are unlikely.332 This revenue is created because the 
artificial reduction in supply permits the foreign exporters to charge higher than normal 
prices, thus achieving super-normal profits at the expense of consumers. 333 For example, the 
steel VERs dramatically increased the price of steel during the late 1980s. Between January 
1988 and March 1989 the price of steel within the United States soared 20%. This in turn 
affected steel-dependent industries causing temporary shutdowns, layoffs and cancellations of 
export sales. There is overwhelming evidence that the use of Voluntary Export Restraints 
propagates major inefficiencies and distortions within an economy.334 
329 United States President Lyndon B Johnston was the first to implement a Voluntary Export Restraint progranune, this was 
also in response to increased foreign steel imports. See T Fillinger "The Anatomy of Protectionism : The Voluntary 
Restraint Agreements on Steel Imports" (1988) 35 UCLA LR 953, 957. 
330 Fillinger notes that between 1984 and 1987, the Reagan administration steel negotiators endorsed Voluntary Export 
Restraints with representatives of28 countries. These agreements, covering 80% of imported steel, constituted some of the 
broadest protection ever awarded to American industry. See Fillinger, above n 329, 953. See also CP Seebald "Life After 
Voluntary Restraint Agreements : The Future of the Steel Industry" (1992) 25 Geo Wash J Int'I L & Econ 875, 875. 
331 The GA TT Secretariat explains that a typical VER raises prices in the importing country and leads to trade diversion. It 
also gives rise to economic rents, welfare losses, and global as well as national resource misallocation in both the exporting 
and importing countries. VERs tend to spread, fragmenting the trading system into a series of market-sharing 
arrangements, dominated by the major trading nations. And VERs may create vested interests in both the importing and 
exporting country, leading to VER entrenchment. Preusse compares the economic effects of VERs to the effects of tariffs 
and concludes that VERs are worse when dynamic effects are taken into consideration. The country's loss of welfare is 
increased because foreign exporters are given the chance of enforcing a monopolistic pricing policy. Their introduction is 
usually the result of successful rent-seeking. The direct costs of their bargaining and implementation are usually high. 
Implementation occurs covertly and bypasses public accountability mechanisms (and the global accountability mechanisms 
of the GA TT). They are frequently justified as "short-term" measures, but in reality they have often become entrenched 
and are then perpetuated by vested interests. Preusse warns that they tend to tilt the equilibrium between free-trade and 
protectionism in favour of the protectionist sentiments. See Preusse, above n 28, 15. See GAIT, above n 2, 116. 
332 VERs have built in compensation for the foreign supplier in the form of economic rents and also provide a degree of 
certainty in market access. See GATT, above n 2, 116. 
333 The "Auto Voluntary Export Restraint", for example, effectively represented a transfer payment running to billions of 
dollars from American consumers to Japanese producers. 
334 A broad range of economic, trade and legal literature concludes that such protectionism hurts the home economy in the long 
run. A Brookings Institution report regarding the Japanese automobile Voluntary Export Restraints calculated an annual 
consumer cost of $150,000 for each job preserved in the US industry. The total consumer loss was US$4.3 billion. 
Protectionism damages the ability to trade abroad, kills incentives to reinvest and modernise, causes the loss of jobs, and 
disrupts and distorts the international economy. Petersmann notes that modem trade and public-choice theory confirm that 
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Voluntary Export Restraints are also constitutionally abhorrent in the United States. 
They permit the President to bypass Congress and directly negotiate with a foreign nation or 
industry.335 In the 1974 United States case Consumers Union of US Inc v Kissenger, 336 the 
Court reasoned that as Voluntary Export Restraints were "purely voluntary unenforceable 
actions", and as nothing in the United States Constitution prevented the President from 
negotiating unenforceable agreements, they were thus not subject to judicial review. 337 This 
meant that the executive branch of Government was given a virtually unlimited discretion. Dr 
EC Emerson comments: "Voluntary Export Restraints operate in a no-mans-land where 
political accountability is abandoned and the injured have little recourse". 338 
This points to another of the essential difficulties with VERs in the United States, a 
high lack of political accountability. 339 United States companies have been able to apply 
direct pressure to the executive branch of Government to solicit VERs, thereby bypassing 
Congress. As Professor KC Kennedy observes, this is constitutionally inappropriate:340 
Voluntary restraint agreements are short-sighted, insidiously erode the integrity of national law in 
Western democracies, and pennit discrete legislative minorities to obtain political results that a 
legislative majority is publicly unwilling to support. 
Strictly speaking, Voluntary Export Restraints are illegal under the GATT. They 
violate Article XIX which provides that import relief measures can only be imposed on a 
finding of "serious injury". They run afoul of the Article I "Most Favoured Nation" principle, 
whereby trading partners must be given equal treatment. 341 And VERs violate Article XI, 
trade restrictions such as VRAs almost always reduce the potential income of the restricting economy ( e.g. because ofrent-
seeking and market distortions). See Fillinger, above n 329,991. See also Petersmann, above n 204, 59. 
335 The "President" in this context means the executive branch of the United States Government - as represented by the United 
States Trade Representative. 
336 506 F.2d 136 (DC Circuit, 1974). 
337 The Court reasoned "the steel import restraints do not purport to be enforceable, either as contracts or as government 
actions with the force of law; and the Executive has no sanctions to invoke in order to compel observance by the 
foreign producers of their self denying representations, They are a statement of intent on the part of the foreign 
producer association". See Emerson, above n 328,302. 
338 See Emerson, above n 328,310. 
339 Voluntary Export Restriants are often embraced because they have a low political visibility. See KC Kennedy "Voluntary 
Restraint Agreements: A Threat to Representative Democracy" (1987) 11 Hastings lnt'I & Comp LR 1, 12. 
340 Kennedy notes that the VER cycle begins with calls for protectionist trade legislation by "one or more members of 
Congress who raise the overworked spectre of foreign imports displacing thousand of honest hard-working American 
citizens." The odds that this legislation would ever be enacted remain remote. The mere threat of passage of such 
protectionist legislation will then result in the negotiation of Voluntary Export Restraints by the President with exporting 
countries in order to stem the perceived protectionism. This action is accentuated by further political pressure applied 
directly to the President by the petitioning parties in support of their bid in Congress. See Kennedy, above n 339, 36, 40. 
341 The promise of a fixed market share to any country would prima facie violate most-favoured-nation treatment. The GAIT 
Secretariat comments "A VER is by its very nature an instrument of selective trade control, in contradiction to the very 
principle of non-discrimination that has served as the cornerstone of multilateral rules since World War IF'. Such non-
discrimination in economic terms means that a given level of protection for domestic producers can be achieved at 
minimum cost to domestic consumers and the rest of the world. The principle also protects the interests of smaller trading 
nations and helps to ensure the access of new entrants to the international market place. Its role in multilateral trade rules 
lends transparency and predictability to international trade relations and to domestic decision making. Voluntary Export 
Restraints clearly undermine these objectives. See GAIT, above n 2, 116. See Kaufinan, above n 102,352. 
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which precludes the use of quantitative restrictions on trade. 342 Yet while VERs are 
technically illegal under the GATI, in reality they have formed another "grey area" of GATI 
legality. They are a subtle form of protectionism that have eluded GATI scrutiny due to the 
political benefits accruing to one nation and the economic rents accruing to the other. 
1 Voluntary Import Expansions : A More Appropriate Response to Cultural Trade Barriers? 
Voluntary Import Expansions ("VIE"s) are a novel and reverse form of Voluntary 
Export Restraint and constitute another form of managed trade. They apply when a powerful 
exporting country is attempting to enter the market of an importing country, and finds 
structural barriers impeding market entry. In this situation the exporting country applies 
pressure to the importing country to enter into bilateral negotiations. In the resulting 
agreement the importing country pledges to open their domestic market to the exporting 
country's products. As with the Voluntary Export Restraint this pledge remains legally 
unenforceable (although in reality VIEs are typically backed by a credible threat of sanctions). 
Metaphorically, while VERs act as a shield, VIEs operate as a sword. 
Voluntary Import Expansions have a political appeal that have seen them supplant 
the use of VERs in recent years: Voluntary Import Expansions do not cause direct economic 
costs to the economy of the powerful nation; they allow politicians to be perceived as 
"achieving something"; and they assuage domestic protectionistic sentiment and associated 
pressures for retaliatory action. They have been portrayed by both Japan and the United States 
as a "short term pressure valve to reduce trade tensions between our two nations" .343 
However, it is also clear that scepticism of Voluntary Import Expansions is in 
order. 344 They appear highly susceptible to political capture. And if they are administered in 
such a way as to prefer one country above others (as seems to be the case), they will also cause 
trade diversion - with the importing nation gaining at the expense of third-country 
producers.345 This is clearly anathema to the "Most Favoured Nation" principle of the GATI. 
342 Emerson comments that this Article XI prohibition was another cornerstone of the GATT system. The use of tariffs 
exclusively, it was believed, would ensure transparency and allow nations to bargain for open trade more easily because 
information concerning market accessibility would be readily available. See Emerson, above n 328, 293. 
343 The GATT Secretariat notes that Japan's export measures are typically described as "transitional, temporary, exceptional 
steps" to avoid "sharp and disruptive increases" in exports. See GATT, above n 2, 37. 
344 Difficulties with VIEs include: risk of political capture; a weak scientific basis for setting quantitative targets; actual 
outcomes may in part be generated by fundamental economic forces beyond any government's control (i.e. changes in 
demand, technological innovations); and enforcement of these agreements is problematic. See Bergsten, above n 4, 120. 
345 Whether a VIE is globally welfare-enhancing comes down to whether the initial situation is distorted or not, and if it is, 
how. If the foreign market is protected and a VIE is implemented on a non-preferential basis among foreign suppliers, the 
VIE may be globally welfare-enhancing although producers in the protected country will lose. If the market is protected 
and the VIE is administered preferentially, it is possible that both the importing and the exporting countries as a whole may 
gain at the expense of importing country and third-country producers. If the market is initially undistorted, the VIE will 
reduce importing country welfare and increase exporting country welfare. Indeed, the exporting country would prefer the 
VIE over an equivalent export subsidy because of the favourable VIE terms-of-trade effects. See Bergsten, above n 4, 132. 
. .· 
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The arguments of the European Community in the Semiconductor case are 
illustrative.346 The Semiconductor Agreement was a Voluntary Import Expansion, coupled 
with a five year Voluntary Export Restraint, that was negotiated between Japan and the United 
States in 1986. The United States had threatened severe anti-dumping action against Japan 
following the alleged dumping of Japanese semiconductors in Asia and the United States; this 
had led Japan to seek a negotiated solution.347 The terms of the resulting agreement included 
that Japan would "impress on Japanese producers the need to take advantage of increased 
market access opportunities for foreign products". 348 Japan would also restrict the entry of 
certain types of cheap semiconductors into the United States. 
The European Community launched a nullification and impairment action against 
Japan in the GAIT alleging use of administrative guidance by the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry to encourage Japanese producers to buy American chips in preference to 
all other chips.349 The European Community argued that this constituted discriminatory 
preferential treatment and therefore nullified or impaired Article I of the GA TI. However, 
due to insufficient evidence the action of the European Community failed. It is clear that 
Voluntary Import Expansions constitute yet another "grey area" of GAIT legality. 
2 The Current Use of VIEs and VERs Against Japanese Trade Barriers 
VERs and VIEs were first applied to perceived Japanese trade barriers in 1981.350 
The success of Japanese vehicle imports into the United States in the early 1980s alarmed the 
incumbent American auto manufacturers. These manufacturers lobbied Congress for 
oppressive legislative proposals that would restrict the import of Japanese cars. Faced with 
the probable enactment of such laws, the Japanese Government initiated talks with the 
American Government to attempt to resolve the issue. As a result of the negotiations, Japan 
entered into a recurring VRA which restricted the import of Japanese cars into the United 
346 See Trade in Semiconductors, above n 184. 
347 Semiconductors are also known as "silicon chips". 
348 The Semiconductor Agreement contained four principal provisions aimed at increasing foreign firms access to the 
Japanese domestic market. The Japanese government would encourage Japanese producers and consumers of 
semiconductors to purchase more foreign semiconductors. The Japanese government would establish an organisation in 
Japan to help foreign producers increased sales in Japan. The Japanese government would promote long-term relationships 
between Japanese and foreign firms. And finally, the Japanese government would ensure full and equitable access for 
foreign firms to patents generated by government sponsored research and development. See Bergsten, above n 4, 130, 226. 
349 There were two separate actions in the Semiconductor case. The first was an action against Japan under Article XI which 
related to the use of administrative guidance to restrict entry of foreign semiconductors into the Japanese market. This 
argument succeeded. The second action was an action under Article I which related to the alleged use of administrative 
guidance by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry to give the United States preferential treatment over 
other countries. This argument failed. See Trade in Semiconductors, above n 184. 
350 Some of Japan's most successful exports to the United States have been limited by Voluntary Export Restraints for a 
considerable period of time: automobiles, machine tools, steel, textiles and apparel. Some of America's exports to Japan are 
also promoted by Voluntary Import Expansions: Japan has a commitment to import specific quantities of semiconductors, 
and Japanese industries have set targets for importing auto parts and automobiles. See Bergsten, above n 4, 16. 
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States.351 Ironically this proved exceptionally lucrative for Japanese auto exporters by 
promoting the cartelisation of the market. This permitted the Japanese exporters to cream 
huge profits from the artificially high prices at the expense of American consumers. 352 
In recognition of the adverse effect of Voluntary Export Restraints, the United States 
is now clearly favouring the use of Voluntary Import Expansions in its trade relations with 
Japan. 353 Dr Fred Bergsten of the Institute for International Economics notes that this policy 
trend is a result of the apparent success of the Semiconductor Voluntary Import Expansion 
which raised the market share of foreign semiconductors within Japan. 354 This achievement 
spurred interest in similar approaches to other sectors.355 However, Voluntary Import 
Expansions are frequently a result of bilateral negotiations provoked by continued threats and 
coercion - which is clearly an insensitive procedure for approaching seemingly intractable 
cultural differences. Such threats have the inevitable result of increasing trade conflict, and 
heightening political and social tensions between the two nations. This has potentially 
damaging long-term repercussions for the stability of the international trading environment. 
Voluntary Import Expansions also indicate a trend away from the fundamental 
GA IT principle of multilateral free trade towards numerically managed bilateral trade. This 
is fundamentally abhorrent to the GAIT. In their January 1993 Trade Policy Review of 
Japan, the GA IT Secretariat asserted: 
Japan continues to stand outside, and to criticise regional and bilateral approaches to trade as 
undermining the multilateral trading system. However, its readiness, when confronted by such 
pressures, to accept bilateral solutions for trade problems, including voluntary restrain agreements 
351 The Voluntary Export Restraints negotiated in 1981 were to last four years (1981-1984). In 1985 they were extended for 
the first time, and thereafter have been ammally renewed up until the present. See Preusse, above n 28, 11. 
352 This provided a textbook exan1ple of the self-defeating nature of Voluntary Export Restraints. Japanese producers initially 
responded to the Voluntary Export Restraint by raising prices on their cars, which now had an additional scarcity value due 
to their limited supply. With the prices of Japanese cars escalating, American and European producers were free to raise 
prices as well. An estimated US$5.8 billion to $10.3 billion in quota rents were transferred annually from United States 
consumers to the world's automobile producers. Most of these rents were captured by Japanese producers, and for several 
years in the 1980s Toyota was the most profitable firm in Japan. These excess profits were ploughed back into investment 
in new plants, equipment, and research and development, making the Japanese firms even more formidable (hence further 
eroding the long-term market share of the major American producers). See Bergsten, above n 4, 106. 
353 Voluntary Import Expansions are now also being called by the euphemism "temporary quantitative indicators". These are 
justified as "simulating what both sides expect would happen in a particular sector if Japanese businesses and 
consumers made purchase decisions on the sole basis of commercial considerations". See Bergsten, above n 4, 19. 
354 Bergsten comments that Voluntary Import Expansions may make some sense as a mechanism to force the adaptation of a 
system that was developed in the closed policy-oriented enviroJU11ent of Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. A VIE could then 
be considered as a temporary compensatory policy to move the Japanese system closer to a free trade equilibrium. It may 
act as a prod to internationalise the keiretsu. It is precisely this encouragement to bring non-Japanese firms abroad in 
product development and the "design-in" phase that could be the avenue by which this inherently discrinlinatory structure is 
made compatible with an open international trade system. However, Bergsten also comments that "in light of the potential 
pitfalls of the VIE approach, one should be very cautious about advocating them". See Bergsten, above n 4, 196. 
3 5 5 The Semiconductor Agreement can take substantial credit for the increased share of foreign companies in the 
semiconductor market - yet it is still too early to assess the results of the new Voluntary Import Expansions on automobiles 
and auto parts. Keitaro comments that it has been a "gold mine" for Japanese companies, setting a price that will allow 
them to obtain a "handsome profit". See H Keitaro "Economic Options After Reagan" (1988) 15:4 Japan Echo 31, 32. 
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and market-opening agreements, continues to give the impression of a country which, while seeking 
to reduce frictions with all trading partners, favours the growth of grey-area measures and of 
managed trade in certain sensitive areas. Such bilateral solutions to trade problems, unless fully 
consistent with the principles of the multilateral trading system, including non-discrimination, 
contribute to the erosion of confidence in the system and of the system itself 
It therefore seems that while Voluntary Export Restraints are clearly recognised as an 
economic evil by most nations, the economic costs and benefits of Voluntary Import 
Expansions remain murky. Voluntary Import Expansions remain the current subject of heated 
debate among the GA TI nations and issues of their GA TI legality and acceptability remain 
unresolved. 356 It seems that the use of Voluntary Import Expansions in the relationship 
between the United States and Japan unfortunately seems set to continue. 357 
C A Bilateral Resolution of Cultural Differences : The Structural Impediments Initiative 
Existing bilateral channels between the United States and Japan include the Joint 
United States - Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, established by agreement on 
2 June 1961. 358 The Agreement provides for regular consultation for the purpose of reducing 
economic conflict, promoting information exchange and resolving trading differences. 359 The 
Committee has facilitated closer trade consultations and the negotiation of Voluntary Export 
Restraints and Voluntary Import Expansions. However, when Japan was declared a "priority 
country" under Super 301, Japan abruptly refused to negotiate with the United States - and 
Adams notes that the functioning of the Committee became "somewhat mitigated''. 360 
356 In his concluding remarks, the Chairman of the GAIT Council commented: "Members recognised that the so-called 
voluntary 'VIE' and 'VER' agreements necessarily involve both exporting and importing partners. However, the 
continuing persistent use of these measures by Japan in certain sensitive areas could lead to diversion of trade into 
third markets and erode confidence in the multilateral trading system". in response, the Japanese government defended: 
"With international trade being affected by protectionistic movements, Japan seeks to avert the imposition of unilateral 
import restrictions by importing countries, and ultimately to restore free trade, by implementing minimal VERs and 
VIEs in regard to automobiles, textiles. machine tools, and other products. Such restraints are considered emergency 
and unavoidable measures and are based on the request, agreement, or some form of consent of the importing 
country". See GAIT (Volume II), above n 2, 6, 22. 
357 This is exemplified by recent the June 1995 "Auto Trade Dispute". Japan's refusal to negotiate with the US was based on a 
perception that such an agreement would constitute managed trade and would violate GATT's most-favoured-nation 
obligation. The 28 June 1995 accord saw the United States drop its requirement of strictly quantified US-Japan auto trade, 
and adopt much vaguer requirements - this pacified Japan and permitted an eleventh hour settlement See "Japan Takes 
Moral High Ground", International Herald Tribune, New York, 28 June 1994. See also "Stalled Negotiations Leave 
Clinton Mulling Long List of Targets", Asian Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong, 8 May 1995. See also "US Weighs its 
Tactics in Trade Battle : Coercing Japan May Break Rule", Asian Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong, 23 May 1995. 
358 11 UST 1633. 
359 The Agreement provides for regular consultation for the following purposes : "(]) To consider means of promoting 
economic collaboration between the two countries; (2) Jn particular, to exchange information and views on matters 
which might adversely affect the continued expansion of mutually profitable trade; and (3) To report to the respective 
governments on such discussions in order that consideration may be govern to measures deemed appropriate and 
necessary to eliminate economic conflict in the international policies of the two countries, to provide for a fuller 
measure of economic collaboration and to encourage the low of trade". See above n 358. 
360 See Adams, above n 17, 53. 
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Most commentators agree that the series of bilateral discussions instigated between 
the United States and Japan in 1990 were an outstanding example of the correct approach to 
be taken in sensitively resolving differences between the two nations.361 The talks were 
named the "Structural Impediments Initiative", and were a year-long round of talks aimed at 
identifying the structural obstacles to balanced trade in each other's economies and to explore 
possible corrective measures. 362 In the final Structural Impediments Initiative Agreement, 
concluded in June 1990, Japan agreed to: 
1. Spend Y 430 trillion on public works over I O years; 
2. Encourage personal consumption by narrowing the gap between domestic and foreign prices and 
by streamlining the distribution system; 
3. Stabilise land prices and promote housing construction; and 
4. Reform the transactions that occur within the keiretsu, or corporate groups. 
In return the United States agreed to: 
1. Reduce its budget deficit and increase its domestic saving rate; 
2. Improve the competitiveness of United States industries; and 
3. Strengthen its education system and worker training programmes. 
While Japan has now implemented many of these agreed measures, it seems the 
United States may have reneged. This is unfortunate as the Structural Impediments Initiative 
represents a classic example of the negotiated "mutually beneficial outcome" that is currently 
applauded within negotiation theory.363 The approach has also been welcomed by the 
Japanese. Indeed, in their January 1993 submission to the GAIT Secretariat, the Government 
of Japan stated:364 
Structural consultations are a new type of initiative, undertaken for the purpose of promoting 
dialogue between countries whose economies have grown deeply interdependent. Pursues with a 
view towards achieving a further expansion of free trade. Such consultations should be seen as 
making a positive contribution to the free economy, since their results are applied without 
discrimination. 
It is submitted this overwhelmingly represents the optimal bilateral method for resolving 
cultural barriers to trade. 365 
361 See ST Anwar "The Impact of the Structural Impediments Initiative ("SU") on United States - Japan Trade" (1992) 16:2 
World Competition 53, 62. See also Nariai, above n 14, 60. 
362 See Anwar, above n 361, 58. 
363 This is also known as "principled" or "consensual" negotiation. See, for example, R Fisher, W Ury & B Patten Getting to 
YES : Negotiating to Agreement Without Giving Jn (2 ed, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1991 ). 
364 See GATT, above n 2, 18. 
365 Bergsten provides a key insight into the most appropriate response to cultural trade barriers: "The experiences of the 
telecommunications talks illustrate the metaphor of an onion, in which successive Japanese impediments to trade must 
be removed incrementally, like the layers of an onion". He concludes "the structural and sec/or-specific sources of 
market access problems in Japan require subtle and sophisticated policy responses by the United States (and other 
foreigners)". Bergsten also notes that increased corporate alliances between American and Japanese firms are also now 
reducing the prospects for conflict. See Bergsten, above n 4, 201. 
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VIII ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROPOSALS 
A Achieving the APEC Vision : An Asia-Pacific Dispute Mediation Service 
1 The Asia - Pacific Economic Co-operation 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation ("APEC") was inaugurated in Canberra in 
1989 with the ambition of facilitating large-scale economic co-operation among the nations of 
the Asia-Pacific.366 Essentially APEC is a "super" regional trade area. It can be viewed as an 
attempt to bridge regional integration efforts within East Asia, with those of the West, to 
further harmonise international trade across Asia and the Pacific.367 The challenge of the 
APEC nations was therefore to develop a structure that could accommodate great diversity.368 
As a result the building blocks of APEC were crafted carefully and informally, utilising an 
innovative tripartite structure of businessmen, academics and officials. 369 
In 1992, APEC commissioned an advisory panel, the APEC Eminent Persons Group, 
to chart the organisation's long term future . 370 The Eminent Persons Group presented its 
initial report "A Vision APEC" to the APEC member nations in Seattle, November 1993. This 
report outlined a four-part strategy that was aimed at creating a new Asia-Pacific economic 
community to liberalise trade within the Asia-Pacific region.371 The report was adopted 
366 The Asia-Pacific Region accounts for 40% of the world's population and 50% of it's economic output. This is double the 
size of the EC. This region is currently the most dynamic in the global economy and its geographical members, particularly 
on the Asian side, now represent the world's fastest growing economies. The current members of APEC include: New 
Zealand, Australia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Thailand, China, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Canada, United States, Mexico, and Chile. This covers virtually the entire spectrum of 
economic development. See "US Commitment to APEC : The Eagleberger Speech" US Department of State Dispatch, 
Washington DC, 7 December 1993. See also "APEC Panel to Discuss Economic Issues", Japan Economic Newsletter, 
Tokyo, 17 March 1994. See also "The Centre of Gravity Shifts East" Vancouver Sun, Vancouver, 13 November 1993. 
367 The idea originated from a speech by former Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke in Seoul in January 1989, and a 
studiously vague statement of intent inviting nations to discussions in Canberra. 
368 The Eminent Persons Group ("EPG") themselves stated: "We are of course aware of the difficulties in achieving the 
proposed vision. There are sharp differences in levels of economic development in the region. All of our economies 
are based on market principles but there are considerable differences in the means by which the member economies 
implement these principles. There are significant differences in cultures, languages, legal systems and other key 
features of our societies. We are pursuing the first truly intercontinental economic enterprise". See Eminent Persons 
Group Achieving the APEC Vision: Free and Open Trade in the Asia-Pacific (APEC, Singapore, 1994), 7. 
369 See A Elek "Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)" [1991) Southeast Asian Affairs 33, 35. 
370 The APEC Eminent Persons Group comprises 11 members including businessmen, economists, former government officials 
and political leaders and academic experts. One person was nominated from each of the APEC members at the time. See 
"APEC and World Trade: A Force for Liberalisation", Foreign Affairs, London, 7 June 1994. 
371 The four components of the strategy announced by the APEC Eminent Persons Group in A Vision APEC were: 
(1) Members should declare an ultimate goal of free trade in the Asia-Pacific Region, and set a target date for it by 1996. 
(2) Members should launch an immediate trade facilitation programme including a dispute settlement mechanism. 
(3) APEC should initiate infrastructure enhancement programmes for trade, education, and technical co-operation. 
(4) APEC should begin modest institutional development, including a permanent secretariat and Ministerial Conference. 
See "Highlights of APEC Eminent Persons Group Report", Japan Economic Newswire, Tokyo, 19 November 1993. See 
also "APEC Seen to be Set on Course for Liberalising World Trade" Agence France Presse, Paris, 21 July 1994. 
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unanimously by the APEC member nations and the Eminent Persons Group were asked to 
develop a strategic plan for its implementation.372 In November 1994, the Eminent Persons 
Group presented their second report, "Achieving the APEC Vision", to the second annual 
APEC leaders' summit in Bogor, Indonesia.373 These recommendations were again 
unanimously endorsed and then subsequently actioned via the "Bogor Declaration". It seems 
that APEC has now unequivocally embarked on its voyage into the Pacific Century. 
The Bogor Declaration is ambitious and aims for free and open trade in the Asia-
Pacific by the year 2020.374 Key components of the Declaration include: the implementation 
of a strict timetable for comprehensive trade liberalisation among the member economies; the 
adoption of a concord on investment principles; the creation of an APEC Asia-Pacific Dispute 
Mediation Service; greater harmonisation and mutual recognition among the member nations 
where possible; and increased co-operation on macro-economic and environmental issues. 375 
The importance of the emergence of APEC to New Zealand was underlined by our Prime 
Minister, the Rt Hon Jim Bolger, in June 1995:376 
APEC's significance to New Zealand reaches beyond economic and trade dimensions. It has created 
a unique grouping of diverse economies around the Pacific rim, building cohesion across the Pacific 
and within Asia as well. This interaction makes a vital contribution to sound political and strategic 
relationships. 
2 The Proposed APEC Asia-Pacific Dispute Mediation Service 
The proposed APEC Asia-Pacific Dispute Mediation Service is directly relevant to 
the issue of cultural trade barriers. It seems it is being crafted specifically to handle the types 
of fierce bilateral disputes that have characterised the relationship between the United States 
and the countries of Asia over the past decade. The Eminent Persons Group's proposal for the 
Dispute Mediation Service was outlined in the Bogor Declaration in the following terms: 377 
372 R Noor, the executive director of APEC, stated: "Trade liberalisation is at the heart of APEC. APEC is a door opener 
and a facilitator for industry. APEC provides a forum for personal interaction between the powerful and the less 
powerful, the rich and the economically more modest. In APEC councils, Papua New Guinea has the same voice as the 
United States. China's President rubs shoulders with Singapore's Prime Minister. National antagonists meet on 
neutral territory in an atmosphere of bonhomie .. .! am now suggesting that we need to stretch our conceptual horizon 
and begin to think of APEC as an organisation which can now produce co-operative solutions to our common regional 
problems." See "Finance Minister's Show Up APEC's Uncertain Role", Business Times, New Yori<, 18 March 1994. 
373 See Eminent Persons Group, above n 368. 
374 The APEC leaders launched the implementation of APEC in Bogor last year. We are now in a five year preparatory phase, 
with initial implementation ofliberalisation measures to occur by the year 2000. The aim is to achieve complete free trade 
by 2020, with the more advanced nations achieving this goal by the year 2010. See Eminent Persons Group, above n 368, 
112. 
375 Australian Government "Promoting Integration with the Asia-Pacific Region (APEC)", Internet, Australian Government 
Home Page, Canberra, accessed 18 May 1995. 
376 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (New Zealand Government, Wellington, 
June 1995), 2 
377 See APEC Economic Leaders Declaration of Common Resolve, Bogor, Indonesia, 15 November 1994. 
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Trade and economic disputes among APEC economies have negative implications for the 
implementation of agreed co-operative arrangements as well as for the spirit of co-operation. To 
assist in resolving such disputes and in avoiding their recurrence, we agree to examine the possibility 
of a voluntary dispute mediation service, to supplement the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, 
which should continue to be the primary channel for resolving disputes. 
The Eminent Persons Group have clearly recognised and endorsed the new Uruguay 
Round improvements to the GA TT and have urged all APEC member nations to make full use 
of the WTO dispute settlement procedures for settling their future trade disputes. Yet the 
Group also noted that the WTO procedures only cover those issues directly contemplated by 
the GATT. They reasoned that where issues were beyond the purview of the GATT the 
prospect of unilateral action and retaliation between nations remained a very real threat. 378 
Bearing these two points in mind, they proposed an APEC mediation service that would be 
carefully designed to supplement the WTO system and would ''fill a major gap in the global 
dispute settlement arsenal":319 
APEC could fill a major gap in the global dispute settlement arsenal by offering a mediation process 
that would cover other areas of potential dispute among members, whether or not the organisation 
had adopted rules in those areas. 
The Eminent Persons Group commented that they irutially based their proposal on 
GATT and NAFfA precedents. Yet they explained that the traditional arbitral approach to 
resolving international trade disputes, adopted by both NAFfA and the GATT, would be 
inappropriate for the unique Asia-Pacific context. Arbitration requires the existence of agreed 
standards against which to judge compliance and this in turn requires a significant degree of 
comparability of laws among the participating APEC economies. This condition was not in 
line with the objective realities of the region. 
378 A prime cause of conflict is what Edmond describes as "cognitive" conflict and relates to ones understanding of a situation. 
Different people have different perceptions of similar or even identical events and issues. In one sense this is simply a 
reflection of different life experiences and cultural backgrounds. Another main source of conflict is a difference of values, 
particularly cultural values. As the world community integrates to a greater extent, cultures are being exposed to each 
other and differences inevitably create misunderstanding and friction. International trade is perhaps the arena where this is 
most apparent. For example, in their report, the EPG comment: "There are those who believe that international security 
will be threatened in the future by a clash of civilisations. If that were to happen, our Asia Pacific community would be 
particularly vulnerable because it is home to a number of distinct cultures. A successful evolution of APEC could play 
a major role in preventing any such conflicts". See DP Edmond "Alternative Dispute Resolution : A Conceptual 
Overview" (1988) 22 Kobe Uni LR 1, 6. See also Eminent Persons Group, above n 368, 59. 
379 See Eminent Persons Group, above n 368, 24. This would not interfere with the existing GATT Dispute Settlement Body, 
but would aim to enhance its operation. Probably sitting as a tier below it. It would "provide APEC with a forum for 
action, in which Japan's market access problems could be addressed". See "US Cautious to New Asia Trade Bloc", 
Business Times, New York, 25 July 1994. See also "Australia Undecided on APEC Trade Proposal", The Reuter 
European Business Report, London, 20 July 1994. See also "Now That the Rising Sam is Eclipsing the Rising Sun", 
Business Times, New York, 21 July 1994. See also "APEC Should Promote Open Regionalism : Economist Says", The 
Strait Times, Singapore, 21 June 1994. See also A Elek "Trade Policy Options for the Asia-Pacific Region in the 90's : 
Potential for Open Regionalism" (1992) 82(2) Am Econ R 74. See also GC Hufbauer & JJ Schott Western Hemisphere 
Economic Integration (Institute International Economics, Washington DC, 1994), 72. 
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The Eminent Persons Group alternatively premised their dispute resolution procedure 
on mediation. 380 This signifies a search for a more consensual approach to problem solving, 
and reflects a view that each dispute is different, and that different types of conflict may be 
more suited to different kinds of dispute resolution procedures. Some international disputes 
may be able to be resolved more efficiently by arbitration, others may be better suited to 
resolution by mediation. A greater variety of dispute resolution procedures allows greater 
scope for tailoring the procedure to their individual needs. Yet the Eminent Persons Group 
noted that the APEC Dispute Mediation Serve would, in some cases, also serve to channel 
bilateral trade disputes back into the multilateral system:381 
We believe that the existence of these bilateral disputes, taken in conjunction with the broader 
factors already described, argues strongly for accelerating the process of APEC co-operation. 
Indeed, APEC should make every effort to begin channelling such disputes, to the greatest extent 
possible, into multilateral rather than bilateral, channels. Doing so, in some cases, would improve 
the prospects for resolving the disputes successfully. 
In terms of structure, the Eminent Persons Group envisaged that the Dispute 
Mediation Service would comprise a tribunal of experts selected by mutual consent of the 
parties from a roster of experts held by the APEC Secretariat. This roster would represent the 
''finest expert opinion from both governmental and non-governmental organisations within 
the APEC region". Essentially the disputants would agree to the terms of reference and 
constitution of the tribunal and would then use their Dispute Tribunal for impartial expert 
opinion and advice (requesting reports from their Dispute Tribunal as required).382 Firm time 
deadlines would apply at each stage of the mediation process to avoid the delays that 
characterised the pre-1994 GAIT dispute resolution procedures (and thus pushed many 
nations to attempt bilateral and unilateral solutions). 
The Eminent Persons Group emphasised that the essence of this process was that it 
was completely voluntary and it was designed solely for facilitating mutually beneficial 
solutions. The aim would be to create an "attractive and effective mechanism for helping to 
resolve disputes that proved intractable through normal channels". 383 It would provide an 
appropriate forum for the parties where conventional bilateral channels were proving 
problematic. Essentially the Mediation Service would allow complex disputes to be addressed 
in a principled manner. The Eminent Persons Group then warned that the proposal should be 
380 Edmond, for example, comments : "There is an important relationship between disputes and processes. Not only are 
some disputes are 'better' resolved by one process lhan another, but submitting a particular dispute to the 'wrong' 
process is fraught with problems". See Edmond, above n 378, 23. 
381 See Eminent Persons Group, above n 368, 11. 
382 Other procedural recommendations include: the ability of the parties to "solicit the views of third parties with legitimate 
concerns about the issue in question"; the parties may seek the advice of the APEC Commission on Trade and Investment 
(which has already had discussed the many US-Japan disputes); and panel recommendations would be "binding" on the 
parties only if the parties agreed in advance to be bound by them. See Eminent Persons Group, above n 368, 24. 
383 See Eminent Persons Group, above n 368, 25. 
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given the highest priority as the increasing ferocity of the bilateral trade disputes between the 
United States and Japan was threatening the positive evolution of the APEC community.384 
Following the Eminent Persons Group report, the October 1994 "Business Blueprint 
for APEC" suggested that the proposed Dispute Mediation Service should also be extended to 
include international inter-company disputes within the APEC region.385 However, the status 
of this suggestion is currently unclear. In November 1994, the earlier recommendations of the 
Eminent Persons Group were wholly endorsed and the APEC Asia-Pacific Dispute Mediation 
Service is currently in the process of being established. 
It is submitted that this proposal is highly commendable, if not superb. It will prove 
perfect for addressing cultural trade barrier issues and is exactly in line with the proposals and 
conclusions of a number of commentators in this area.386 
B A New Zealand Approach: Ambassador Taniguchi's Proposal 
In March 1994, Japan's Ambassador to New Zealand, Ambassador Taniguchi, 
advocated a possible complaint management function for the New Zealand-Japan Business 
Council.387 He suggested an "ombudsman system" or "complaint management committee with 
impartial eyeS'' . This would be aimed at creating a new institutional mechanism to deal with 
problems and difficulties arising in pragmatic, day-to-day, business transactions between 
Japan and New Zealand:388 
Let me address the question of complaint management as a possible additional function of your 
Council. The more our mutual activities and closer economic relations develop, the more various 
problems and difficulties in the actual day-to-day business transactions will inevitably arise. I am 
given to understand that at the annual meeting between our Councils, the attendants engage 
384 The EPG also commented : "In making these proposals for an APEC Dispute Mediation Service, we again reflect on the 
evolution of the community of Asia-Pacific economies. Members of such a community should both seek, and respond 
positively to, the views of their peers governing the conduct of economic relations throughout the region. To be sure, ii 
would be premature to consider adoption of binding dispute sel/lement rules and procedures at this stage of APEC. 
But our vision of its future development must surely include effective means to settle the disagreements that will 
inevitably arise, and we believe that this set of proposals should thus rank high on the APEC agenda". See Eminent 
Persons Group, above n 368, 25. 
385 The recommendations included : "APEC should establish dispute sel/lement mechanisms within the APEC framework. 
These mechanisms should be used to settle intergovernmental and inter-company disputes" . See Pacific Business 
Forum Report - A Business Blueprint for APEC : Strategies for Growth and Common Prosperity, 15 October 1994. See 
also M Rudner "Institutional Approaches to Regional Trade & C0--0peration in the Asia-Pacific" (1994) 4 Transnat'l L & 
Cont Probs 159, 173. 
386 Field proposed a "Multilateral Trade Facilitation Committee" that would facilitate communication, negotiation, mutual 
understanding, and c0--0peration. It would remain informal, based on principles of mediation. See Field, above n 34, 193. 
387 Japan-NZ Business Council "Ambassador Suggests Council Should Take-on Complaint Management" [1994) 3 The 
Japan File 3. 
388 See Ambassador Taniguchi Speech at the AGM of the Japan-New Zealand Business Council Wellington, 17 March 
1994. See Appendix of this paper for a copy of Ambassador Taniguchi's speech. 
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themselves in reviewing the macro-economic situation and the overall economic prospects of both 
countries. Even in the corridors outside the plenary, they would be occupied with the general 
economic trend rather than tack.ling individual details in business. 
However, I would suggest to you today that there is an additional area to which the Japan-New 
Zealand Business Council should address itself It should set up a new institutional mechanism to 
deal with these concrete yet micro problems. What about an Ombudsman system or a complaint 
management committee with impartial eyes? Once some sort of framework is established, business 
people could directly submit problems, and suitable information could be exchanged to enable them 
to solve the particular issues. 
The New Zealand-Japan Business Council is a private institution with a membership 
constituting businesses, institutions and individuals engaged in commerce with Japan. 389 The 
Council's objective is to •foster and develop long term economic and trading relations with the 
Japanese". 300 Many eminent business-people are included within the Business Council's 
roughly 160 members.391 In light of his proposal, Ambassador Taniguchi suggested 
membership of the Council should now be extended to include smaller-sized companies such 
as those entering niches within the Japanese market: 392 
With a view to encouraging such systems, it would make sense that your Council extend 
membership to smaller-sized companies which recently started business in new niche markets in 
both countries, this is in addition to the present members which are relatively large scale companies 
with Jong experience. Even if these smaller companies were not necessarily accepted as full regular 
members, there could be an associate membership system or provision for their submissions on an ad 
hoe basis. 
This appears a suggestion worthy of serious consideration. 
It appears that Taniguchi envisaged his "Complaint Management Committee" as 
promoting greater communication and negotiation between Japanese and New Zealand 
companies. It would provide a welcome forum for increasing inter-cultural understanding 
between Japan and New Zealand with a view to building long-term relationships. It could 
also provide useful information and advice. 
389 The Japan-New Zealand Business Council is one of seven New Zealand business councils operating to promote trade 
between New Zealand and foreign countries. It is administered by the New Zealand International Business Council. 
390 See Japan New Zealand Business Council Notes to the Accounts Wellington, 31 December 1993, para 3. 
391 For example the members of the Japan Advisory Board, an institution created by the Japan-New Zealand Business Council, 
include: the Chief Executives of the National Bank, Fletcher Challenge, Sealord Products, Carter Holt Harvey, Nelson 
Pine; the Managing Directors of The Helicopter Line, Comalco New Zealand, Air New Zealand; the Chairmen of the New 
Zealand Dairy Board, New Zealand Kiwifruit Marketing Board. The function of the Japan Advisory Board is to liaise with 
Ministers, Government officials and their advisors on matters relating to the relationship between Japan and New Zealand. 
See "Japan Advisory Board Named" The Japan File, Wellington, I April 1994. 
392 See Taniguchi, above n 388. 
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In principle, a Complaint Management Committee of this nature would act as a 
mediator and facilitator in the event of international trade disputes. 393 A single conciliator 
and interpreter could be provided for minor issues between companies; an informal mediating 
tribunal to discuss more intractable issues. Arbitration would prove too formal and is best left 
to a superior institution or, alternatively, could be organised by the Complaint Management 
Committee in special circumstances if this was what the two disputing companies desired. 
The Committee would remain concerned with the micro practicality of daily business. 
Conceptually, such a Complaint Management Committee would sit at the bottom of a 
dispute resolution pyramid for managing New Zealand's trade relations with Japan. The 
upper tier would constitute the World Trade Organisation and its new Dispute Settlement 
Body. This is able to give a highly authoritative adjudicative ruling on major trade issues (for 
example, New Zealand complained to the GA TT Ministerial Council about access of our beef 
to the Korean market in 1989).394 The middle tiers of this pyramid would constitute normal 
diplomatic channels and the new APEC Asia-Pacific Dispute Mediation Service. These would 
enable both inter-governmental negotiation and mediation, and the mediation of large inter-
company disputes. The lower tier would comprise the smaller and more informal Complaint 
Management Committee. This would provide advice, promote greater understanding of 
cultural differences, and provide a pragmatic forum for the discussion, negotiation and 
mediation of inter-company disputes. 395 
393 In the context of the United States - Japan relations, fundamental differences were apparent in the way each country 
perceived the role oflaw. llus in itself rapidly impeded further negotiations. Japan started from a perspective emphasising 
informal, consensual relations. The United States meanwhile emphasised coercive legal regulation. These approaches 
reflect cultural differences between the legal systems of the two nations. Japan's legal system is based largely on 
conciliation and mediation. While America's legal system is overwhelmingly adversarial. It seems that if New Zealand 
adopted a conciliation or mediation based approach, this would be welcomed by the Japanese - as indicated by 
Ambassador Taniguchi's speech. See S Koyama "Introduction to Conciliation in Japanese Law" (1971) Rev Ind Dr 
Compare 77,81. See also K Mushakoji "The Cultural Premises of Japanese Diplomacy" (1972) 7 Japan Interpreter 3. See 
also E Wilkinson Japan Versus the West : Image and Reality (Penguin Books, London, 1990). See also R Benjamin 
"Images of Conflict Resolution and Social Control : American and Japanese Views Towards the American Adversary 
System" (1975) 19:1 J Conflict Resolution 123, 127. 
394 See Republic of Korea - Restrictions on Imports of Beef: Complaint by New Zealand (1989), GATT Panel Report 
adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/234. 
395 Arbitration requires value judgements as to which party is "wrong". llus would detract from a "win-win" outcome. The 
four primary methods of dispute settlement are: negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication. Conceptually, 
dispute resolution can be seen as a collection of processes falling along a continuum. At one end lie consensual processes, 
at the other end coercive processes: Negotiation is the least coercive and most consensual. The parties resolve disputes 
informally among themselves. Negotiation thus empowers the parties - they control the process, their own participation, 
and the solution. Mediation takes a further step along the continuum. A third party is involved who may articulate the 
rationale behind arguments, deflate unreasonable cla.irns, clarify values, seek joint gains, and otherwise facilitate settlement. 
The mediator may persuade and cajole, but has no power to impose decisions. Arbitration requires the parties to select a 
third party and agree to be bound by his or her decision. The procedure is private and informal but has the advantage of 
enforceability. The decision of the arbitrator may be upheld by a court oflaw. Adjudication utilises the highly formal and 
coercive power of the legal system. The decision of a judge is enforced by the absolute authority of Governrnent. llus 
system has limited flexibility and disempowers the parties. It also accentuates differences, resulting in "win-lose" outcomes. 
See Edmond, above n 378, 14. See also J Bercovitch "International Mediation and Dispute Settlement : Evaluating the 
Conditions for Successful Mediation" (1991) 7 Negotiation J 17, 30. See also B Hall & M Noguchi "Intercultural 
Conflict : A Case Study" (1993) 17 Int'I J Intercultural Relations 399, 415. 
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IX CONCLUSION 
With the success of the GA TI in suppressing tariffs and quotas, non-tariff barriers to 
multilateral trade have emerged into the international arena. In this modem renaissance of 
subtle protectionism, many of these new trade barriers are proving ex1raordinarily complex 
and some even appear intractable. In the most difficult cases such trade restrictions embody 
long-standing cultural beliefs and practices. This has given rise to the concept of a "cultural 
trade barrier": an impediment to international trade stemming, to a significant degree, from 
an entrenched cultural pattern within a society. Cultural trade barriers are inherently 
contumacious and may often remain deeply rooted in national pride and identity. Japan's 
corporate keiretsu, or use of relational contracting, provide two emotive illustrations. To 
attack these practices is akin to assaulting Japanese social values as well. It seems that 
cultural trade barriers are spawning a new dimension of issues within international trade. 
Within this context, Japan has been targeted by the international community due to 
her perceived introspective attitudes and alleged anti-competitive institutional practices. The 
United States has spearheaded a policy of aggressive unilateral action. In America's crusade 
against Japan it seems the voluntary export restraint has become a shield, the voluntary import 
expansion a sword. Credibility has been provided by the frequent use of Super 301. Such 
action is anathema to the GAIT and risks undermining the multilateral stability of the entire 
international trading community. 
Yet the GAIT appears severely restricted in its ability to deal with such seemingly 
intractable cultural differences. As this paper demonstrates, allegations of Japanese indirect 
discrimination tend to descend into a murky "grey area" of causation. Meanwhile, trade 
barriers caused by anti-competitive commercial practices appear to elude GAIT scrutiny 
entirely. Indeed, the current infancy of international competition law seems to thwarts any 
substantive action whatsoever. As a result of such complications, and the frequent gaps and 
grey areas in the GA TI, the existing international tendency towards unilateral and bilateral 
action has been further exaggerated. 
Recently the laws and procedures of public international trade law were infused with 
a new life. The streamlined dispute resolution procedures of the new World Trade 
Organisation have increased global confidence in the GAIT and enhanced its credibility as a 
regulator of international commerce. Meanwhile, the nations of the Asia-Pacific are 
establishing their own Dispute Mediation Service. This would further supplement and fortify 
the GA TI by providing an alternative venue for the resolution of grievances that may not be 
amenable to immediate GA TI adjudication. Both these processes are refining a set of 
international institutions and mechanisms that will be extremely well suited to resolving the 
many issues raised by this paper. 
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Such a trend is deserving of much praise. The optimal strategy for resolving cultural 
differences is based on a patient and consensual approach - where differences are discussed 
and worked through carefully in an atmosphere conducive to mutual co-operation. Archetypes 
include the United States - Japan Structural Impediments Initiative of 1980 and the new 
APEC forum (with its associated Asia-Pacific Dispute Mediation Service). In the New 
Zealand context Japanese Ambassador Taniguchi has suggested a similar model, albeit at a 
micro level. Taniguchi's proposal emulates international trends and appears entirely 
appropriate for facilitating increased understanding between our two nations. 
In conclusion, the further adoption of such archetypes by the global community 
would provide a clear and sensible arrangement for promoting international trade with Japan. 
It would ameliorate the current frictions that are endangering the multilateral trading system. 
It would realise a vision of cultural harmony as we advance towards a new age. 
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Patriotic 
fast-food 
crusade 
By CHRISTOPHER THOMAS 
COCA-COLA, Pepsi, -Kentucky 'Fried Chicke~ _ and McDonald's are being targeted by lndi~ _i 
an nationalists worried by Western cultural con~ 
tamination. Demonstrations are planned againsi 
the foreign invaders in most big cities, the van J. 
guard of a movement that threatens to under! 
mine attempts to attract overseas investment. 
. Bombay is the epicentre of the campaign, whic~ 
has overtones of xenophobia, a legacy of centuries of 
colonial . experience. ,there is scant chance that lnt 
dia's modernisation ·drive will be derailed, but there 
are signs that desperately needed investment in in+ 
frastructure will be lost: ; .. ;. , 
The economic reform · programme launched in 1991 
largely ran . out of steam almost two years ago bel 
cause of resistance · from' the poor, who were becom~ 
ing poorer. I Growing an~i-foreign sentiment coulq 
force further political retreat. The campaign is not 
targeted against investment in roads, telephones, wat 
ter, sewerage systems and electricity, but against 
consumer goods that India does not urgently need. 
The Swadeshi Jagran Manch, a front organisation 
of the Hindu extremist party, the RSS, wants to drive 
Pepsi and Coca-Cola out of India and to block Ameri7 can-owned fast-food outlets. The fact that McDon1 
ald's is responsible for many dead cows adds a reli f 
gious dimension, though its burgers in lnC:.a would be 
beefless. "We do not need global competition," says 
Mr S Gurumurthy, the Manch convenor. "Let there be 
fierce internal competition for the domestic market: 
Why should we globalise our economy to satlsf~ 
Western hunger for new markets?" 
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Such · hostility puts the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP), the main opposition party in parliament, in diffi+ 
culty. It needs · to bow to nationalist sentiment whil~ 
not driving · India in on .itself once more. It is linked; , 
' however, with organisations heading the campaign~ · 
·against Coca-Cola and others, and will have to pay liP. 
service to their ideologies. 
The, manifestations of resurgent patriotism ___: Hin} 
du, Indian and regional - are many. That is particu-
larly true in M·aharashtra state, the richest in th~ 
c·ountry, and its capital, Bombay. In July, the city wa~ ' 
renamed Mumbai, its ancient Marathi name. The stat~ 
government, a combination· of the BJP and ~hiv Sen~ 
(Army of Shivaji), cancelled the construction '!f ~ 
US$2.8 billion power plant by Enron, an Americar, 
company, the biggest foreign investment project in 
India. The newly elected state administration allegeq 
corruption by its Congress party predecessor. Enron 
said that it had already spent US$300 million on th~ 
project and threatened to . sue. Foreign investors ar~ 
trying to decide whether the cancellation was an a~; 
erration or the start of a political trend. Either way, 1~ 
has made potential investors nervous. 
Even within India the extremism of Shiv Sena cre7 
' ates unease. A Delhi-based publisher, Rupa and Co1 
excluded Bombay from the release of Salman Rush+ 
die's new book, The Moor's Last Sigh, because it 
contain_s apparent uncomplimentary allusions to Bal 
1 Thackeray, the leader· of Shiv Sena, _w_hich runs a 
private army of thugs known as Sam1ks. - Th!t 
Times 
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Unit value differentials, tariff and nontariff barrier rates, imports, domestic production, and import 
penetration, 1989· (percentages unless noted otherwise) 
Sector and product category 
Food and beverages 
Wheat 
Soybeans 
Citrus fruits 
Oilseeds other than soybeans 
Leaf tobacco 
Dressed carcasses (beef, 
pork, etc.) and poultry 
Processed meat products 
Dairy products 
Milled rice 
Bread 
Confectionery goods 
Canned or bottled 
vegetables and fruits 
Beer 
Whiskey and brandy 
Tea and roasted coffee 
Sparkling and still beverages 
Tobacco products 
Textiles and light industries 
Cotton yarn 
Knit fabrics 
Clothing 
Plywood 
Paper 
Leather footwear 
Metal products 
Copper ore 
Sheet glass 
Clay refractories 
Ferro alloys 
Lead (incl. regenerated) 
Regenerated aluminum 
Other nonferrous metals 
Chemical products 
Natural gas 
Nitric fertilizers 
Soda ash 
Caustic soda 
Titanium oxide 
Methane derivatives 
Industrial oil and fat 
Polyethylene 
Pharmaceuticals 
Cosmetics, toilet preparations 
Gasoline 
Machinery 
Chemical machinery 
Radio and television sets 
Electric computing equipment 
Communication equipment 
Semiconductor devices 
Medical instruments 
Total for listed products 
Unit 
value 
differentialb 
280 .7 
477 .8 
423 .6 
128. 5 
628 .6 
119 .6 
38.6 
119.8 
228 .6 
737.1 
346 .5 
210.8 
139.2 
143.0 
94 . 1 
718.4 
197 .0 
241.2 
102.5 
39 .6 
8.1 
292.6 
30.7 
22 .1 
13.8 
59.5 
159.2 
63.1 
180.3 
21.6 
23.4 
25.9 
13.5 
128.3 
113 .4 
84 .8 
148.5 
223.7 
39.8 
193.0 
44.7 
33.2 
8.5 
661.6 
229 .0 
140.2 
61.1 
607 .0 
75.8 
236.6 
106.6 
32 .7 
178.2 
Tariff 
ratec 
8.2 
0 .0 
0.0 
14. 1 
0.0 
0 .0 
14.1 
17.9 
17 .6 
0 .0 
6.5 
18 .8 
18.0 
1.7 
5 .9 
11.9 
17 . 1 
,0 .0 
11.0 
5.3 
8 . 1 
10.4 
11 .6 
3.3 
6.4 
0.8 
0 .0 
1 .3 
1 .2 
3 .5 
3 .5 
0 .8 
0.4 
1.4 
0.0 
0 .0 
0 .0 
4 .9 
4.1 
2 .3 
0.8 
5.7 
3.4 
2 .0 
5.5 
0.3 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 1 
0.0 
2 . 1 
4 .7 
Implied 
nontariff 
barrier 
rated 
272.5 
477 .8 
423 .6 
114.4 
628.6 
119 .6 
24.5 
101.9 
211 .0 
737 .1 
340 .0 
192.0 
121 .2 
141.3 
88 .2 
706.5 
179.9 
241.2 
91.5 
34 .3 
0 .0 
282.2 
1 9 .1 
18 .8 
7.4 
58.7 
159.2 
61.8 
179.1 
18.1 
19.9 
25.1 
1 3.1 
126.9 
113.4 
84.8 
148 .5 
218.8 
35 .7 
190.7 
43.9 
27.5 
5 . 1 
659.6 
223.5 
139.9 
61.0 
607.0 
75.8 
236 .5 
106.6 
30.6 
173.5 
Imports 
(billions of 
1989 yen) 
2,000 
164 
185 
79 
83 
3 
622 
31 
83 
2 
1 
58 
93 
24 
291 
19 
27 
237 
1,364 
84 
451 
567 
159 
73 
31 
1197 
261 
37 
9 
178 
9 
174 
530 
1,356 
770 
6 
7 
1 
20 
38 
11 
32 
395 
55 
21 
1,274 
59 
44 
574 
80 
358 
158 
7,191 
Annual 
growth in 
imports, 
1985-89° 
6 .0 
-9.0 
-11 .2 
1 . 1 
-10 . 1 
28.0 
11 .5 
1 6 . 1 
7 .0 
-2 .4 
11 . 7 
10.3 
4.3 
41 . 1 
16.4 
-4.7 
56.1 
21 .9 
20 .9 
-4 .7 
19 .8 
25 .0 
56 . 1 
13 . 7 
18 .6 
1 . 1 
4.6 
24.4 
0 .2 
7 .8 
-5 .3 
18 .0 
-3.4 
-11.8 
-20 .5 
29 .6 
-1.5 
24 .3 
10 .5 
-2 .9 
-3 .4 
10.9 
4.9 
18 .3 
35.6 
12.2 
5.0 
53 .8 
10.6 
10 .2 
14 . 1 
13 .8 
3 .6 
Domestic 
production 
(billions of 
1989 yen) 
19,311 
162 
60 
290 
1 
136 
1,931 
835 
483 
3,040 
1 ,008 
1,226 
379 
2 ,294 
469 
599 
2 ,383 
4,015 
4,983 
337 
1 ,256 
1,351 
995 
874 
170 
2,119 
3 
673 
385 
239 
62 
551 
205 
12 ,088 
78 
40 
47 
192 
106 
144 
74 
1,356 
5,552 
837 
3,663 
15,511 
1,142 
1,022 
6 ,384 
2 ,723 
3 , 515 
724 
54,013 
Import 
penetration1 
9.4 
50 .3 
75.5 
21 .4 
99 .3 
2 .2 
24.4 
3.5 
14.7 
0 .1 
0 . 1 
4 .5 
19 .6 
1 .0 
38.3 
3.1 
1 . 1 
5.6 
21.5 
19 .9 
26.4 
29.6 
13 .7 
7.7 
15 .3 
36 . 1 
98 .9 
5 .2 
2 .3 
42 .6 
12.2 
24 .0 
72 .1 
10.1 
90 .7 
13 .2 
12 .3 
0 .8 
1 5 .6 
20 .8 
1 3 .1 
2 .3 
6 .6 
6 . 1 
0 .6 
7 .6 
4 .9 
4 .1 
8 .2 
2 .9 
9.3 
17 .9 
11 . 7 
a. Source data, at the item and the commodity level , for this and all tables in this study may be obta ined from Hiraki Kawai (see pag e 
iv). Figures for sectors and . totals for all listed products are value-weighted averages of the product categories they contain using import 
values or the sum of import and domestic production values as appropriate . 
b. The unit value differential for 1989 is defined by equation ( 1.2) in the text and interpreted as a rough measure of the tariff equ ivalent 
of tariffs and nontaritt barriers. 
c. Realized ad valorem tariff rate. 
d. Calculated as the unit value differential minus the realized ad valorem tariff rate . 
e. At constant 1985 prices. 
f. Defined as : Import volume/(domestic production + import volume) . No account is taken of exports which are small tor most of these 
products . 
Sourc8s: Unit value differentials are from appendix A . All other data are from the Japanese input -output tables (Management and 
Coordination Agency 1989, and MITI various years) . 
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Calculated welfare effects of removing protection, 19891 (billions of 1989 yen unless noted otherwise 
Sector and product category 
Food end beverages 
Wheat 
Soybeans 
Citrus fruits 
Oilseeds other than soybeans 
leaf tobacco 
Dressed carcasses (beef, 
pork, etc .) and poultry 
Processed meat products 
Dairy products 
Milled rice 
Bread 
Confectionery goods 
Canned or bottled 
vegetables and fruits 
Beer 
Whiskey and brandy 
Tea and roasted coffee 
Sparkling and still beverages 
Tobacco products 
Textiles and light industries 
Cotton yarn 
Knit fabrics 
Clothing 
Plywood 
Foreign paper and Japanese 
paper 
Leather footwear 
Metal products 
Copper ore 
Sheet glass 
Clay refractories 
Ferroalloys 
Lead (incl. regenerated) 
Regenerated aluminum 
Other nonferrous metals 
Chemical products 
Natural gas 
Nitric fertilizers 
Soda ash 
Caustic soda 
Titanium oxide 
Methane derivatives 
Industrial oil and fat 
Polyethylene 
Pharmaceuticals 
Cosmetics, toilet preparations 
Gasoline 
Machinery 
Chemical machinery 
Radio and television sets 
Electric computing equipment 
Communication equipment 
Semiconductor devices 
Medical instruments 
Total for listed products 
Consumer 
surplus gain 
(A+ B + C + D) 
8,058.5 
219 .4 
189.2 
109 .3 
94 .5 
24 .2 
401.2 
132.1 
102.4 
2,235 .6 
364 .0 
758 .8 
225.6 
273 . 1 
272.3 
232.2 
376 .1 
2,047 .7 
1,239.1 
80.4 
85 .9 
878 .9 
94.8 
92 .0 
7 .1 
712.3 
172.8 
192 .0 
91.7 
51 .3 
12.2 
108 .5 
83 .9 
2,139 .0 
459 .7 
8.9 
12.3 
57.0 
16 .3 
76.6 
17.2 
137 .2 
182.9 
500 .6 
670.3 
2,979 .2 
142 .7 
684.0 
620.0 
389.3 
1,046 .6 
96 .6 
15,128.0 
Producer 
surplus loss 
(Al 
5,963.0 
57 .0 
19 .3 
60 .7 
0.3 
20 .8 
208 .9 
110.4 
31.8 
2,233 .0 
363 .0 
714.0 
148 .6 
253 .2 
111 . 1 
192.0 
212.4 
1,226 .6 
461.1 
55.7 
50.9 
221.6 
51 .9 
78 .2 
2.8 
351.3 
0 .5 
175.8 
57.3 
18.5 
10.5 
71 .3 
1 7 .5 
1,168.3 
16 .3 
5.3 
6 .6 
55.4 
8 .6 
37.4 
12 .9 
128 .5 
1 51 .0 
102 . 1 
644.3 
1,695.5 
111. 7 
409 .8 
334.5 
249 .3 
538.3 
51 .9 
9,639.3 
Tariff 
revenue decline 
(Bl 
149.8 
0.0 
0 .0 
9 .8 
0 .0 
0 .0 
77 . 1 
4.7 
12.4 
0.0 
0.1 
9.2 
14. 1 ~ 
0 .4 
16 . 1 
2 .0 
3 .9 
0.0 
112.0 
4 .2 
33 .8 
53 .3 
16;4 
2.3 
1 .8 
10.6 
0 .0 
0 . 5 
0 . 1 
6 . 1 
0 .3 
1.4 
2 .3 
18 .6 
0 .0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.8 
0 .9 
0 . 1 
1.7 
12 .9 
1.1 
1.1 
3 . 5 
0.0 
0.0 
0 .0 
0 .0 
0.1 
3 .3 
294.5 
Quota rents 
eliminated 
(Cl 
953 . 5 
135 .2 
149.7 
34 .6 
71 .4 
1 .7 
96 . 1 
12 .0 
45 .3 
1.8 
0.8 
30.2 
39.7 
13 .7 
124 .7 
14 . 7 
13 .9 
167 .8 
422.2 
19 .6 
0.0 
369.1 
20 .8 
10 .9 
1 .9 
301 .5 
160 . 1 
13 .8 
5 .7 
25.5 
1 .4 
34 .3 
60 .8 
533 . 5 
409.1 
2 .8 
3 .9 
1 .0 
4 .8 
24.0 
3 .4 
6 .3 
18 .0 
46 .4 
13.8 
584 .2 
22.5 
37 .8 
247 .2 
56 .2 
184.8 
35 . 7 
2,795 .0 
Efficiency gain 
(D) 
992 . 1 
2 7 .1 
20 .2 
4 .2 
22 .8 
1.7 
19 . 1 
5 .0 
13.0 
0 .8 
0.6 
5.5 
23.2 
5.9 
20.4 
23.5 
145.9 
653 .2 
243 .8 
0.9 
1 .1 
234.9 
5.7 
0.5 
0.7 
48 .8 
12 .3 
1 .9 
28.6 
1 .2 
0.0 
1 .4 
3.4 
418 .5 
34.4 
0.9 
1 . 7 
0.5 
2.2 
14.4 
0.8 
0.7 
0.9 
351.0 
11 . 1 
696 .0 
8.4 
236.4 
38 .3 
83.8 
323 .4 
5.7 
2,399 . 1 
Consumer 
surplus ratio 
(percentages 
37.8 
67 .5 
77 . 1 
29.6 
113.4 
1 7 .3 
15 .7 
15 .3 
18.1 
73 .5 
36 . 1 
59 . 1 
47.8 
11 .8 
35.9 
37 .6 
15 .6 
48 .2 
19.5 
1 9 . 1 
5 .0 
45 .8 
8 .2 
9 .7 
3 .6 
21.5 
65.6 
27 .0 
23 .2 
12 .3 
1 7 .2 
15 .0 
11.3 
15.9 
54 .2 
19.4 
23 .0 
29.5 
12 .9 
42.1 
20.2 
9 .9 
3.1 
56.2 
18 .2 
17.7 
11 .9 
64.2 
8 .9 
13 .9 
27.1 
10.9 
24 .7 
a. See appendix C for the methodology used to calculate consumer surplus, producer surplus , tar i ff re ve nue . quota ren ts. and efficienc 
gains. Quota rents are computed as the value equivalent of nontariff barriers (i .e ., the difference , expressed in value terms between uni 
value differentials and realized ad valorem tariffs) . The consumer surplus ratio is defined as the consumer surplus gain divided by th 
value of imports plus domestic production before liberalization (from table 1 . 1) . 
Sources: Authors' estimates based on Japanese input -output tables (Management and Coordination Agency 1989 , and MITI, variou years). 
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Some Key Japanese Cultural and Business Practices that Differ from 
Traditional American Practices 
Japanese Practices 
1. Emphasis on process and consensus in 1. 
decision-making . Inability and 
unwillingness of top management to force 
through unpopular decisions. 
2. Style of negotiation: avoidance of direct 2. 
confrontation; reliance in implicit 
agreement vs. explicit contractual 
relationship. 
3. Close working relationship with 3. 
government bureaus. 
4. Permanent employment system . 4. 
Internalization of losses if necessary to 
maintain employment levels ; labor a 
fixed cost; limited mobility in labor 
market. 
lill111tll1!il1Jlli1 5. 
b . ·Emphasis on long-"term market growth vs.; 6. 
s_}:i9rt-term profitability _;.=i 
7. Reliance on long-term debt vs . equity 7. 
financing. Stockholders relatively 
powerless in corporate decison-making. 
Use of short-term debt vs . cash 
settlement. 
8. Emphasis on "managed" economic growth 8. 
and competition. 
9. Emphasis on social responsibilities, 9. 
obligations, and interdependence among 
individuals and firms. 
Contrasting American Behavior 
Emphasis on majority decision-making, 
decisive timing, and strong 
implementation by management. 
Emphasis on . direct confron tation in 
negotiations; reliance on explicit 
contractual arrangements. 
Suspicion and resistance to working with 
government. 
Labor a variable cost . Levels of 
employment adjusted to o ve ra 11 
profitability and growth of firm . Greater 
mobility in labor market. 
Emphasis on open bidding, seeking ou t 
lowest-cost supplier. Greater open 
market for most production goods. 
Requirement of relatively constant 
profitability in each new market venture. 
Reliance on equity capital for corporate 
finance . Stockholders and market 
performance critical factors in corporate 
policy. 
Tradition of free -market competition, 
frequent entry and exit of firms. 
Emphasis on individualism, creative 
competition, mobility. 
10 Traditional absence of strong political 
support for consumer interesls . 
10. Politically potent consumer movement 
protecting consumer interests vis-a-vis 
producers. 
Source: Arthur D. Little, Inc. 
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Products and Services Handled by ITOCHU 
•Textile Group 
Textile Group Planning & Coordinating 
Textile Group Accounting & Control 
Textile Group Information System 
Textile Develoement 
Tokyo Textile Development 
Textile Affiliates & Credit 
Raw Cotton 
Cotton Yarn & Fabrics 
Wool 
\\'ool Yarn 
~Ian-Made Fibre 
Man-Made Fibre & Yam Trade 
Industrial Textiles & Materials 
Industrial Textile & Materials Trade 
Home Furnishing 
Medical & Healthcare 
Textile Trade No.I 
Textile Trade No.2 
Synthetic Filament Yam & Fabrics 
Textile 
Silk 
Apparel No.I 
Apparel No.2 
Apparel No.3 
Apparel No.4 
Apparel Coordination 
Apparel No.5 
Apparel No.6 
Government Supply 
• Machinery, .Aerospace & 
Electronics Group 
Machinery, Aerospace & Electronics Group 
Planning & Coordinating 
Machinery, Aero~ace & Electronics Group 
Accounting & Control 
Machinery International Trade Coordination 
Information Systems Machinery Group 
Media & Entertainment 
Marine 
Power Plant & Electric Machinery 
Metal & Industrial Project 
Chemical Plant 
Machinery & General Project 
Project & Machinery 
Automobile No.l 
Automobile No.2 
Automobile No.3 
Automobile No.4 
Automobile No.5 
Industrial Machinery No. l 
Industrial Machinery No.2 
Industrial Machinery No.3 
Industrial Machinery No.4 
Communications Business 
Communications Equipment 
Mechatronics Systems & Equipment 
Information Systems & Electronics 
Aerospace 
• Basic Industries Group 
Basic Industries Group Planning & 
Coordinatin~ 
Basic Industries Group Accounting & 
Control • 
Metal Group New Business Planning & 
Development 
Metal Group Information System 
Metal New Investment Promotion 
LNG Project 
Chemicals & Plastics Croup Project 
Development 
Cis & China Coordinating of Chemicals & 
Plastics Group 
Iron Ore 
Coal & Coke 
Metal Materials 
Thermal Coal 
Steel Sheet 
Steel for Automobile 
Speciality Steel & Wire Rods 
Steel Plate. Tube & Pipe 
Steel Building & Construction Materials 
Iron & Steel Project 
Osaka Iron & Steel No.1 
Osaka Iron & Steel No.2 
Osaka Iron & Steel No.3 
Iron & Steel International Trade 
Steel Tubular Products International Trade 
Iron & Steel International Business 
Development 
Non-ferrous Metal & Ore 
Precious Metal 
Light Metal No.l 
Light Metal No.2 
Nonferrous & Light Metal Planning & 
Development 
Osaka Non-ferrous & Light Metal 
Petroleum Project 
Nuclear Energy 
Crude Oil 
Gas 
Energy Domestic Marketing 
Petroleum Products Trading No.l 
Petroleum Products Trading No.2 
Organic Chemicals No.l 
Organic Chemicals No.2 
Specialty & Functional Chemicals 
Osaka Chemicals No.l 
Project Planning 
Inorganic Chemical 
PVC & Synthetic Rubber 
Polyoldin 
Functional Plastics 
Osaka Chemicals No.2 
• Foods & General Merchandise Group 
Consumer Industries & Real Estate Group 
Planning & Coordinating 
Consumer Industries & Real Estate Group 
Accounting & Control 
Construction Group Accounting & Control 
Foods & General Merchandise Group 
Planning & Development 
Construction Material & Equipment 
Coordination 
City Project Promotion 
Office for Regional Development 
Overseas Realty & Development 
Real Estare Investment & Development 
Architectural & Civil Engineering 
Department 
Grain & Foodstuff 
Cotfee & Sugar 
Oils & Fats 
Fcedstulf Materials 
Osaka Produce & Provisions 
Meat & Livestock 
Marine Products 
Food Marketing & Distribution No.l 
Food Marketing & Distribution No.2 
Osaka Provisions 
South Sea Log & Products No.l 
Soft Wood 
Pulp Materials 
Woodchip Materials 
Pulp & Paper Products 
General Merchandise No.1 
Ceramics & Minerals 
General Merchandise No.2 
Coostruction & Contracting 
Construction & Development No.l 
Construction & Development No.2 
S_ystem Construction · 
Overseas Construction & Realty 
Aloha Tower Project Development 
Department 
Osaka Construction & Contracting No.l 
Osaka Construction & Contracting No.2 
Osaka Construction Devdopment 
Osaka Realestate Investment & 
Development 
Osaka South Sea-Port Project Development 
Residential Properties Development 
Department 
Urban Redevelopment & Condominium 
Department 
Commercial Building Development 
Department 
Osaka Real Estate Development 
Department 
• Administration Group 
Auditing 
Office of Political & Economic Research 
Secretariat 
Corporate Planning & Administration 
Research 
Corporate Communications 
Trade & Security Policy Coordination 
Preparatory Office for Training Center 
Domestic Administration & Planning 
Investment Banking 
Global Environments 
Overseas Administration & Planning No.l 
Overseas Administration & Planning No.2 
China 
Proiect Development 
New Business Promotion 
New Technology 
Personnel 
Human Resources Development & 
Training 
General Affairs 
Health Administration 
Affiliates Administration 
Business Consulting 
Logistics Management & Traffic 
Logistics Business Development 
General Accounting Control 
Tax 
Legal 
Credit 
Information & Telecommunication 
Systems Planning 
Information Systems Development 
Corporate Planning Information Strategy 
Finance. Insurance & Control Groups 
Planning & Coordinating 
Finance 
Forex & Capital Markets & Insurance 
Control 
Forex & Capital Markets Planning 
Forcx & Capital Markets 
International Finance 
Insurance 
Kansai Business Promooon 
Kansai Project /VJ ot October I. 1992 
JAPANESE AND WESTERN PERSPECTIVES ON.JAPAN'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
Tbeoretical Foundation 
P.i,gjbution Structure 
~Scale Retail Store 
Law (LSRSL) or 
-~Ho 
~System 
<. 
-~vity/Efficicncy 
~litical System 
~/Trading 
'~ 
Recailers'/Wholesalers' 
Orois Margin (RGM/ 
1'GM), Cost of 
Distribution (CD), 
Distributive Gross 
:Margin (DGM) 
·libOlculc/Retail (W /R) 
;)ala Ratio 
fi¥wks in Distribution 
SOuQ.c.£ 
Mainstream Japanese School 
(Logic/J usti fi ea tion) 
Japan is an island nation; it needs 
multi-layered wholesalers and 
retailers; massive trade surplus is 
a result of stronger yen . 
Systematic and regulated by 
tradition; serves the consumers 
and dictated by the infrastructure . 
Protects morn-and-pop stores; 
provides welfare and social 
service. 
Stable and productive system for 
the Japanese companies; helps to 
seek long-term efficiency aiming 
at market share. 
Western distribution/retail 
productivity/efficiency standards 
are irrelevant in Japan, and should 
not be applied at arm's length. 
Societal and political system is 
compatible with the distribution 
system; consumers prefer small 
neighborhood stores . 
Long-term contracts , rebat~s. 
various return policies, sales 
support, pricing policies arc 
necessary. 
In most cases, high RGM, WGM, 
CD, and DGM are due to multi-
layered distribution system; 
justified on the basis of 
convenience . 
High W /R is a result of small 
morn-and-pop businesses; their 
survival, in some S<'.'Ctors, is 
imperative . 
Consumption and eating patterns; 
lesser space available to 
households; infrastructural 
problems. 
Mainstream Western School 
(Conventional Wisdom) 
Japan is no longer a developing 
country; should modernize its 
markets; mqst of the barriers are 
intact and patronized by the 
government and businesses . 
Based on regulatory and market 
distortions; hampers efficiency 
and impedes productivity. 
Blocks/discourages big/ chain 
stores; time-consuming and 
protects local monopolie,; 
Breeds cross-share holdings and 
hinders open competition 
resulting in unfair trade practices 
and distribution networks . 
Japan is an economic power; 
should apply Western standards 
to achieve distribution 
productivity and efficiency. 
Socio-political system is 
politicized and often protects big 
business groups . ,. 
Long-term contracts, rebates, 
various return policies are 
unnecess:ary; hinder efficiency 
standards . 
Higher RGM, WGM. CD, DGM 
are a result of multi-layered 
system . 
High W /R is a result of multitude 
of wholesale operations and small 
retailers . 
Government regulations and 
powerful local R/W and 
corporate lobbying . 
RETAIL/WHOU!SAU! nOOUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY DATA: JAPAN, UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM Art!> ·.:r WEST GERMANY -c -' United United West <" 
Japan States Kingdom Germany .z 
United United West C I. Rrt•illWholtult 0.,tltts Pro.filt 
Japan State< KingJom Germany No. ofR.cuil Stores (thous.nds) 1,620 1,509 242 4-07 "'J<.. 
(1988) (1982) (1984) (1985) V ·, Productivity Criteria ~ ,' No. of Whoksalc Stora (thousands) 437 376 105 119 •'Relative Productivity of Wholesale/Retail 
(1988) (1982) (1984) (1985) Sector (1989) 0.55 0.70 0.97 0.79 ,. Retail Scotts/ 1,000 inhabitants ( 1992) 12.8 6.1 6.0 n.a . . Wholesale Sales/Worker (1985) 448.7 n.a. n.a. 299.8 Whoksalc Storcs/1,000 inhabitants (1992) 3.8 1.8 2.0 n .a. Kl!tail Sales/Worker ( 1985) 72.4 n.a. n.a. 80.3 No. of Rcuikn/1,0001cm. sq. 4,311 . 205 1,406 1,636 ·Wholesale Sales/Company (1985) 4.219.4 n.a . n.a. 2.870.8 ~ (1985) {1982) (1984) ' (1985) . Retail Sales/Company ( 1985) 281.3 n.a. n.a. 465 .8 No. ofWboleulen/1,000lcm sq. 1,093 44 n.a. 505 :::, 
(1985) {1982) (1985) ~ Ratio of Va/1ie Added/Worker (1985) ~ 
Distribution sector 0.76 0.70 n.a . 0.68 :r-No. of Worken/Rcuilen 3.9 7.5 6.8 5.8 (1985) (1982) (1984) (1985) Industry Total "' Manufact11ri11J Sector I. 19 I. 12 n.a. 0.95 ~· No. of Worlc.cn/Wboleulen 9.7 12.6 n.a. 7.0 
(1985) (1982) (1985) Industry Total ('\ 
O.M 0.63 0.71 -( II. Rt11tnl Sloml&.pl,y«Y (o/,,) Distributi(ln Sector n .a. 
Manufacturing Sector 0 1-2 54.0 40.0 n.a . 14.7 
' (1988) (1982) (1988) :~ Gross Profit Martin Ratio (1986) __, 3-9 39.3 40.5 n.a. 62.8 
Wholesale 11.2 19.4 n a. 12.6 f (1988) (1982) (1988) 
Retail 27.1 31.0 n .a. 34.2 10--19 4.3 10.4 n .a. 14.7 ~ (1988) (1982) (1988) lVllE "Distrib11tio11 Martin ~ 20--49 I. 9 6.5 5.7 ' ,Aggregate Margin , Distribution Sales 15.5 25 .3 II . a. n .a. ·-0 n.a . 
1' (1988) (1982) (1988)' (1986) (1986) ::. 50--99 0.3 I. 9 1.2 ··/lggregatc Margin, Retail Sales 57.6 49.7 n . a. n.a . (\ n.a. 
~ {1988) (1982) (1988) (1985) (1985) l~ver 0. 1 0.7 n.a. 0.9 ~ 'Consumer f'rire.1/lndex 
J.8 4.9 (1988) (1982) (1988) Annual Percentage Change (1992) 2.2 3. 1 f Ill. Wltoltult!Rn.il (WIR) Ratio (1985) >.Xi· Cost of Li1•ir1t Index (London= 100, 1991) W/Rin Sales 3.44 0.97 n.a. I.SO 
134 .4 -W/R foe ln-.en~ 1.55 0.85 n.a. 1. 7 Tokyo 
131.1 Osaka IV. Propo,tiM II/ Wholtult S.lts by 
Frankfurt 100.7 ...... Clan of CtUtMttn ('ro) 
London 100 f OthcT Whoksakrs 41.9 24.8 n.a. 16.2 New York 95.7 (1982) (1982) (1986'. r Rc:uikn Mld R.qnir Shops 24.0 28.0 n. a. 30.0 
·~ financial Times, 1991 and 1992b; Goldman, 1992; ltoh, T., 1992; Ito and Maruyama, 1991; -;f-I ( 1982) (1982) (1986) :d'-.. M., 1991; The Economist, 1993b; United States Bureau of the Census. 1992; Umted StatC! f Export 7.4 9.8 n.a . 14.9 ·'..aefiutional Trade Commission, 1990a . (1982) (1982) (1986) ~ rt.a. not available . c., Households and Individ1Ul1 0.6 1.6 n .a. 2.8 
-.( .,v' (1982) (1982) {1986) ~?""1£ : Pt/\~ r (/\ Industrial UKTS, Manufacturing & Mining n.a. 15.0 n.a . 26.8 t (1982) (1986) Otha 26.1 20.8 n .a. 9.2 
(1982) (1982) (1986) 
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Business 
Partners 
' Ministries \ t :' 
anq >-------/ Business 
Agencies ~ : '-,.f Association+ 
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Mass Media.¥\ ______ /"" Universities 
and Trade ,, t \ and 
Journals / '- Research 
GArr: As a Framework Agreement 
(constitution~ functions: 
code of conduct) 
1. The Principle of Sovereignty (i.e. 
Articles II. III. VI, XVI, XVll to XXI 
and :xxvm bis) . 
2. The Principle ofMarlcet Opening (c. g. 
Articles ll. III, XI, XV, XXVTII and 
XXVIIl bis). : 
..J. The Principle ofNon-Discrimination 
(i.e. Articles I, III, Xlll and XVll to 
XX). 
4. The Principle of Undistorted Com-
pcrition (i .e. Articles VI, XVI, XVII 
and XXIII) . 
5. Ruic of Law and Rule-Oriented Dis-
pute Settlement (i .e. Article X, XIII : 
3(b) and XXIII) . 
6. Non-Reciprocal and Preferential 
Tre:ument of Less-Developed 
Countries (i .e. Articles XVlll , 
XXXVI to XXXVlll md the 
wembling cbusc") . 
Centers 
Liberal 
Democratic / 
Party 
FUNCTIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF GATI-LAW 
GArr: & a Trade Org.inization 
(administntive and <fupute 
settlement functions) 
1.'CONnA~(. Pwia {i\riid~ XX\f; 
. plenary assembly). - · · · · 
2. GArr Council 
(Executive Body). -
3. GA.TI Secretariat. 
4. Functional Committees (e.g. permanent 
Committees on Trade and Development. 
Balance of Payments, Tariff Concessions, 
Safeguards, Budget and Administntion) . 
5. Working Parties and Technical Groups (e.g. 
temporary Accession Working Parties and 
Article XXIV Working Putie5, Techni~ 
Group on Non-Tariff Measures) . 
6. Article XXIII Dispute Settlement Pmds, 
Code Panels and Textile5 Surveillance Body. 
7. Committees md Councils under GATT Codes 
md other CATT Agreements (e.g. Textiles 
Committ~. Codes Committee) . 
GATr. As a Forum ofNegorimons 
(legislative fi.mctions) 
1. 1947 Gen~:1. Round on uriff reductions (23 
countries,,"45,00)uriffroocessions) . -
2. 1949 Annecy Round 
(33 countries, 5,000 uriff ronccssions, 
aa:cs.sion negotutiom) . 
3. 1950/51 Torquay Round 
(J.4 countries, 8,700 uriff concessions, 
accession negotutions). 
4. 1955/56 Geneva Round 
(35 councoo, modest uriff reductions, GA TT 
Amendments including Arride XXVIII bis ). 
5. 1960/61 Dillon Round 
(42 countries, 4,400 tariff reduction5; Short-
Term Cotton Arrmg~ent) . 
6. 1964/67 Kennedy Round 
(72 countries, 35 per cent avenge tariff cuts for 
60,00J industri;i.l products, sectoral 
negotiations, Antidumping Code) . 
7. 1973/79 Tokyo Round (85 countries, across-
thc- border tariff reductions by one-third, 12 
Agreements on NTBs, Dispute Settlement 
Undcnunding). 
8. 1986/93 Uruguay Round (more than 120 
countrin, Agr~mmt on MTO integrating 
SOIIK 30 Agreements on CATT, GATT Codes, 
TklPSandG•n). 
Structure of the World Trade Organization 
appoints: 
I 
Director-General 
of the Secretariat 
Ministerial Conference 
General Council 
approves: 
I 
annual budget and 
financial statement 
Council for Trade 
in Goods 
oversees 
implementation 
and operation 
of GATI 1994 
(Annex 1A) 
Council for Trade 
in Services 
oversees 
implementation 
and operation 
of GATS 
(Annex 1 B) 
Committees on: 
Trade and Development 
Trade and Environment 
Balance of Payments 
Restrictions 
Budget, Finance, and 
Administration 
Dispute Settlement 
Body (Annex 2) 
Trade Policy Review 
Body (Annex 3) 
Plurilateral Agreements 
(Annex 4) 
TRIPs Council 
oversees 
implementation 
and operation 
of TRIPs 
agreement 
(Annex 1 C) 
.;~993"°lJRUGUAY ROUND DRAFT AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE MULTILATERAL 
•': · TRADE OR(;ANIZATION (MTO) 
I>l$PUTE SETTLEMENT 
BODY 
.I 
·~OMMrrTEE 
\~'ONTRADB 
IIUDGF.T 
COMMITTEE 
I. MTO OR(;ANIGRAMME 
MINISTFRIAI. C<lNFF.RENCF 
(hirnnial) 
GF.NF.RAI COUNCIL 
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30 days 
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Dispute settlNOent under GATT Article XXIII and HTN agree~ents involving Japan, 1955-92 
A. 
1. 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
5 . 
6 . 
7 . 
8 . 
9 . 
10. 
11. 
12 . 
13 . 
14 . 
15 . 
16 . 
8. 
I. 
2. 
3 . 
Noto: 
Description of case 
Import restriction on thrown 
silk yarn 
Restraints on Imports of 
leather 
Restrictions on Imports of 
leather 
Restraints on Imports of 
manufactured tobacco 
Measures on Imports of 
leather 
Nullification or Impairment of 
benefits and Impediment to the 
attainment of GATT objectives 
Restrictions on imports of 
leather footwear 
Restrictions on Imports of 
certain agricultural products 
Customs duties, taxes and 
labelling practices on 
Imported wines and alcoholic 
beverages 
Restrictions on Imports of 
herring, pollack and surlml 
Trade In semi-conductors 
Tariffs on Imports of 
spruce, pine and fir dimension 
lumber 
Copper trading practices In 
Japan 
Restrictions on imports of 
beef and citrus products 
Restrictions on Imports of beef 
Restrictions on Imports of beef 
Imports of parts and components: 
anti-dumping measures by the EC 
EC refunds of anti-dumping duties 
EC anti-dumping proceed i ngs on 
•udlo-tapes and cassettes 
Complaint by Year 
United States 1977 
United States 1978 
Canada 1979 
United States 1980 
United States 1983 
EEC 1983 
United States 1985 
United States 1986 
EEC 1986 
United States 1986 
EEC 1987 
Canada 1987 
EEC 1987 
United States 1988 
Australia 1988 
New Zealand 1988 
Japan 1988 
Japan 1992 
Japan 1992 
Res ul ts 
Panel re~ . adopted in May 1978 
notesthat part i es arrived at a 
bilateral sol ution . 
Panel ref>Ert, adopted In November 1979, 
notes-liTTatera 1 sett 1 ement and 
withdrawal of complaint . 
~~!.!__reeort, adopted in November 1980, 
notes that parties agreed on a solut i on 
to the matter . 
Panel reeort. adopted In June 1981 , 
notesliiTateral settlement and 
withdraw] of complaint . 
Pa~!l reeort, adopted in May 1984, 
tounothat the Japanese imp~rt 
restrictJons were inconsistent with 
with Article XI. 
Article XXl!l : l consultations. 
Requesttor a GATT ~orking Part y 
not purs ued . 
Panel was set up, but the matter was 
notpursued as part i es agreed on a 
bi lateral solut i on . 
Panel re~ . adopted in March 1988, 
1ounothat Japanese measures for a 
large part of the products concerned were 
inconsistent with Article Xl : l. 
Panel re~, adopted In November 1987, 
founiftliit1apanese taxes on certa i n 
Imported alcohol i c beverages were 
Inconsistent wi th Article 11 1: 2. 
Bi lateral solution was reached, 
arid.Panel, though requested, was 
not establ i shed . 
Panel report, adopted In J une 1988 , 
found that Japanese measures on third-
country mon i t o ring were inconsistent with 
Article XI : I. However, measures to Improve 
access to Its market for US products were 
not found to be discriminatory. 
Penel Re~. adopted in July 1989. 
TouriatliaOapanese tar i ffs on d imension 
lumber were not Inconsistent with 
Article I : I. 
Concil i ation by Director-Genera l under 
1979 understand i ng was requested by both 
parties . Good offices report by Personal 
Representative of Director-General was 
submitted to the Counc 11 In January 1989 . 
Panel was set up, but the compla i nt was 
wTThilrawn In July 1988 following Japan's 
market-opening measures . 
Panel was set up, but the complaint was 
wTThilrawn following Japan's market-
opening measures. 
Article XXlll : 1 consultat i ons 
CoiiipTaTntwaswTTii clrawrir oTTow i n g J a pa n ' s 
market-opening measures . 
Panel reeort, adopted In May 1990, 
coricTuclea-that anti-dumping measures and 
undertakings by firms In EC member states 
were Inconsistent with Article 111 : 2 and 
III :4 and not justified by Article XX(d) . 
Consultations requested under Article 15 : 2 
of the Anti-Dumping Code . 
Conciliat i on requested under Article 15 : 3 
of the Anti-Dumping Code. 
Reference 
B!SD, ZSS/10 
26S/320 
27S/118 
28S/IOO 
31S/94 
l/5479 
l/5826 + 
Add.I 
36S/163 
34S/83 
L/6070 
35S/116 
36S/167 
l /6456 
L/6322/Add . l 
l/6370 
L/6333 & Add. 
L/6355/Add . l 
L / 63 7 0 
37S/132 
AOP/78 
ADP/79 
The llat contain• compl•lnta under both Article XXIII : I (conaultltlons •mong p•rtles concerned) and Article XXlll : 2 (normally 
r1cour11 to p•n1l1) . Sine, GATT contr•ctlng parties •r• obliged to notify requests for Article XXIIII consultations only a1 of 
I M•y 1989, the list m•y not bo compl1t1 . 
"BISD .. S/ .. . " or " .. S/ ... " refers to documents published In the regular Supplements of GATT, ~!.!.~~!:~'!'..!~t, and Rel•!!£! 
Oocum~ . 
~~I£! ' GATT Secret•rl•t . 
,t-\PPcNDl'i.. ltf. 
STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE (sn): FRAMEWORK, PRINCIPAL ITEMS CONCLUDED AND 
AREAS OF FRICTION 
S I I-Frameu,ork ( September 1989) 
U .S . Demands and Agenda 
- Eliminate discriminatory business practices . 
- Encourage more foreign direct investment. 
- Increase public spending for comprehensive infrastructure (homes, roads, bridges and 
airports) . 
- Reduce Keiretsu structure and corporate cross-shareholding. 
- Reform the antimonopoly law. 
- Reform land pricing and land taxation. 
- Reform large Scale Retail Store law (lSRSL) . 
- Provide more public facilities in the areas of 24-hour automatic-teller machines and collect 
telephone calls . 
Japanese Demands and Agendas 
- Reduce Federal budget deficit . 
- Eliminate/reduce export control regulations . 
- Increase research and development spending. 
- Reform tax system. 
- Regulate junk bond market . 
- Increase savings rate . 
- Encourage long-term corporate behavior to increase competitiveness and productivity. 
- Impose gasoline tax. 
- Place restrictions on the supply of credit cards. 
- Adopt the metric system . 
Sil-Principal Items Conc/11ded LJune 1990) 
Japan 
- Increase in public spending and social overhead capital, $2.8 trillion between 1991-2000 (e.g. 
roads, bridges and airports) . 
- Reforms ofbnd pricing by relaxing zoning limits. 
- Reforms of large Scale Retail Score Law (LSRSL). 
- Reforms of distribution system and import procedures. 
- Promise of toughening the anti monopoly law. 
- Reforms of the patent system (from 37 months to 24 months) . 
- Reforms of the Keiretsu system (e .g . anti-competitive practices, group boycotts and 
preferential transactions between two corporations) . 
- New guidelines for the Fair Trade Commission. 
- Greater transparency under official administrative guidance. 
Sil-Principal Items Conc/11ded LJ1111e 1990) 
United States 
- Gr:idual reduction in the Federal budget deficit . 
- Encouragement of private savings . 
- Reduction in the cost of capital to businesses. 
- Increase in the Federal funding for research and development and science and mathematics . 
- Provide non-discriminatory treatment to Japanese investment in the United States. 
- Reduction of export controls for c ocoM. 
Sil-Areas oj r·riction (1992-1996) 
- Japan may not abide by its commitments . 
- U .S. federal deficit may not decrease. 
- U.S.-Japan trade deficit . 
- Changes in the Japanese distribution system may not be implemented . 
- Rice trade may not be resolved . 
- Restructuring of the Keiretsu system may take another ten years . 
- Areas of construction, financial services, semi-conductors , and computers may sabotage the 
Sil. 
- Possible sector-specific imbalances and microeconomic problems . 
Source: U .S. International Trade Commission; Financial Times; The Wall .Street Journal ; The 
Economist. 
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I thank you warmly for your welcome. It is an 
honour for me to join you and address such a 
distinguished gathering this evening. 
Despite my relatively short time in New Zealand, 
I have been trying to travel within this country as 
extensively as possible, almost from North Cape to the 
Bluff, and I have tried to meet as many Kiwis from as 
many walks of life as possible. 
Everyone I have met, without a single exception, 
has always been kind and friendly towards me in the 
discharge of my public duties as ambassador, or in the 
conduct of my private life, be it golf or bungy 
jumping. It is quite disamung to feel so at home! 
Our two countries are far apart from each other, 
separated not only by the Pacific geographically, but 
also culturally, ethically and religiously. 
As people, however, we share many attributes: 
our curiosity about new knowledge, our respect for 
tradition, even our love of gardens and predilection to 
drive on the left. But, perhaps, we share in particular 
a temperament that may be hesitant to show affection, 
but which has a capacity for deep feeling. 
In so saying, I do not pretend to be a sociologist 
nor a psychologist. But as a diplomat, there is one 
thing I am sure of, and that is that I feel more relaxed 
and at home in New Zealand than anywhere else I 
have served in the past. Informality and casualness 
seem to be the key in New Zealand, and I, for one who 
have had to indulge in diplomatic platitudes and 
cliches whenever occasions so dictate, am second in 
none in appreciation of the Kiwi common touch. 
Be that as it may, I look around the audience this 
evening. You are all so elegantly dressed in business 
suits. I'm glad I recently read a newspaper article 
about Speaker Peter Tapsell of Parliament, and came 
here today at least with my jacket on. 
Now gentlemen, in a more serious vein, I should 
like to make a few remarks on how I view our 
economic and trade relations with New Zealand, and, 
time permitting, to briefly touch on the present 
economic state of affairs with the United States. I am 
sure you are as concerned from your professional 
viewpoint, as we are, since these affairs are bound to 
affect our otherwise cordial bilateral trade relations. 
In the wake of the successful conclusion of the 
GATT Uruguay Round, Japan and New Zealand, as 
trading nations, should have ample room before us for 
further expansion of our bilateral trade relations. 
After all, these have been in the past, and will be in 
the future, the bedrock of relations between our two 
countries. There is a win-win prospect for both of us, 
give an innovative and entrepreneurial approach. We 
have everything to gain from closer business, 
commercial and even financial links with each other. 
With that in mind, and based on my own findings 
as a result of various contacts with both Japanese and 
New Zealanders who engage in Japan-related 
business activities within New Zealand, I have several 
personal and concrete suggestions to make to this 
Council. It will be by no means a display of high 
sounding abstract philosophy, but a very practicable 
suggestion of a day-to-day nature. In point of fact, Mr 
Mclaughlan has asked me in his courteous letter if I 
would care to speak on current economic and trade 
issues impacting on Japan/New Zealand trade. 
However, I do not intend to bore you with 
cumbersome statistics and figures which you 
yourselves are already familiar with. Instead of trying 
to carry coals to Newcastle, I thought I would rather 
say a few words about the role of your Council as seen 
by an outside amateur like me. 
Firstly, let me address the question of complaint 
management as a possible additional function of your 
Council. The more our mutual activities and closer 
economic relations develop, the more various 
problems and difficulties in the actual day-to-day 
business transactions will inevitably arise. These are 
not necessarily limited to the trade relationship alone. 
As you know, for instance, there are already all kind 
of problems with taxation, investment, distribution, 
accounting, legal system, real estate transactions, 
labour relations, working visas and residency. 
I am given to understand that at the annual 
meeting between our Councils, the attendants engage 
themselves in reviewing the macro economic situation 
and the overall economic prospects of both countries. 
Even in the corridors outside the plenary, they would 
be occupied with the general economic trend rather 
than tackling individual details in business. 
However, 1 would suggest to you today that there 
is an additional area to which the Japan-New Zealand 
Business Council should address itself. It should set 
up a new institutional mechanism to deal with these 
concrete yet micro problems. What about an 
Ombudsman system or a complaint management 
committee with impartial eyes? Once some sort of 
framework is established, business people could 
directly submit problems, and suitable information 
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could be exchanged to enable them to solve the 
particular issues. 
Secondly, with a view to encouraging such 
systems, it would make sense that your Council 
extend membership to smaller-sized companies which 
recently started business in new niche markets in both 
countries, in addition to the present members which 
are relatively large scale companies with long 
experience. Even if these smaller companies were not 
necessarily accepted as full regular members, there 
could be an associate membership system or provision 
for their submissions on an ad hoe basis. 
Thirdly, the need for closer co-ordination 
between government and the business sector. I know 
well that since the 1980's leaving business in the 
hands of the private sector has been the cornerstone of 
New Zealand economic reform. Likewise in Japan at 
the time, the Hosokawa administration is making 
deregulation a main pillar of its economic policy. 
However, I do not believe this automatically means 
that Government no longer has a role to play. Both 
Government and business, ought to know what is 
going on outside their respective areas of 
responsibility. On the contrary, I believe there are 
areas left in which Government should be involved to 
promote closer relations with the business sector, for 
example, harmonisation of the tax system, quarantine, 
and standards, etc. I believe there is reason to deepen 
the co-ordinative and co-operative relations. 
So much for our bilateral economic relations. 
now wish to move onto our economic relations in a 
wider context. 
As world wide traders, our two countries have a 
strong commercial interest in the development of 
multilateral economic relations. 
In particular, New Zealand is now perceivmg 
itself as an Asia-Pacific country and rapidly 
expanding its economic relationship with East Asia, 
the Japan-New Zealand experience which your 
Council has achieved so far, will be an effective tool 
for developing new co-operative business in 
Asia/Pacific countries from now into the 21st century. 
I hope that your Council will play a leading role in 
breaking into the new stage of business relationships 
in the Asia-Pacific. As a prerequisite, we hope and 
believe that stability and prosperity based on a free 
and unhindered market system will prevail in the 
months to come throughout the Asia and Pacific 
region in which we live. 
As a further step beyond the economic 
relationship, we should broaden our co-operative 
relationship into politics, culture, education, etc, as 
well. From that standpoint, there are many other 
prospective areas I wish I could touch on today. Alas, 
however, due to limited time available, I must leave 
them for another opportunity. 
But I would like to talk a little about Japan-US 
relations which I am sure you are all greatly interested 
in. Before proceeding, I should point out that what I 
am about to tell you is largely my own personal 
interpretation of events based on reports I have been 
receiving from Tokyo on the current impasse. 
Now, as you all know, the meeting between 
Prime Minister Hosokawa and President Clinton in 
Washington in February failed to reach an agreement. 
Some say that the situation between both countries is 
similar to that which prevailed immediately prior to 
World War 2. In addition, learning the decision last 
week by president Clinton to reinstate the Super 301 
clause to allow unilateral sanctions against Japan, 
some reports even say that a trade war between the 
two countries has begun. 
These are all sweeping assumptions by the mass 
media and bound to lead to a gross misunderstanding. 
For your convenience, let me define the scope of 
my talk. Firstly I would like to talk as briefly as 
possible about what has happened in Washington, 
what was agreed and what was not agreed by the two 
leaders. Secondly, I will put forward our judgement 
of the current situation, followed by our expectations 
and intentions in the near future. 
First, what happened at the Framework Talks last 
month. No doubt, it is a matter of great 
disappointment and regret to my Government, and 
perhaps to the United States as well, that we were 
unable to reach an agreement in Washington. 
In retrospect, there were three main pillars of 
vital concern on the table. Firstly, macro-economies; 
secondly, the so-called sectorial "basket", and thirdly, 
global co-operation. Unfortunately the second issue, 
(the sectorial basket), had loomed too large at the 
sacrifice of two other equally, if not more, important 
issues in the eyes of the world community. 
Actually, the first pillar of the three, (macro-
economies), is the most important. In July last year, 
both Governments agreed to co-ordinate their macro-
economic policy in the in the medium term. The 
Japanese Government pledged to make its market 
more open and to encourage domestic market-
oriented economic growth in order to meaningfully 
reduce the current account surplus. In the same way, 
the US Government promised reduction of its 
financial deficit, promoting saving rates and 
strengthening international competitiveness. 
In line with her pledge, the Japanese Government 
introduced the Comprehensive Package of Economic 
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Measures last February. lhis Package, presumably 
not up to US expectations in their view, nevertheless 
represents the largest economic stimulus package ever 
undertaken with a total value of ¥15 trillion (NZ$2SO 
billion) including approximately ¥6 trillion (NZ$90 
billion) in income tax reduction. 
Regarding the third pillar, (global policy co-
operation), leaders of both Governments reached 
complete agreement in Washington on such specific 
areas as assisting the population and AIDS problems 
of developing countries, co-operation with forest 
projects in the Asia region, and additional financing of 
environmental projects in Central and Eastern Europe. 
You can see therefore, that two of the three pillars 
were going well. Only on the sectorial issue, notably 
Government procedure, insurance and automobiles, 
could both sides not reach agreement. In our view, 
the heart of the problem is that the US Government is 
determined to establish concrete numerical targets as 
the "objective criteria" in dealing with the sectorial 
issue. 
To the Americans it seems the logical corollary of 
the objective criteria are numerical targets. In our 
view, accepting numerical targets as "objective 
criteria' is not only inconsistent with the main 
economic policy of the Hosokawa Government, which 
is shooting for deregulation and an open society, but 
also endangers the world free trade system as 
succumbing to a managed trade system. 
I am sure that New Zealanders, as strong 
proponents of the market economy and free trade 
system, will understand this point. 
So much for what has happened in Washington, I 
now come to my second point, namely, how Japan 
judges the current situation in the wake of the failure. 
We are of a very strong view that today's 
Japan/US relationship is not based exclusively on 
economics and trade. A deep-rooted interdependence 
exists in the areas of politics and security as well. 
Both countries are strongly committed to stability 
in the total Japan/US relationship. Furthermore, both 
countries, as the two largest economies in the world, 
should be aware of their special responsibility for the 
prosperity of the world economy as a whole. 
Accordingly, we are at one in our recognition 
that the failure of agreement on the economic front 
would not, and should not, undermine the overall 
relationship between the two countries. In this sense, 
we must not lose sight by focusing only on the 
economic sphere. 
Keeping this in mind, what is it going to be like, 
and what does Japan intend to do? My third point. 
lhis is a "period for reflection' for both countries. 
The Government of Japan reaffirms its intention to 
advance voluntary measures towards further market 
opening, deregulation, promotion of import and 
investment, competitive policy, government 
procurement reform, etc., as much as possible. 
Also, along with the previously mentioned ¥15 
trillion economic package, we expect expansion of 
imports from not only the US, but the EU, and the 
Asia/Pacific including, of course New Zealand. 
At this juncture, I must emphasise one important 
point. As we are accelerating on these voluntary 
measures, all the more we are unable to let one-sided 
accusations nor unilateral sanctionary action remain 
unchallenged. They are not productive or 
constructive, certainly not conducive to a solution. 
The US seems to be of the view that Japan is not 
complying with her commitment, (her pledge to 
meaningfully reduce the surplus to the current 
balance and substantial increase US and global 
importation of goods and services), while the US 
adheres to the promised reduction of her financial 
deficit. The US has also made a one-sided decision for 
the reinstatement of the Super 101, which in our view 
is not in accordance with the GA TT Uruguay Round. 
The unfortunate thing is that from the beginning 
there was a discrepancy in perceptions as to the root 
cause of the trade imbalance and the appropriate 
solution for it. The US insists on a numerical target 
because they regard the sectorial agreement as a direct 
measure to improve overall trade imbalance. 
On the other hand, however, we believe that the 
main reason for trade imbalance stems from macro-
economic factors. For example, Japan is a high saving 
country in contrast to the US which is an 
overspending country. And Japan is in deep recession 
right now while the US is on the way to recovery. 
Anyway, the difference in perception is the greatest 
cause underlying our disagreement. 
Gentlemen, in conclusion, I would say that we, 
Japan and the US, are at the threshold of working in a 
co-ordinated fashion to a solution. 
[Pays tribute to previous chainnan] 
Once again, many thanks for inviting me to join 
you this evening and may I conclude by expressing 
my hopes and beliefs that the friendship which today 
binds Japanese and New Zealand together will endure 
and be strengthened. 
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